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THE SHAPING OF TURKISH MIGRATION POLICY:  
COMPETING INFLUENCES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND DOMESTIC AUTHORITIES  
 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis studies Turkish migration policies as an outcome of the interactions between the 
European Union, international organisations (UNHCR, IOM) and domestic migration 
governance. Counterbalancing a tendency in the literature to focus on external influences and 
specifically the EU’s power over candidate countries, Turkish migration policy is seen to 
result from interrelationships between external and domestic actors that vary according to 
context of policy type, time and relative balance of power between the actors. Changes in 
international relations, Turkey’s relationship with the EU, and internal to migration 
governance, can relativize the power asymmetry between EU and Turkey, leading to 
opportunities for domestic authorities to exert influence. 
 
The study has a comparative design across four cases of migration policy decision-making 
and by actor-type. This allows investigation of interrelations and an actor’s efforts to exert 
influence relative to the others. A prominent policy is examined for each of the main four 
fields of Turkish migration policy: legislative reform (Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection), irregular migration (EU-Turkey readmission agreement), regular migration 
(adoption of the EU’s visa lists) and asylum (removal of geographical limitation clause from 
the 1951 Refugee Convention). Document analysis is supplemented by original data from 
twenty-one semi-structured interviews, conducted with experts from Turkish Ministries, 
international organisations and the EU Commission. 
 
The main finding is that the degree of external influence over Turkish migration policy is 
contextually shaped, by time, the substance of a specific policy field, and most notably by 
the degree to which a policy field is politicised. EU influence is strongest when a policy field 
is politicised and driven by ‘conditionality’. International organisations are less influential 
actors but present in shaping more technocratic and less politicised policies through ‘social 
policy learning’. Turkish authorities exert clear agency and use international negotiations to 
gain leverage to advance domestic migration interests. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In March 2016, against the backdrop of the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey and the EU 
published a joint statement, endorsing their commitment to the Joint Action Plan on 
migration activated in November 2015, to eliminate the irregular transit route through Turkey 
to Europe (European Commission, 2015; European Council, 2016). The parties agreed upon 
a return and resettlement scheme in return for the acceleration of the visa liberalisation 
process for Turkey, re-opening of some accession negotiation chapters and additional 
financial support (European Council, 2016). Within the scope of this agreement, migration 
policy served as a bargaining tool for Turkey in its relationship with the EU, provided the 
country leverage to negotiate cooperation in other policy areas, and even restored its 
accession prospects. This plan is the most recent manifestation of the EU’s attempts to 
influence Turkish migration policies. However, it is not the product of a new policy 
negotiation framework. Although the backdrop was the extreme conditions of the Syrian 
refugee crisis, which exacerbated the need for cooperation, it is not an exceptional policy 
outcome. On the contrary, it is a continuation of the relationship between the EU and Turkey 
on migration policy. It is built upon a history of negotiations, interactions and exchanges 
between the parties, accelerated in the last decade. The main themes of the current 
relationship have been re-appearing as demands, concerns and incentives since the mid-
2000s, as the parties have been establishing an inter-relation of power on migration policy.  
In this thesis, I sketch the trajectory of EU-Turkey relations on migration policy by analysing 
the decade preceding these recent developments. I argue these relations did not develop as a 
one directional EU influence over Turkey. The EU is an influential actor on Turkish 
migration policies but a one way flow of influence is often overstated in the literature 
(Boswell, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Jandl, 2007; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2009; Börzel, 2011; Langbein & Börzel, 2013; Langbein, 2014). In reality, 
Turkish policy makers are active negotiators, seeking leverage from contextual developments 
and aiming to further their benefits from policy reform. For instance, because of its status as 
a transit country for irregular migrants from the Middle East and Africa, the country became 
a crucial EU partner for management of flows emerging from the Arab Spring and Syrian 
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refugee crisis. These developments empowered Turkey to exert some influence over the EU 
and seek further concessions for a policy change. In addition to the international context, the 
changing structure of the country’s relationship with the EU, in an era when the power of 
accession conditionality was at its lowest, also empowers Turkey to negotiate on new terms, 
concessions and incentives. Thus, in Turkey’s migration policies, Turkish influence over the 
EU is also a significant flow to consider, for a complete narrative of policy developments. In 
addition to this two way flow between the EU and Turkey, there is also a third flow of 
international organisations on migration. These organisations, mainly the UNHCR and the 
IOM, have gained relevance in Turkey as a result of their presence in policy implementation 
and more recently in policy making processes. The ways they influence the policy 
preferences of the EU and Turkey are different from two way flows based on leverage. Their 
normative claims prevail in their attempts to influence Turkish migration policies. Their 
inclusion does not only add a third level of actor to my research, it also introduces different 
ways of facilitating change and another form of external influence.  
1.1 Aims and Scope 
I retain a three way structure throughout this study, presuming interactions between the EU, 
international organisations and Turkish policy makers play an important role in the formation 
of Turkish migration policies. I aim to show the multiple directions Turkey, EU and the 
international organisations influence each other, and the way they shape the country’s 
migration policies. The influence of each actor should vary according to context, 
characteristics of specific issue of concern and time. The variances between these actor 
influences are discussed not only with respect to each other in overall migration policy area, 
but also in relation to different circumstances established under different policy fields. For 
this contextual evaluation, I divide overall Turkish migration policy into four sub-fields: 
legislative reform, irregular migration, regular migration, and asylum. These sub-fields 
reflect the way Turkish policy makers and EU Commission officials divide migration policy 
area in official documents and to a large extent in their staff arrangements. For a policy 
oriented research, categorisation should parallel the policy elite. This division enables the 
establishment of a research structure, parallel to the policy documents, and the policy elite’s 
response to migration policy area. Moreover, the literature on Turkish migration uses such a 
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division, with different priorities relating to each area (Kirişci, 2003; Içduygu, 2005; 2006). 
For instance, while policy makers respond to regular migration by prioritizing economic 
concerns, security prevails for irregular migration. Together, these policy fields illustrate 
Turkey’s policy responses to migration comprehensively. 
The main research question is: 
“How does the changing constellation of the relations between the EU, international 
organisations and Turkey shape Turkish migration policies? How does it vary across 
the policy fields and over time?”  
There are three main dimensions to this research question: the constellation of actor relations; 
policy fields and time. By the first dimension, the constellation of actor relations, I aim to 
establish the inter-relationships between the actors and the ways they influence each other’s 
policy preferences on migration. Here, inter-relationship is a key word. There is not a one 
way influence of the EU, or any other external actor, over Turkish policy makers. Instead, 
Turkish policy makers are active negotiators, who seek leverage against external actors, to 
obtain more favourable deals for policy change. There is a complex structure of relationships 
where interactions between all three levels of actors contribute to policy outcomes. I analyse 
this complex structure by mapping relationships between actors, presenting possible alliances 
or divisions among them and identifying instances when they are empowered or 
disempowered through a relationship. With this analysis, I establish the relative influence of 
each actor on Turkish migration policy. An actor-based study is important for revealing inter-
relationships between actors with a balanced approach showing the influence of each actor 
over another.  
The policy fields dimension adds a contextual element to my research. For each policy field, 
I identify and explain characteristics that influence the level of external involvement and the 
types of domestic reactions. Thus, I analyse the qualities of each policy field, and how it led 
to policy development and the current outcome. In conducting such an analysis, from each 
sub-field of migration, I chose the most predominant policy instruments as case studies. 
These are: the Law on Foreigners and International Protection; the EU-Turkey readmission 
4 
 
agreement; Turkish visa policy; and the removal of the geographical limitation from the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Turkey and the EU have been negotiating the 
terms of these policy elements for at least a decade and international organisations have a 
stake in most of them. Thus, these policy instruments fit the purposes of my research, seeking 
to present the evolution of each migration policy field, through the lens of the relationships 
between Turkey, EU and international organisations. Their main purpose is to add context to 
the study, by showing how the inter-play between the actors evolve under different 
circumstances. These case studies establish the role of the policy context on each actor’s 
influence and identify circumstances when external influences succeed or fail.  
Regarding the time dimension, the focus is on the policy making processes, rather than solely 
on policy outcomes. Such a focus is due to the duration of migration policy making in Turkey, 
and the fluctuation in power distribution among actors during the process. I seek to explain 
changes in actor relations in different phases of policy making, with a process-oriented 
approach. Thus, time adds another contextual dimension to my research along with the policy 
fields. Time is an important dimension of a narrative on Turkish migration policy. The case 
studies that I chose for the purposes of this study consist of policy elements, which the 
process of policy change has been continuing since the late 1990s. The long duration of 
migration policy processes is mainly due to their lower significance in domestic politics and 
the involvement of the EU, which in some policy areas, transforms policy reform into long 
negotiations. This is an important contextual dimension for the purposes of this research, as 
the changes in the international context alters the leverage of each actor. My inclusion of the 
time dimension in this study is important for elaborating how relationships between the actors 
evolve and develop over time.  
1.2 Chapter Structure 
In upcoming chapters, I aim to maintain a balanced discussion of each actor and policy field. 
I maintain a three-level structure: EU; international; and domestic, throughout the thesis. This 
order, beginning each chapter with a section on the EU, is an informed decision. In this study 
my main aim is to challenge a tendency in the literature to analyse policy change in third 
countries from an EU perspective with an EU “influence-over” conceptualisation. Thus, it is 
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fitting to this research to initially uncover the EU dimension of the literature and the case 
studies, and then to present international and domestic sources of influence that evolve 
independently or as a response to the actions of the EU.  
In Chapter 2, I initially address the literature and theoretical approaches of EU external 
influences. I mainly frame my research around this literature, and also aim to contribute to 
this literature by questioning its one-way EU influence premise through the example of 
Turkish migration policy. The literature establishes its main theoretical approaches on two 
main types of countries, which are adopted as case studies. The premise of the studies is 
either built on Central and Eastern European countries, with accession prospects (Lavenex, 
2002; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Jandl, 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; 
Börzel, 2011; Langbein, 2014); or countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, 
mostly in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework, who establish their 
premises independent of accession prospect (Smith, 2005; Kelley, 2006; Lavenex, 2008; 
Baracani, 2009). Inclusion of both types of literature and theoretical approaches is important 
to provide a background of all the elements of Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Turkey, as 
a country still maintaining its relationship with the EU in a framework of accession 
negotiations, though with marginal prospects of accession, contains elements from both types 
of literature. Thus, in the EU-level section of this chapter, I combine these two types of 
literature and present the themes and theoretical approaches relevant to the Turkish case. 
First, I explicate the suitability of research on Europeanisation to the Turkish case, and 
present its usage with examples from the literature on Turkey (Diez, Agnantopoulos, & 
Kaliber, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Içduygu, 2007; Börzel, 2012; Kaliber, 2012; Macmillan, 2012; 
Nas, 2012; Oğuzlu, 2012; Terzi, 2012; Aydın & Kirişci, 2013). Then, I justify the selection 
of institutionalist theoretical approaches, by presenting how the EU-Turkey relationship on 
migration policy has elements that suit an evaluation on an institutionalist basis. From 
institutional theories, I focus on rational choice and sociological institutionalism. I mainly 
concentrate on their approach to EU external influence, more specifically on mechanisms the 
EU uses to influence policy in third countries. I analyse and explain the power of 
conditionality, socialisation and legitimisation and the circumstances when they have an 
impact on third countries. In the second part of this chapter, on the international level, I make 
a similar exploration of influence mechanisms that are available to international 
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organisations. I evaluate the capabilities of the international migration regime, explain the 
absence of conditionality, and the ways the international organisations facilitate socialisation 
and legitimisation (Smith, 2003; Martin, 2005; Kotzian, 2007; Koslowski, 2011; Hansen, 
2011; Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2011; Piedrafita, 2012). In these two sections, I frame the 
prevailing influence mechanisms that the EU and international organisations are capable of 
using and their relative impact with respect to context. Such framing enables me to 
systematically seek these pre-identified mechanisms within the case studies, and present 
characteristics of the Turkish case, distinctive from the overall findings of the institutionalist 
literature. In the final part of this chapter, I elaborate the literature on state capabilities on 
migration, to examine the possible domestic impact of external actors, given the expected 
facilitators or limits to state capacities on migration policy (Freeman, 1995; Brubaker, 1995; 
Sassen, 1996; Abadan-Unat, 1997; Joppke, 1998; Guiraudon, 2001; Hollifield, 1998; Joppke, 
2005; Boswell, 2007; Hampshire, 2013). This literature is mainly based on countries of 
immigration in Europe or North America which is not expected to be fully applicable to 
Turkey. However, the literature is weak in explaining the domestic actors involved in 
migration policy in transition countries, such as Turkey. Thus, I adopt this literature to 
systematically seek domestic stakeholders on migration policy in Turkey and expect to 
contribute it by presenting problems of generalisation for a new immigration country. 
In Chapter 3, I present my research design based on a case study analysis, and my data 
collection methods consisting of document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The 
selection of the research design and data collection methods are in line with the themes of 
my research question. I chose a case study design, selecting the above-introduced policy 
elements as cases, to correspond to its policy dimension, contextualising the research by 
analysing how the inter-play between actors occurs under different circumstances. I divide 
each case study into three levels, where I seek specific actor influence for a given policy field 
in the corresponding section, to meet with the actor dimension of my research question. I also 
chose my main data collection method, semi-structured interviews in accordance with my 
focus on actor inter-relations and my research design consisting of in-depth case study 
analyses. With semi-structured interviews, I explicate the background story on each policy 
field from the perspectives of key actors, and thus better understand the many directional 
influence flows during the policy processes. These are hidden in the policy documents that 
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only provide information about policy outcomes. In this chapter, I also provide the details of 
offices that I have interviewed, methods that I have used to reach experts and the content of 
interviews, along with hardships faced in the field, enabling future researchers to replicate a 
similar study. I had twenty one interviews with key policy officials from Turkey, EU and 
international organisations, whose identities I keep anonymous, responding to their demands 
and also to ethical review standards imposed by the University of Sussex. I chose the 
interviews on positional criteria and mostly contacted them via e-mail. The main problems 
that I have faced in the field were due to scheduling problems and some political 
developments which led to cancellations of meetings. The interviewees responded well to 
my questions which were flexible and in the form of framing devices. Thus, in some cases, 
they were interpreted less substantially than I had anticipated. Despite these handicaps, in the 
end, I obtained rich data on actor policy preferences and priorities, and the influence 
mechanisms they are capable or willing to implement to fulfil those preferences and 
priorities. The interview data is also satisfactory to establish inter-relations between the actors 
and reveal the dynamics of these relations in the following case study chapters. 
In Chapter 4, I present the historical context and establish a brief background of migration in 
Turkey. In this chapter, my main aim is to introduce the policy fields, where reform is 
prioritised by the EU, the international organisations and Turkish policy makers and present 
each actors’ preferred policy elements for undertaking reform. The main function of such a 
presentation is to provide the reader with necessary contextual information to situate the 
analyses in the following four case studies on policy elements, to the broader framework of 
migration in Turkey. In the first part of this chapter, I identify the contextual developments 
which have generated pressures for a policy response by at least one of the three levels of 
actors. I initially address the way policy makers in Turkey and in the EU perceive and 
categorise the migration policy area, as regular migration, irregular migration and asylum 
and I justify my choice to use this categorisation in this chapter as well as in the upcoming 
case study chapters. 
Then, I present the policy discussions on migration by harmonising it with topical data. I 
show the decreasing importance of regular migration for all three levels of actors together 
with the increasing significance of irregular migration and asylum movements to and through 
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Turkey. In the second part of this chapter, I list the main domestic and external actors that 
have an influence on migration policy in Turkey. I present their domains of interest and the 
logic of their action to explain their capabilities and limitations on migration policy, with 
respect to their overall presence in Turkey. I conclude this chapter by linking the context to 
the capabilities and policy positions of actors, and introducing their preferred policy 
elements. I conclude by presenting, Turkish need for an all-encompassing legislation for 
migration; claims of sovereignty for visa policies; Turkey’s status as a transit country for the 
EU; and the incompatibility of Turkey’s policy response to asylum with the country’s asylum 
reality. With these contextual conclusions, I construct a basis for the case study chapters that 
follow. 
Chapter 5 is the first case study chapter where I introduce the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection as an all-encompassing legislative response to three migration policy 
fields: regular migration, irregular migration, and asylum. It is significant to reveal the 
processes of the Law’s adoption and the relative impact of each actor beforehand, as the 
implications of this policy field reflect on the following case study chapters. This is a 
technicalised case with lower levels of politicisation, both domestically and at the EU level. 
Thus, I expect a lower level of domestic limits to policy makers, a higher level of international 
expert involvement and limited EU incentives. In this case study, the main themes emerge as 
Turkey’s status as a transition country, in the process of becoming a country of immigration, 
and the policy makers’ aim to transform migration as something beneficial to the country . 
Thus, despite the EU’s initiation and continuing presence in Turkish legislative reform, its 
influence on policy processes remained limited, while Turkey centralised and framed policy 
reform as a domestic need. In the process of preparation and adoption of the Law, the EU has 
triggered reform with accession conditionality. Turkish policy makers undertook the reform 
agenda, international organisations provided technical support and normative legitimisation, 
while the EU guaranteed its presence with financial aid. Thus here, inter-relationship between 
the actors shows a flow in multiple directions while the most influential actors are Turkish 
policy makers. 
In Chapter 6, I analyse the irregular migration policy field through its most controversial 
policy element, the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. As an international agreement 
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negotiated between the EU and Turkey, this policy element is the most politicised among the 
case studies I introduce in this study. In this policy field, the power asymmetry between the 
EU and Turkey, established through the accession framework is disturbed. The EU no longer 
expects Turkey to fully transfer EU policies to domestic legislation. The parties negotiate 
concessions and incentives, predominately on visa liberalisation, in return for management 
of irregular migration, independent of Turkey’s accession prospects. In this case study, a two 
way influence flow is clear, as the international context, its changing relationship with the 
EU, and the EU’s inner dynamics empowered Turkey during the negotiations, to obtain 
significant concessions. In return, the EU could influence Turkish migration policy in its 
preferred direction by replacing its main incentive, the accession conditionality with a 
specific policy conditionality, a short-term viable incentive to Turkey at a time when the 
credibility of the country’s accession prospects were in decline.  
In Chapter 7, I present a policy element from the field of regular migration, by a case study 
of Turkish visa policy and adoption of EU visa lists. This adoption is an accession 
conditionality for Turkey. However, with the decline of its accession prospects, and EU’s 
inability to present any other specific incentive for this policy, Turkey did not only stop its 
efforts to adopt EU visa lists, it has also retreated from earlier steps. Since the late 2000s, the 
country has been implementing a new policy called “visa diplomacy” offering visa 
facilitations to third countries for strategic or economic gains, and some of these countries 
are on the EU’s negative visa list. The EU or the international organisations are limited in 
making any normative claims to emphasize their preferences for this policy element. For the 
policy element of visas, a multilateral regulatory framework is absent and the state claim full 
sovereignty. This restricts any external involvement, based on a logic of appropriateness. 
Thus, external actors are limited in influencing policy, as the EU cannot introduce a viable 
conditionality framework due to the low significance of this policy element and both the EU 
and international organisations cannot influence policy with normative claims due to the 
absence of a multilateral framework. Turkey frames its policy priorities around economic 
and diplomatic gains, and expects a commitment from the EU to meet the costs of abandoning 
such gains. As a result, resolution for this policy field is stalled by both the EU and Turkey. 
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In Chapter 8, I analyse external pressures on Turkey to lift the geographical limitation it 
maintains to the 1951 Geneva Convention, and policy elements introduced by Turkey to 
satisfy priorities of these external actors without lifting it. In this policy field, both the EU 
and international organisations aim to influence policy with claims based on human rights, 
as the strong multilateral framework on asylum empowers their claims. These claims grant 
the UNHCR and IOM influence because of their long-time socialisation in the field 
establishing normative legitimacy in Turkey. However, the EU’s normative legitimacy on 
asylum is not well established in Turkey, and further disturbed by the Union’s response to 
the Syrian asylum crisis. Also, the EU did not present credible conditionality mechanisms 
directly for this policy instrument. Thus, its influence has remained limited, and it had to 
show some flexibility over its initial policy position on geographical limitation.  
In Chapter 9, I make a cross-case comparative analysis of actor relationships aiming to find 
the relative influence of each actor in the overall migration policy area. The variation in actor 
influences in overall migration policy area depends on the actors’ capability to facilitate each 
influence mechanism and contextual differences. Accordingly, in this chapter, first, I briefly 
re-visit the influence mechanisms that are introduced in Chapter 2 in the framework of the 
external influences literature, and summarise premises applicable to the upcoming analysis. 
I systematically define mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation to seek applicable 
characteristics in each relationship. Then, I establish a relationship-based cross-case analysis, 
seeking the most dominant and efficient form of influence mechanism in each relationship. 
In the relationship between Turkey and the EU, I present the ways the EU continues to 
maintain a high level of influence on Turkish migration policies, despite the decline in 
accession prospects. There is a transformation from accession conditionality to policy 
conditionality specific to migration policy, and the influence of the latter is increasing. In the 
migration policy area, the visa liberalisation road map has become the dominant framework 
defining EU-Turkey relations on migration (European Commission, 2013). Then, I elaborate 
the indirect interaction between international organisations and the EU, and their leverage to 
influence policy change in Turkey. Finally, I analyse the relationship between international 
organisations and Turkey, tracing socialisation and legitimisation in this relationship and 
finding how these organisations find presence in Turkish migration policy. I conclude this 
chapter by stressing the significance of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, framed 
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around policy conditionality, as the main determinant of Turkish migration policies. 
However, the context in which the EU can establish a credible policy conditionality 
framework is limited. When the EU is unable to do this, other sources of influence gain 
relevance. In such instances, if a multilateral framework is present, international 
organisations influence policy through social policy learning, normative suasion or 
legitimisation. In the absence of these, Turkish policy makers determine the outcome with a 
cost and benefit analysis.  
In Chapter 10, I conclude this study by systematically presenting my empirical findings to 
explain the formation of each policy outcome. I discuss the factors that contribute to variance 
between these policy outcomes and make generalisations upon the relative power of each 
actor under different policy types. I establish a general position on when, why and in what 
ways each actor is relatively influential, based on the context of policy type, time and relative 
balance of power between the actors. Accordingly, I conclude that the degree of external 
influence on Turkish migration policy is based on the presence of a sense of emergency and 
the degree to which a policy field is politicised or technicalised. EU influence is strongest in 
the politicised fields, and when it is driven by conditionality. International organisations are 
present in technicalised policy fields through social policy learning and normative suasion. 
The actors of Turkish domestic migration respond to these external influences by exerting 
clear agency and seeking concessions together with advancing domestic migration interests.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction: Identifying the Relevant Theories and Literature for the Research 
In this study, I examine changes in Turkish migration policies in the last decade, to explain 
the processes through which domestic change occurs. I seek such explanation in actor 
influences based on their preferences, priorities and reservations, with a three level analysis: 
the EU, the international and the Turkish domestic level. EU-level sections of such analysis 
is directly connected to literature on Europeanisation and EU external influences, mainly 
consisting of research built upon cases of Central and Eastern European countries (Lavenex, 
2002; Boswell, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Jandl, 2007; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2009; Börzel, 2011; Langbein & Börzel, 2013; Langbein, 2014). Despite 
its similarities, relations between the EU and Turkey significantly contrast with Central and 
Eastern European countries, and requires additional theoretical perspectives for explanation. 
Hence, in this chapter I also provide insights from the literature on countries without any 
prospect for accession, mostly countries within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
framework (Smith, 2005; Kelley, 2006; Lavenex, 2008; Baracani, 2009). Incorporating these 
two types of literature makes this chapter more accommodating to Turkey’s case, whose 
relationship with the EU embraces elements from both types. 
On external influences at the international level, the relevant literature consists of theoretical 
perspectives on the capabilities of existing global governance regimes to influence domestic 
change in nation states (Koser, 2010; Betts, 2011). In addition to those discussions, because 
of its focus on migration policy, this study also needs to briefly introduce literature on the 
international migration regime, beginning with the reasons for international cooperation on 
migration, and effects and complications related to it (Koslowski, 2011; Martin, 2005; 
Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2011). Then, it presents influence mechanisms 
of the international migration regime, similar to the discussion at the EU level (Pridham, 
1999; Smith, 2003; Kotzian, 2007; Piedrafita, 2012).  
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This discussion is followed by a literature review of the concept of globally-limited 
sovereignty, with a specific focus on the global human rights regime (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 
1996; Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001). This literature is expected to be relevant in identifying 
the enablers or handicaps for international-level influence mechanisms on policy change. At 
the domestic level, existing literature on limits to state capacities on migration policy making 
in countries of immigration (Freeman, 1995; Brubaker, 1995; Sassen, 1996; Abadan-Unat, 
1997; Joppke, 1998; Guiraudon, 2001; Hollifield, 1998; Joppke, 2005; Boswell, 2007; 
Hampshire, 2013) is not expected to fully comply with Turkey’s case, which is a transition 
country in the midst of becoming a country of immigration, whose relevant actors institutions 
are still uninterested in or incapacitated to influence policy change on migration. However, 
there are some relevant elements in this literature which help to explain the current sources 
of influence on Turkish domestic change. The presence or absence of domestic sources of 
influence is specifically relevant in enabling the influence of other sources. They are also 
relevant for making predictions for the future as Turkey becomes a country of immigration.  
In line with this overview, in this chapter, I provide a review of the literature and a theoretical 
background for the upcoming case studies. To ensure a logical flow through the study, I 
structure this chapter according to the level of each actor function: (a) European Union; (b) 
international; (c) domestic. Under the EU and the international level, I elaborate the literature 
on external influences and mechanisms with a specific focus on institutionalist theories on 
external influences. A discussion of the restrictions on state capabilities follows the external 
influences. With a specific emphasis on Turkey’s status as a transition country, I conclude 
the chapter with the problems of generalisation and possible shortcomings of the literature 
for an analysis of Turkish migration policies.  
2.2 The EU Level: External Dimension and Coordination beyond Accession 
The literature on the external dimension of the EU is established upon relations with third 
countries, consisting of cooperation on a wide range of policy areas within the limits of the 
Commission’s legislative competence (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). While it started 
with trade relations, the policy areas of external cooperation have expanded in parallel to the 
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expansion in EU’s legislative competence, to policy areas like democracy promotion, 
environmental issues and migration. This external dimension is essentially based on the EU’s 
acquis communautaire and its main aim in establishing an external dimension is to extend 
rules and policies within the acquis to its neighbourhood beyond member states. The need 
for such extension has mainly occurred due to the EU’s perception of interdependence, 
suggesting its internal policy goals cannot be fulfilled without extending its sphere of 
influence to its neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004, p. 681). This perception indicates the need 
to transform the EU’s neighbourhood in compliance with its institutional rules and 
regulations to maintain the security and stability of the EU. This compliance suggests a 
process of policy transfer in which EU expertise on policy making and implementation is the 
basis for policy development in candidate and third countries. Lavenex lists various forms of 
policy transfer, in a continuum from lesson drawing on a voluntary basis, to direct imposition 
or conditionality in a coercive fashion (Lavenex, 2002). The EU’s choice of each form 
depends on the peculiarities of the policy area, as well as the EU’s relationship with the third 
country. While the EU expects a complete adaptation from candidate countries and where 
necessary, uses conditionality to ensure a full transfer, its capabilities for policy imposition 
are limited against other third countries.  
Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement at the time, once stated, 
“enlargement is at the core of the EU’s soft power” (Rehn, 2007). The Commission has 
succeeded in extending the scope of the Acquis through policy transfer to candidate states, 
with the enlargement strategy. However, enlargement did not prevail as the main EU strategy 
for external governance, due to the limits of EU enlargement capacity (Lavenex & Uçarer, 
2002; Grabbe, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Beyond accession, the EU 
expanded its sphere of influence to third countries typically through foreign policy initiatives 
and bilateral or multilateral cooperation frameworks. The literature responded to this 
expansion by extending the definition of “Europeanisation”, first from member states to 
accession candidates (Friis & Murphy, 1999; Cowles & Risse, 2001; Featherstone & 
Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005), and eventually beyond candidates to countries 
in the EU sphere of influence. After the 2004 enlargement, when the Union began to offer 
accession negotiations more cautiously, but simultaneously aspired to increase its influence 
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in its neighbourhood, the scope of the term was broadened to cover processes of policy 
change resulting from EU-generated pressures (Lavenex & Uçarer, 2002; Lavenex, 2004).  
It is still contested whether Europeanisation is a suitable framework for research on countries 
without any prospect of membership, such as the ENP countries, or the specific case of 
Turkey, which, despite the accession prospect, continues its relations with the EU in a 
framework beyond accession. To ensure the relevance of the Europeanisation theoretical 
framework for these countries, it is central to perceive Europeanisation as “routes of 
influence” (Grabbe, 2003). EU external influence functions through these routes of influence, 
which in the end, ideally leads to domestic change in the form of policy transfer, in line with 
EU values, directives and norms (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Mair, 2004). This study adopts this 
“routes of influence” perception against Europeanisation, and to avert the discussions on 
alternative usages of the term “Europeanisation”, which are insignificant for the purposes of 
this study, it abstains from using the term. However, its theoretical basis is established upon 
Europeanisation literature, similar to its predecessors on the EU influence in Turkey (Diez, 
Agnantopoulos, & Kaliber, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Içduygu, 2007; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009; Bingol 
McDonald, 2011; Börzel, 2012; Kaliber, 2012; Macmillan, 2012; Nas, 2012; Oğuzlu, 2012; 
Öner, 2012; Özer, 2012; Terzi, 2012; Aydın & Kirişci, 2013). These studies suggest, although 
the term, for defining EU influence on candidate countries or countries with no prospect of 
accession is contested, from a perspective focused on the mechanisms for influence, 
Europeanisation literature is relevant in an analysis of the EU influence on Turkey. 
EU mechanisms of influence differ depending on the policy area and respondent third 
country. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig identify three sets of factors that establish the EU’s 
capabilities to influence its external environment: institutions, power, and domestic 
structures (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 792). These three factors are not mutually 
exclusive, but they complement each other. The literature based on institutional factors gives 
the most prominent explanation on EU external influence by connecting the choice and the 
impact of the external action to internal EU rules and modes of governance. These theories 
suggest that the EU’s internal structures of policy making in a given policy area is a template 
for its external influence. The choice of external influence mechanisms inevitably reflects 
internal ones. Institutionalist theories assess the level of EU influence by the institutional 
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compatibility of domestic policies to the EU acquis (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999). These 
theories suggest, as the level of institutionalisation in a policy area increases, with the support 
of a strong legal and normative framework, the level of EU influence also increases in parallel 
to it (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The power factor not only suggests the 
significance of nation state power in relation to the EU, but also the position of a state in 
relation to other international sources of influence, including other third countries or 
international organisations. In the case of nation state interdependence to third parties, EU 
influence depends upon the Union’s bargaining power in the given policy area. Domestic 
structures are the indispensable factor among the three as they would inevitably enable or 
challenge the EU external influence. Such influence depends upon the compatibility of EU 
rules and regulations with domestic institutions as well as the power of possible veto players 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009).  
Despite the explanatory value of theoretical perspectives on power and domestic structures, 
in interpreting EU external influence on third countries (Grabbe, 2003; Dur & Mateo, 2010; 
Paoletti, 2011), this study adopts an institutionalist approach. In respect of the features of 
Turkey and its migration policy, an institutionalist approach is promising to explain the EU 
external influence. This approach is suitable for the overall EU external influence on Turkey, 
as it is still a candidate country and despite the decline in its accession prospects, a large 
portion of its relations is still based on compliance to the EU acquis within the accession 
conditionality framework. Such a structured rule transfer, assessing the EU influence, based 
on the institutional compatibility of domestic policies to the EU acquis through annual 
progress reports, is suitable to be analysed in an institutionalist framework (Knill & 
Lehmkuhl, 1999). Moreover, in Turkey, the migration policy incorporates factors introduced 
by Freyburg et al. which are complementary to an explanation of EU external influences with 
an institutional approach (Freyburg et al., 2009). EU migration governance is codified, at 
least at a medium level, where the elements are legally determined and incorporated in the 
EU acquis, and also in international law in some cases. The rule adoption is rarely contextual 
depending on the third country, it is often inflexibly codified. The policy area is strongly 
institutionalised, as all the third countries within the EU’s neighbourhood are subject to 
similar rules and regulations. It is also internationalised at least at a medium level, where the 
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EU mainly promotes the rules, but the international organisations are also involved in such 
promotion within the boundaries of their mandate (Freyburg et al., 2009). In addition to these, 
Grabbe and Vachudova identify monitoring as a factor complementary to an explanation of 
EU external influence with an institutionalist approach (Grabbe, 1999; Vachudova, 2005). 
EU monitoring is not only strong in Turkey in the framework of annual progress reports on 
the country’s accession, but it is also specifically strong in migration policy with additional 
monitoring specific to the visa liberalisation road map.  
2.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism and the Mechanism of Conditionality 
The literature on EU external influence is predominantly framed around rationalist and 
sociological variations of institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism lies on the 
fundamental premise that institutional political action is facilitated with a logic of 
consequentiality. During the policy making process, actors and institutions primarily define 
their preferences for political action with a cost benefit calculation, and then take action to 
maximize these fixed, inflexible, a priori defined preferences and interests (Kotzian, 2007; 
Piedrafita, 2012). Institutions shape and in return are shaped by these individual actor 
preferences. In this model, the actors prefer hard bargaining as the dominant negotiation 
perspective, in which they face a distribution of interests and they facilitate retractions, 
commitments and threats. According to this approach, the EU influences policy change by 
either re-structuring power distribution in certain policy areas by offering some actors 
additional resources to increase their level of influence and constrains the ability of opposing 
actors to pursue their goals (Börzel, 2011); or as an external incentive, in which domestic 
actors or institutions facilitate reforms in the framework of Europeanisation in expectation 
of rewards or incentives. Each path of influence under this approach presumes an 
asymmetrical relationship where the stronger actor uses vertical mechanisms to influence the 
weaker actor (Lavenex, 2008).  
Nation-state negotiations with the European Union usually show an asymmetrical 
characteristic where the states are involved with an interest, for a kind of relation, such as 
membership, association or a trade agreement. It is expected such power asymmetry to result 
in a stronger party pressurising the weaker one, aiming to get concessions (Elgström and 
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Strömvik, 2005). Processes of EU influenced policy change in Central and Eastern European 
countries suggest, in the candidate countries, the asymmetrical nature of the relationship 
coupled with the strong accession incentive to implement EU policies grants the EU further 
power to influence these countries’ policy making processes (Grabbe, 2003). These features 
have also dominated EU-Turkey relations in the first years of its candidacy when Turkey’s 
accession prospects were strong and viable. The accession incentive coupled with 
asymmetries in the relationship was the catalyst for significant domestic change in Turkey 
during the early 2000s in the policy areas of justice, freedom, security, judiciary and 
fundamental rights.  
The most prominent asymmetrical mechanism the EU uses within the scope of this approach 
is conditionality, which comprises the links, established between benefits desired by the third 
country and the fulfilment of certain conditions (Smith, 2003). It is expected that the recipient 
state will be rewarded in parallel to the level of compliance with conditions. It suggests policy 
transfer, rather than a deliberative process (Dimitrova, 2002; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2004). Conditionality is a centralised mechanism, in which involved actors consist of high 
ranking policy elites in the third country and EU Commission, within the limits of its mandate 
granted by the Council. The conditionality mechanism in the EU, is elaborated within the 
“external incentives model” developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, through their 
own and others research on accession conditionality especially in Central and East European 
states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Grabbe, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Dimitrova & 
Dragneva, 2013). The external incentives model identifies material benefits of EU 
membership as the main incentive for compliance with accession conditionality. The model 
presumes, in the countries and policy areas where conditionality is credible and the size and 
speed of rewards meets domestic adaptation costs related to implementation, EU induced 
policy change is anticipated (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). In essence, the external 
incentives model is a bargaining model framed around rational choice institutionalism, 
postulating main actors as strategic utility maximizers. Similar to a typical rationalist 
bargaining situation, during the policy transformation process, actors exchange information, 
threats and promises and their bargaining power is central to the outcome of policy 
negotiations and policy change.  
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For the purposes of this study, the instrument of conditionality is categorized under two sub-
headings, in accordance with the scope of the external incentives: (a) accession 
conditionality; (b) policy conditionality. As is self-explanatory, accession conditionality 
refers to structured and extensive EU conditionality presented to the candidate countries, 
which indicates that accession will be the outcome of compliance. It is the type of 
conditionality praised for its influence in facilitating compliance in Central and Eastern 
European countries (Grabbe, 2002; Smith, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 
Grabbe, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007). Until the 2007 enlargement, accession conditionality 
was presented as the EU’s most successful policy tool (European Commission, 2003). Yet, 
after 2007, with arguments of enlargement fatigue and deepening, effectiveness of accession 
conditionality began to decline, as neighbouring countries began to lose prospects of 
membership. Although the accession conditionality framework continued to be implemented 
in candidate countries, its power to influence domestic change diminished considerably. This 
trend is also applicable to Turkey. In the first term of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) government, between 2002 and 2007, with the existence of a credible and strong 
accession conditionality, EU influence on the country’s legislative reforms (Özer, 2012) and 
its foreign policy (Terzi, 2012) were strong and visible. In parallel to loss of credibility in 
EU conditionality, beginning in late 2006 and early 2007, EU influence on Turkish state 
policies are in decline.  
In contrast to accession conditionality, policy conditionality is not an all-encompassing 
compliance framework. It is applied to specific policy negotiations, with attachment of 
shorter-term policy-specific rewards to certain areas of reform (Langbein & Börzel, 2013). 
Although rewards attached to accession conditionality are larger in size to meet the domestic 
adaptation costs related to implementation, these policy specific rewards stand out as more 
credible in the short term (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). The strength of the 
conditionality mechanism is not only dependent upon the size of rewards, but it is also 
directly linked to their credibility (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). In countries with 
no, or receding prospects for accession, the credibility of accession conditionality is 
inadequate to influence policy change. However, shorter-term rewards attached to 
compliance in a well-defined specific policy area have higher credibility. In the Turkish case, 
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the visa liberalisation road map is a well-defined, shorter-term policy conditionality 
framework, specific to migration policy; on completion of a number of benchmarks, Turkey 
will be granted visa liberalisation. In comparison to accession prospects, it is a shorter-term 
incentive with more credibility.  
The financial and technical assistance the EU provides to third countries is also a significant 
vertical mechanism in which the EU empowers domestic level actors who are in support of 
compliance to European institutional settings. Such financial and technical assistance re-
distributes and re-structures the balance of power within a country, advantaging domestic 
actors for policy change (Kotzian, 2007; Börzel, 2011; Piedrafita, 2012). Such assistance 
implies a more indirect connection, in comparison to conditionality in which the EU 
empowers certain actors to facilitate policy change (Börzel & Risse, 2012). This division 
between assistance and conditionality is valid in EU relationships with countries it is loosely 
connected with and in policy areas where the Union’s level of institutionalisation is 
considerably low. However, when the EU has established a well-structured policy 
conditionality, such as the visa liberalisation road map, these mechanisms are embedded 
within the terms of the conditionality framework and their influence can hardly be isolated 
from the influence of the overall conditionality framework. They are capable of increasing 
the credibility of the conditionality framework. Consistent assistance also facilitates 
transformation from rule adoption to rule application within the conditionality framework.  
2.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism and the Mechanisms of Socialisation and Legitimisation  
Sociological institutionalism explains domestic change in member states and candidate 
countries with the ideational and normative processes of Europeanisation. By emphasizing 
appropriateness, sociological institutionalism argues that a shared understanding of 
appropriate and socially accepted behaviour, not the consequentialist expectations for 
material progress, lead to policy compliance (March & Olsen, 1989; Finnemore, 1996). 
These understandings lead institutions to seek appropriate ways of behaviour to meet social 
expectations of the society in which they are a member of (Müller, 2004). The main 
mechanism of influence, elaborated in the framework of this approach is socialisation, 
defined as the process by which principled ideas are internalized and implemented to become 
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domestic norms and collective understandings about appropriate behaviour. Socialisation is 
a mechanism that functions both at the international level, where these principled ideas 
consist of the international normative framework of the global migration regime; and at the 
EU level, where they consist of European norms, principles and institutions. It is a long term 
mechanism where finally these norms are internalised and institutionalised to change 
identities, interests and behaviours of institutions and actors of the targeted state (Müller, 
1993; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). However, it is misleading to treat these norms, principles and 
institutions as fixed or even firmly established. These norms are in a constant process of 
discursive and political reconstruction, both at European and nation-state levels. European 
norms are substantially re-interpreted, and these re-interpretations occur during policy 
making processes as well (Diez, Agnantopoulos, & Kaliber, 2005; Kaliber, 2012).  
The literature on socialisation designates “norm entrepreneurs,” including epistemic 
communities, advocacy networks and even missions directly commissioned by international 
and EU-level institutions, to facilitate internalisation and institutionalisation of these norms 
and ways of appropriate behaviour by domestic actors (Börzel & Risse, 2000; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Risse and Sikkink connect the speed of this diffusion 
of international norms, to establishment and sustainability of networks among domestic and 
transnational “norm entrepreneurs” (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). These networks are expected to 
raise awareness for possible norm-violations in the international agenda, support claims of 
domestic opposition and end up challenging policy making both from above, and from below 
(Brysk, 1993).  
In Turkey, these networks put norm-violating cases of the Turkish state on the international 
agenda for moral-consciousness raising. Typically, advocacy networks in Turkey appeal to 
the European Court of Human Rights, which strengthens the leverage of policy makers who 
are for domestic change and leads to an increase in the consciousness of the country’s 
Western partners about the situation in Turkey. However, other than this linkage, which 
results in global conscious rising, civil society in Turkey has had a low level of participation 
in migration policy change, which began to change just recently, after the Directorate General 
for Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior has adopted a more participatory 
approach in policy making and increasing asylum movements from Syria have compelled 
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state agencies to seek cooperation with civil society organisations that are experienced in the 
field. Turkish civil society on migration policy is still immature, in explaining externally 
induced domestic change through cultivation of civil society and transnational ties, by 
adopting a network, or linkage approach (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 
2011). Because of these attributes of the Turkish migration policy area, socialisation, in the 
scope of this paper, does not suggest a linkage or network approach. It suggests a more direct 
relationship between policy making and implementing bodies of both parties where, rather 
than a realist cost and benefit framework, social policy learning and normative suasion 
influence actor policy preferences. In line with this perspective, this paper adopts a “top-
down” perspective to socialisation in which internalization of EU norms as rules of 
appropriate behaviour emerge as a result of a direct interaction between representatives of 
EU-level institutions and Turkish policy making and implementing bodies, instead of a 
“bottom-up” one in which civil society and non-governmental organizations perceive these 
rules as appropriate and lobby the government to adopt these norms (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005).  
The level of influence of such a “top-down” socialisation mechanism is dependent on the 
attributes of the policy area. In more technical and less politicised policy areas, social policy 
learning is likely to occur through frequent policy consultation (Thomas, 2009). In such a 
setting, the external actors which have permanent missions in the targeted country or frequent 
meetings with their domestic counterparts, have an advantage to influence policy change 
through socialisation. In policy areas where the EU has a normative claim to appropriate 
ways of behaviour, normative suasion is possible as a mechanism of influence, where the EU 
presents the normative basis of its policy preferences to influence policy. For facilitation of 
both social policy learning and normative suasion, the EU needs an established normative 
claim to support its influence on determining appropriate behaviour.  
In the literature, such claims of EU normative power are highly contested (Bull, 1982; 
Manners, 2002; Bicchi, 2006; Manners, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Diez, 2013). While earlier 
discussions have focused upon EU civilian power in opposition to military power (Duchene, 
1971; Bull, 1982), latter ones distinguish EU normative power from overall civilian existence 
of the EU and aim to identify characteristics that make the EU a normative power with an 
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ideational impact, beyond its usage of non-militant mechanisms for influence (Manners, 
2002,2013; Diez, 2013). The basic principle of literature on EU normative power 
distinguishes EU ability to use civilian instruments from its ability to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’ as the former is only an indication of EU civilian power while the latter 
demonstrates its normative power (Manners, 2002, p. 240). Manners identifies some EU-
level core norms, including peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights, and defines EU normative external influence as interventions made in accordance with 
these norms, without any obvious material gains (Manners, 2002). Diez questions the 
universality of these norms and claims that assuming such universality in spreading such 
norms might lead to harmful interference with the targeted countries (Diez, 2005); while 
Sjursen suggests such normative universality could be achieved if the EU aims to strengthen 
international and cosmopolitan law and binds itself with rules and regulations of such 
universal legislation (Sjursen, 2006). Further discussions over EU normative power is 
beyond the scope of this study. Rather than examining the overall normative power of the 
EU, this paper identifies some policy fields where the EU has a normative “claim” regarding 
appropriate behaviour and aims to influence policy change by normative suasion, by stating 
compliance as the appropriate direction to follow. This perception is similar to Sjursen’s idea 
of a normative power as an act in compliance with international legislation (Sjursen, 2006). 
Thus, policy fields where the EU has a normative claim are established as ones where the EU 
claims to act in compliance with the international legal framework and aims to influence 
policy change by claiming such universal legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is another important theme that frequently occurs within the socialisation 
approach. In the scope of this study, this theme emerges in two forms. First, it emerges as the 
EU and other international organisations’ legitimacy to influence policy change in Turkey as 
perceived by domestic actors, mainly the policy elite. This does not suggest a universal 
legitimacy, but a perceived one, and absence of such legitimacy constitutes grounds for 
domestic actors to contest compliance with normative claims (Noutcheva, 2009; Stoddard, 
2015). With a rationalist perspective, it is possible to establish such perceived legitimacy 
with a utilitarian approach, in which outcomes of policy are beneficial for all parties that are 
involved. With such an approach, the EU typically establishes perceived legitimacy with the 
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conditionality mechanism, where targeted states comply with the EU reform agenda to obtain 
presented utilities (Sjursen & Smith, 2004). However, with a logic of appropriateness, it is 
more complex to establish perceived legitimacy. Noutcheva suggests normative legitimacy 
could only be distinguished through reactions of policy makers in targeted states against 
external pressures which lack a rationalist cost-benefit scheme (Noutcheva, 2009, p. 1074). 
Thus, perceived legitimacy of an external actor could only be understood through the 
influence it can exert through normative suasion, and absence of such legitimacy provides 
leverage to targeted states for legitimising non-compliance. 
Secondly, theme of legitimacy emerges as a mechanism, where states use established 
legitimacy and normative claims of external actors to legitimise their actions against 
domestic veto players or other external actors. This mechanism is not only significant for 
providing assurances to domestic veto players; the Turkish state also uses it as a bargaining 
tool to legitimise non-compliance when EU induced policy change is perceived as 
normatively unacceptable by international organisations that are active in Turkey. Moreover, 
for politically costly reform agendas, legitimisation enables policy makers to delegate 
responsibility for policy change to international organizations to ensure collective 
legitimisation and to diminish possible political fallout at national level by shifting liabilities 
to non-state actors (Lahav, 2004; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2007). The literature on such 
legitimisation claims that states aim to re-assert control and seek new venues at supra-
national level to facilitate this and escape from electoral concerns (Lavenex, 2001; Geddes, 
2003). However, even such instrumental and strategic adaptation of international norms is 
significant, as it leads to domestic structural change and constitutes a stepping stone for future 
identity building of institutions (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). This suggestion is specifically valid 
in cases when Europeanisation is used as a mechanism for legitimisation in nation states for 
implementing policy change in policy areas where domestic opposition is powerful. It is not 
atypical for nation states to use international organizations and supra-national participation, 
especially EU membership, to legitimize activities of certain actors in policy making that 
defends a logic of control (Lavenex, 2001). In Turkey, the AKP government, successfully 
used the legitimizing impact of Europeanisation to consolidate its governing power against 
the international community as well as against secular state tradition in Turkey (Tocci, 2005). 
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In empirical analyses of EU external influence, the literature based on cases of Central and 
Eastern European countries often overlooks mechanisms of socialisation such as social 
policy learning or normative persuasion. Instead, they acknowledge the impact of rationalist 
mechanisms, especially EU accession conditionality, on extension of EU sphere of influence 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005; Smith, 2005; Kelley, 2006; Börzel, 2011; 
Sedelmeier, 2011). Unlike these studies, Langbein and Wolczuk, do not attempt to establish 
dominance of one single mechanism of influence, but aim to identify the relative influence 
of different mechanisms during different phases of policy compliance: rule selection; 
adoption; and application (Langbein & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 863). From a case study on 
Ukraine, they conclude, while accession prospects of a third country determines rule 
selection; policy conditionality, financial assistance and social policy learning are more 
important for rule adoption and application (Langbein & Wolczuk, 2012). This study also 
does not perceive mechanisms of rational choice and sociological institutionalism as 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, these mechanisms are recognised as complementary to 
each other in different phases of the relationship and grant permanence to EU external 
influence. It is significant to establish a balanced understanding between these two 
approaches without being biased in favour of short-term outcomes of rational choice 
institutionalism. One needs to see a larger picture in terms of sustainability of reforms and 
the role of socialisation in the implementation phase. In an empirical sense, it is very hard to 
establish precise divisions between cases on their fitness to each approach in time or across 
policy areas. For instance, the early stages of socialisation in which actors and institutions 
seem like adopting EU norms and values for easing external pressures could accurately be 
framed in rationalist terms. Moreover, the legitimization aspect of socialisation inevitably 
harbours some elements of rationalist institutionalism in which policies in favour of the ruling 
elite are framed with European values to crush opposition. Thus, it shall not be expected in 
this thesis, to conclude with a pure and ideal approach in which EU induced policy change 
occurs. This study presents elements of each approach to give meaning to each policy change, 
but it does not aim to find the ideal approach to explain EU-induced policy change.  
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2.3 International Level: Global Migration Governance and International 
Organisations  
Despite being one of the most trans-boundary issues on the international agenda and the 
inherent interdependence of national migration management policies, there is an absence of 
a formal and coherent ‘top-down’ multilateral framework to govern international migration. 
Migration is mainly governed by sovereign states without any binding multilateral 
framework, except for issues related to asylum and international protection (Betts, 2011). 
This absence of a formal multilateral institutional framework does not imply the absence of 
a global migration governance, but it implies absence of a single formal multilateral structure 
to govern migration, similar to regulatory structures for other trans-boundary issues like the 
World Health Organization and World Trade Organization. In such an environment, one can 
expect the most formalized form of migration governance to be established between sending 
and receiving states, in a bilateral manner (Hansen, 2011). However, for the last two decades, 
interest in international cooperation on migration management has been increasing, resulting 
from states’ inability to unilaterally or bilaterally cope with the increasing volume of 
international migration and their desire to manage irregular flows. Moreover, the increasing 
politicisation of migration, especially in western democracies, direct policy makers to 
multilateral cooperation, not only for establishing a sustainable migration regime, but also 
for evading domestic political criticisms (Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2011).  
The elements of multilateralism in international migration governance, exists on two main 
levels. First of all, there is a legal and normative multilateral governance framework to 
regulate issues of asylum, international travel and labour migration. Such legal and normative 
frameworks governing international migration consist of legally binding international law 
and non-binding best practices and principles. The level of multilateralism varies depending 
on the policy area of discussion. While asylum and refugee regimes are governed by the most 
developed multilateralism, the UNHCR refugee regime, labour migration has least, with 
some ILO treaties applicable to migrant workers as well (Betts, 2011; Koslowski, 2011). 
Major international instruments on migration, to which Turkey is also a party are: the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 1990 UN 
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Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the 
2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. International law derived from these international 
Conventions and Covenants, limit state power on policy making by granting certain rights to 
foreign nationals. Rights introduced in the framework of international law are unalienable 
and binding independent of the migratory status of the person (Martin, 2005). Betts (2011) 
calls this applicability of states’ obligations in a variety of other global governance 
frameworks to migration as ‘embedded governance.’ This concept indicates interpretation 
and application of already existing areas of international law, to international migration 
(Betts, 2011).  
The second form of multilateralism in migration policy, has occurred with emergence of 
informal multilateral forms of cooperation, in regional or trans-regional settings. With the 
increasing functional need to cooperate, as a result of the increasing volume of international 
migration and state desire to manage flows; regional and trans-regional institutions of 
cooperation are becoming increasingly relevant, and informal regional frameworks of 
cooperation are now greater in scope in providing a venue for international cooperation. 
States increasingly prefer these informal and non-binding arenas, rather than formal and 
binding agreements (Hansen, 2011). These institutions of regional and trans-regional 
governance consist of sets of formal and informal institutions that connect states within a 
geographical region or connect different geographical regions to each other, and as a result 
constitute the behaviour of states and non-state actors in a given policy field (Betts, 2011). 
This study focuses on the first form of multilateralism as its interest lies in externally induced 
policy change, rather than cooperation on a global scale. As the study aims to trace relative 
actor influences, at an international level, its attention is on the international organisations, 
which function to implement international legal and normative frameworks. More 
specifically, it elaborates activities of the UNHCR and the IOM and the influence 
mechanisms they facilitate. These mechanisms that are available for these institutions, are 
presented in the next section, by retaining the institutional approach adopted in the previous 
section.  
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2.3.1 International Influence Mechanisms on Migration Policy  
International organisations use similar influence mechanisms to the EU’s. However, their 
impact varies significantly depending on development of international legal and normative 
frameworks and the mandate, competence and capabilities of the given international 
organisation. International and regional financial institutions frequently use conditionality, 
demanding adoption of a reform package in return for financial assistance (Pevehouse, 2002). 
Multilateral trade institutions also have a strong presence in domestic politics as they 
influence policy change with an emphasis on enhanced trade relations (Goldstein, 1998). 
However, such rationalist conditionality or bargaining mechanisms are beyond the mandate, 
competence and the capabilities of international organisations that govern international 
migration, specifically the UNHCR and the IOM. To explain the relationship between these 
organisations and the actors of Turkish migration governance, sociological institutionalism 
provides a more plausible theoretical approach.  
Institutional perspectives perceive institutions as the main units of analysis assuming that the 
institutional structure within which policy-making takes place defines the policy outcomes. 
In the framework of sociological institutionalism, social structures determine rules and 
values, and establish necessary actors that are relevant in international politics and state 
policies. These social structures are not material, but cultural, while global cultural norms 
shape actor behaviour (Finnemore, 1996). Sociological institutionalist literature provides 
evidence for this theory by presenting the similarity of processes or structures between states, 
determined by international cultural norms, despite these states’ material differences. 
Empirical evidence on state definition of citizen rights and obligations (Boli, 1987), treatment 
of foreign nationals (Soysal, 1994) and the structure of education systems (Ramirez & Boli, 
1986) suggest that similarities in state policy making are driven by global cultural factors, 
rather than specific interests of actors. In such a setting, the function of international 
organisations is identified as elaboration and dissemination of these international cultural 
norms to ensure institutional coherence at a global level (Finnemore, 1996). Institutionalists 
suggest state participation in these organisations is a result of state’ commitment to a “logic 
of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1989). Rather than a rationalist alliance system, 
participation in these organisations is perceived in its normative dimension as a commitment 
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to norms, rules and principles presented by these organisations. This approach was criticised 
mainly because of its disregard of the role of politics and power on normative contestation 
(Finnemore, 1996). However, it is a comprehensive approach providing a theoretical 
background to mechanisms with which international organisations influence policy, in the 
absence of a clear asymmetrical power relationship.  
The influence mechanisms of sociological institutionalism within the scope of these 
international organisations are similar to ones introduced within the scope of the EU: 
socialisation and legitimisation. In the absence of a cost-benefit framework, international 
organisations of migration governance rely dominantly on these mechanisms. The 
dissemination of their principled ideas depends on social policy leaning and normative 
suasion, which are built upon a strong claim for legitimacy. Both mechanisms require 
frequent policy consultation, and social policy learning gains further relevance in technical 
and scientific policy areas (Thomas, 2009). In the absence of such technicality, international 
actors support their policy preferences with normative suasion. Thus, ideally, for the 
socialisation mechanism to effectively influence policy, international organisations need to 
have a normative claim, together with a scientific or technical claim to determine appropriate 
behaviour. In such a setting, migration policy in Turkey accommodates a socialisation 
mechanism. It consists of largely technical issues in which international organisations are 
experienced in policy implementation. International organisations of migration governance 
have long term presences in the field, trusted and perceived as legitimate by policy making 
bodies in Turkey. They also undertake projects on policy implementation in frequent 
consultation with Turkish state bodies. Moreover, Turkey is bound by various international 
Conventions and Covenants, stated in the previous section, which strengthens normative 
legitimacy of these organisations, which are the implementing bodies of this international 
normative framework. 
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2.4 Domestic Level: Migration Policy and State Sovereignty  
2.4.1 State Sovereignty and Capacities on Migration Policy 
For a nation-state level explanation of migration policies, it is necessary to unpack the actors 
and institutions that constitute the state. Modern liberal states do not have conclusive agendas 
on migration. Rather, mobilization of conflicting agendas by different actors and institutions 
shape state agendas. In a systematic analysis based on this approach, James Hampshire 
introduces four main constitutive features of liberal statehood to provide an understanding of 
the “contradictory imperatives” of the liberal nation-state that shape their response to 
migration flows. These are (a) representative democracy; (b) constitutionalism; (c) 
capitalism; and (d) nationhood (Hampshire, 2013, p. 3). In a typical liberal state, while actors 
and institutions associated with state representative democracy and nationhood features, 
support more restrictive migration policies, actors and institutions of constitutionalism and 
capitalism impose a more liberal regime, thus limiting state capacities to act freely on 
demands of constituencies and their dominant national identity. This categorisation provides 
an ample understanding and structural clarity to the literature concerning capacities of the 
state on migration policy making, and remaining parts of this section are structured 
accordingly.  
The actors and institutions associated with the representative democracy feature of the nation 
state are a dominant influence on migration policy moving towards more restrictive policies. 
The main drivers of migration policy, related to state representative democracy, are threefold. 
First, public opinion, reflecting the preferences, priorities and reservations of constituencies, 
shape the migration debate by influencing preferred policies candidates for the office 
propose, and finally, set the tone of the migration debate. Secondly, political parties and 
interest groups dominate organized political behaviour and selectively bring out demands of 
some parts of the public over others. Thus, party politics and interest groups determine 
dominant public opinion by promoting demands of some over others through organized 
political behaviour. And finally mass media, through political communication, sets the 
political agenda with the power of politicizing certain issues (Hampshire, 2013). In the end, 
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the policy impact of these actors and institutions would be restrictive depending on the level 
of politicisation of the immigration policy and strength of public opinion for inducing 
meaningful change. In new countries of immigration, such as Turkey, media politicisation of 
the issue is immature and the public rarely have strong opinions on migration. Thus, it is 
expected for political parties and interest groups to have further influence and organized 
political behaviour to dominate policy decision making in favour of restrictionist policies. 
This de-politicisation debate is further elaborated below to distinguish strengths and 
weaknesses of actors and institutions related to Turkish representative democracy in 
influencing migration policy change.  
The nationhood feature of the liberal nation state also functions through actors and 
institutions introduced above for electoral politics and dominates cultural, religious and 
security framings of immigration by public opinion, political parties, interest groups and the 
media. Nationhood is one of the most controversial features of the liberal nation state and 
migration policy making, creates a continuous tension between states’ claims for 
universalism and their commitment to conservation of nationhood. However, the nationhood 
feature of liberal states only leads to restrictive policies if a national narrative against 
immigration exists. Turkey, historically, has been a migrant-sending country and claims to 
protect rights of Turkish immigrants in European countries. Turkey does not have an 
established understanding of immigration in parallel to its understanding of nationhood. 
Conversely, immigration is understood as immigration of ethnic Turks during the early 
republic period, who were welcomed by the local population. Thus, the narrative of 
nationhood is not expected to have a significant influence in shaping Turkish domestic 
policies in a more restrictive manner. Conversely, claims of common historical ancestry with 
some countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran or Iraq lead to more liberal policies towards nationals 
of those countries, regardless of international pressure to restrict immigration from some of 
them due to security considerations (Abadan-Unat, 1997).  
Despite demands by their constituencies, and a sense of nationhood as foundations of the 
nation-states that call for restrictive migration policies in nation-states; same states adopt 
more liberal policies, welcoming considerably more international immigrants or at least 
delaying implementation of adopted restrictionist policies, contrary to restrictive policy 
32 
 
discourse. This gap between restrictionist policy discourse and a more liberal immigration 
reality is explained by theories on limits to state sovereignty, either internal or external. 
Internal limits to state capacities on migration policy-making are deliberated under the 
context of self-limited sovereignty which claims that domestic political actors, institutions 
and structures, including client politics (Freeman, 1995) and constitutional-legal processes 
(Joppke, 1998) limit state sovereignty, causing a gap between restrictionist policy intent and 
expansionist migration reality (Joppke, 2005).  
Joppke frames self-limited sovereignty around constitutionalism and claims institutions and 
normative implications of liberal statehood act as interferences upon coercive practices 
against immigrants. He argues, through courts, judiciaries and non-governmental 
organizations, that liberal constitutionalism limits state capacities both in legislative as well 
as in a normative framework (Joppke, 1998). Thus, governments are self-limited by liberal 
norms they have adopted, and their policies to restrict unwanted migration, independent of 
the category of immigration flow, which includes irregular migrants, asylum seekers and 
family migrants. In ideal liberal democracies, fundamental freedoms based on human rights, 
instead of citizenship, are guaranteed to immigrants by independent courts, which are 
institutions of liberal nation states themselves. Thus, this acts as a pure case of self-limited 
sovereignty, a constitutive feature of the liberal state, by an independent court system which 
limits state control on entry and stay of people in its own territory (Guiraudon & Joppke, 
2001) even in cases where states have no or little interest. The right to family reunification 
or to seek asylum are significant examples of constitutionalist self-limited sovereignty.  
Internal limits on state sovereignty based on capitalism are established upon the assumption 
that, migrant labour is essential for advanced capitalist societies and business networks push 
national immigration policies in a more liberal direction (Freeman, 1998). Thus, the gap 
between restrictionist demands of the public and official policies, is the outcome of “client 
politics” based on preferences of a small group of actors in which economic benefits of labour 
migration are accumulated. Freeman argues these organized business and ethnic lobby 
groups, inevitably have greater influence over policy, in comparison to the unorganized 
public (Freeman, 1995). Thus, in conclusion, Freeman argues, in liberal nation states, during 
policy making processes of labour migration, policies are determined by the relative strength 
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of organized client politics (Freeman, 2006). This approach is criticized for overlooking 
preferences and priorities of state actors and institutions in terms of providing access to a 
small number of businesses and unions that pursue similar agendas to their own (Boswell, 
2007). Moreover, Brubaker, together with agreeing this model would fit settler societies like 
the USA, argued this model would not be suitable for countries in Europe, where immigration 
has post-dated nation building (Brubaker, 1995). Despite criticisms, the model is worth 
discussing to explain the scope and impact of client politics in facilitating domestic change 
in labour migration policies while accepting the theory’s inadequacies for other categories of 
migration.  
2.4.2 External Limits to State Capacities on Migration Policy 
The literature on globally-limited sovereignty presents two main types of external restraints 
on state capabilities on migration policy making: (a) international norms and a global 
migration regime that states are bound to (Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994) (b) increased “de-
nationalization” of the global market economy with co-existence of free flow of capital and 
information in contrast with restrictions on mobility of people (Sassen, 1996). The initial 
type of globally-limited sovereignty literature mainly presents the global human rights 
regime and other international structures as limiting state sovereignty in migration policy 
making (Jacobson, 1996). Under this category, Soysal’s theory of post-national membership 
is worth a mention (Soysal, 1994). She argues that immigrants and their descendants bypass 
state jurisdiction in their claims for social and political inclusion and derive their rights from 
the international human rights regime instead. Thus, their membership of the international 
community is perceived as being beyond nation state citizenship as a form of post-national 
membership (Soysal, 1997). Soysal’s post-nationalist arguments on loss of sovereignty based 
on global human rights and a “universal personhood” (Soysal,1994; Jacobson, 1996) are 
mainly challenged by constitutionalist self-limited sovereignty arguments, introduced above, 
stating that these norms are not external constraints imposed upon liberal states by the global 
migration regime. Conversely, these norms establish the basis of liberal nation states and the 
normative framework of the global migration regime is also constructed by these states 
(Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001). This approach is also challenged by claims of the non-existence 
of a substantial global migration regime, framed around an international organization 
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(Freeman, 1998). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) does not have a clear 
mandate under the UN system, and except for issues related to asylum and refugee protection, 
which are regulated by the UNHCR, there is not an established multilateral migration regime 
consisting of a formal set of international agreements.  
The second category of external limits to state capacities on migration policy, focuses on the 
incompatibility of the co-existence of two contradictory trends: re-nationalization of 
immigration policies and de-nationalization of the global market economy. Sassen claims 
that the co-existence of these two contradictory trends is indeed unstable and the latter will 
end up limiting the activities of the former (Sassen, 1996). This claim mainly puts emphasis 
on the deficiency in the system for implementing different regimes for capital and people, 
although closely connected economically. It displays need for a formalized labour migration 
policy as globally as the one for skilled migrants or for the global economic regime itself 
(Sassen, 1998). She supports her claim with the inexorable mobility of elite personnel 
together with movement of capital and argues this movement will inevitably spill-over to 
other categories of labour migration (Sassen, 1996). In the same direction as Sassen’s theory, 
Hollifield introduces the “liberal paradox” in which nation state policy makers struggle 
between keeping their markets open to foreign investments and keeping their borders closed 
to international migration. These policy-makers are expected to establish a balanced policy, 
between keeping their economies open to trade and investment; together with regulating 
international migration, to satisfy popular scepticism towards migration (Hollifield, 2004). 
To be more precise, Hollifield supports the idea that, nation-states struggle to find an 
optimum point between the economic logic of liberalism with its ideal of openness, and 
political and the legal logic of closure (Hollifield, 1998). Yet, neo-functionalist spill-over 
theory states that it is not necessarily a zero-sum game in which the logic of liberalism shall 
be presented as the opposite of political and legal logic of closure. Instead, due to the 
interconnection of various issue areas, it is expected that, integration in one policy area, the 
economic sphere, performs as a catalyst for spill over into related policy areas. For instance, 
development of the EU Justice and Home Affairs dimension can be perceived as a direct 
consequence of earlier market integration policies such as the Single Market and the 
Schengen Agreement (Macmillan, 2008). 
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2.5 Conclusion: The Questions of Generalisation 
Leading theories on migration policy making in nation states were presented above to form 
a basis for the nation-state level discussions on domestic change in Turkey. Empirical 
evidence for theories that are introduced under this section are often found in traditional 
settlement countries and migrant receiving countries of Europe. These countries have 
established electoral and party systems, constitutional structures, civil societies, a traditional 
national narrative on immigration and they experience an advanced level of capitalism. 
Generalising these theories has been challenged in various empirical studies and cross-
country differences, numerous studies occurring among these migrant receiving countries. 
For instance, in a study on British immigration policies, Statham and Geddes present 
evidence both challenging Freeman and Joppke by showing that elite positions dominate 
policy making processes to make them more restrictive while the power of organized public 
and judiciaries remain limited. They present British immigration policies as driven by 
relatively autonomous elites, and these elites have the power and autonomy to act against 
restrictionist policies, if they had the political will to do so (Statham & Geddes, 2007).  
Considering the cross-country variance between Western liberal democracies, it is not 
surprising to come upon stronger inconsistencies in the case of Turkey, as the country does 
not fully possess any of the features that are mentioned above. Its electoral and party systems 
have been dominated by single party rule for the last fourteen years without much space for 
active opposition. Its constitutional structures and civil society are weak as a result of a strong 
state tradition. Turkey does not have a traditional national narrative on immigration resulting 
from its status as a transition country, in the process of transforming to a migrant-receiving 
country. Its level of advanced capitalism is most certainly the most compatible feature with 
Western liberal states, though that feature is premature as well, resulting from the relatively 
new introduction of the full capitalist system in the 1980s. However, it is also difficult to find 
an established migration policy theory for a transition country, like Turkey, which is in the 
process of becoming an immigrant-receiving country, rather than just a sending one. These 
theories will inevitably present various shortcomings in explaining Turkish migration 
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policies, but an established theoretical structure is necessary to start a structured empirical 
analysis. 
In this chapter, I have introduced theoretical approaches to external influences and state 
capabilities on migration policy making. In upcoming case study chapters, with respect to 
the institutionalist theoretical framework, I evaluate actor influences based on their ability to 
induce compliance with their own institutional features, rules and regulations, either by 
mechanisms of rational choice or sociological institutionalism. A literature review of 
facilitators and limits of given mechanisms at EU and international level, has simplified the 
search for these mechanisms in these actors’ relationships with Turkey. Such a review has 
established differences between mechanisms available to international organisations of the 
global migration regime and the EU, based on their capabilities. Essentially, such difference 
emerges from weakness of the global migration regime, due to absence of a formal and 
coherent ‘top-down’ multilateral framework to govern international migration. This absence 
inhibits the global migration regime from acting on conditionality, the main mechanism the 
EU uses for enacting domestic change in third countries. It is also hard to mention any 
international-level retractions, commitments or threats without a unified body to govern 
international migration. While the EU’s most successful mechanism for enacting domestic 
change, the conditionality framework, is framed around rational choice institutionalism, the 
global migration regime can only act upon socialisation without any background to facilitate 
cost and benefit structures.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Research Design: A Case Study Analysis  
As presented in the introduction chapter, the underlying research question of this study is:  
“How does the changing constellation of the relations between the EU, 
international organisations and Turkey shape Turkish migration policies? How 
does it vary across the policy fields and over time?”  
In line with this question, in this study, I focus upon three sets of factors that establish the 
outcome in Turkish migration policies: (a) the constellation of actor relations; (b) their 
evolution with respect to time and context; (c) their variations with respect to characteristics 
of four different policy fields. In this study, I seek these factors in a case study analysis. In 
this way, I indicate a systematic examination of diagnostic evidence that is selected and 
analysed in a way compatible with the research questions (Collier, 2011). In such a 
systematic analysis, cases are phenomena limited within space and time, such as individuals, 
groups, policy areas or institutions (Burnham et al., 2004). For an analysis of Turkish 
migration policy change, I employ a multiple case study design, selecting diverse policy 
fields as cases. Such a multiple case study design, focusing on each policy field 
independently enables me to better assess the deployment of influence mechanisms by each 
actor, with respect to contextual differences embedded within each case.  
Accordingly, I have selected four migration policy fields as case studies to represent Turkey’s 
migration reality and the nature of external influences on migration policy change: Turkey's 
legislative reform and the introduction of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection; 
irregular migration and the EU-Turkey readmission agreement; regular migration and 
Turkish visa policy; the condition of asylum seekers and removal of geographical limitation 
from the 1951 Convention. These cases correspond to the different types of migration, regular 
migration, irregular migration, and asylum, and as a result are representative of 
characteristics of policy responses and the nature of external influences against them. As the 
study seeks an analysis of actor influences, I chose cases among the policy fields where the 
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EU or international organisations are involved with an interest to influence policy change. 
Thus, I chose them from among policy fields stressed in Chapter 24 of the EU annual progress 
reports for Turkey, published since 1999 (Commission of the European Communities, 1999-
2009; European Commission, 2010-2015).  
The case studies incorporate discussions on the migration literature, and their impact on actor 
influences. The cases are representative of different types of migration, regular migration; 
irregular migration; and asylum. Such representation enables this research to make grounded 
generalisations and better identify contextual specificities which facilitate or block a causal 
relationship. Case selection also enables the researcher to illustrate the logic behind policy 
responses to each category. I expect each policy field to be framed with an economy, security 
or human rights based logic. A representation of each type of logic, facilitates cross-case 
comparison to understand implications they have on the impact of external influences, and 
influence mechanisms applicable to each logic. Prominence of concerns over state 
sovereignty embedded in each case study also adds an important variable to analysis of 
external influences.  
The first case study is on Turkey's legislative reform and introduction of the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection. It embraces all three types of logic during the 
development of migration legislation, containing an economic dimension related to regular 
migration, politicisation and security framing related to irregular migration and human rights 
concerns of asylum policy making. It gives an introductory understanding of the changing 
impact of actor influences with respect to different types of migration under the legislative 
reform umbrella. This case is also strongly related to discussions over state sovereignty 
embedded in external influences, as Turkish policy makers aim to maintain assistance 
provided by external actors, but at the same time to avoid preparing initial migration 
legislation of the country under external influences. Turkish policy makers’ aim to re-assert 
power without losing external assistance is a main theme of this case study.  
The second case study, irregular migration and the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, 
reflects politicisation and securitisation of irregular migration, especially in relations between 
the EU and Turkey. This case involves imposition of an international agreement on the 
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country’s domestic policies, which implies a more structured and binding external influence 
compared with other policy fields. This imposition here and its absence in others is significant 
and elaborated in respect of politicisation. Moreover, a comparison of influence mechanisms 
established through an international agreement and accession conditionality framework 
further strengthens the relevance of this case in this study.  
The third case, regular migration and Turkish visa policy, analysed with a specific focus to 
the policy element of EU positive and negative visa lists, incorporates elements of the state 
sovereignty debate, while economic concerns on policy making prevail. This policy field is 
distinguished from others with its links, both economic and diplomatic, to third countries 
neighbouring Turkey. Here, a strict international bargaining framework between the EU and 
Turkey is applicable, and there are no other international organizations that have presented a 
policy preference. In this case study, policy change, responds to economic and diplomatic 
interests and commitments of Turkey, and its choice of partners in line with such interests.  
The final case study, the condition of asylum seekers and the removal of the geographical 
limitation from the 1951 Convention, incorporates the human rights dimension of migration 
policy change and is the most suitable case for international organisation involvement. Only 
in this case, are international organisations expected to have comparable influence with the 
EU. This policy field shows external pressures on Turkey, by international organisations, to 
prepare a policy with respect to human rights; and by the EU for maintaining a human rights 
and security balance. The significance of this case lies in the indirect relationship between 
these two levels of actors, and EU attempts to balance its claim to normative power without 
clashing with international organisations, together with protecting Union security interests.  
I have structured analysis of these four case studies, upon three levels of actor influences on 
policy outcome. I initially map relationships between actors and present an overview of 
external influence mechanisms, under EU and international level sections of each case study 
chapter. I place the findings of this initial mapping into the domestic context, present 
domestic reactions to each influence attempt, and evaluate their influence with respect to 
policy outcome under the domestic level sections. I conclude each case study with an analysis 
of the relative influence of each actor. I then introduce a comparative chapter, to make a 
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cross-case comparison and to present the dominant forms of influence mechanisms that 
actors use; the contextual peculiarities that support or undermine each influence mechanism; 
and the developments in the form of each actor relationship with respect to the context. 
Within these case studies, I do not seek a pure form of influence mechanism, but to identify 
the contextual differences when one mechanism grants superior influence in comparison to 
another, and the instances when these mechanisms complement each other.  
3.2  Data Collection Methods: Document Analysis and Semi-Structured Interviews 
3.2.1 Document Analysis: Primary and Secondary Sources  
I chose qualitative data collection methods of document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews to suit the case study research design this study employs. An adequate analysis of 
the case studies necessitates in depth information about policy making processes which can 
only be obtained through interviews with key officials. I began the data collection process 
for this study with compilation and analysis of related documents. Undertaking such an 
analysis prior to the fieldwork was an informed decision. I have postponed my fieldwork 
until I have absorbed related documents, to provide a more informed discussion during the 
interviews, and to better evaluate interview data during the fieldwork. While I have 
established the main narrative of the thesis through interview data, I have benefited from 
documents to crosscheck and contextualize this data. I have used the documents to establish 
policy background where policy reactions derived from the interview data materialize; and 
to reveal official policy outcome shaped by these reactions.  
The documents analysed in this study consist of primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources suggest original materials in the form of organisation and government agency 
original records, such as annual reports, treaties or legislations. Secondary sources are 
interpretations of these primary sources, which means reports and papers, prepared by 
research centres and academics, interpreting and evaluating primary sources. Primary sources 
are fundamental to this study, preparing a timeline of actor positions during policy processes 
and to understand the context in which changes in official bargaining positions, priorities and 
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attitudes occur at each actor level. However, secondary sources prepared by experts are also 
valuable to understand more specialised documents, such as legislation and treaties.  
The primary sources this study uses consist of Turkish national legislative documents, 
parliamentary decisions and action plans, EU assessment documents and agreements 
concerning Turkey and international conventions. The collection of these documents was not 
a difficult task. Careful online research has enabled the project to be comprehensive of all 
related important documents, published by the EU, international organisations and the 
Turkish state.  
The main Turkish national legislative documents that I have examined in the scope of this 
study, are the Law and Foreigners and International Protection (Law No. 6458, dated April 
4, 2013) and embedded migration legislation preceding this Law, such as the new Law on 
Settlement (Law No. 5543, dated September 19, 2006), Passport Law (Law No. 5682, dated 
July 15, 1950), the Law on Residence and the Travel of Foreign Nationals (Law No. 5683, 
dated July 15, 1950), and Turkish Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated February 11, 1964)1. 
Due to my focus on policy making processes and considering I don’t have a legal 
background, I have benefited from some secondary sources prepared by academic scholars 
and non-governmental organizations, to gain a better understanding of these documents. For 
instance, I have especially benefited from a report prepared for the Turkish Migration Studies 
Group at Oxford University (Açıkgöz & Arıner, 2014) and another published in the Oxford 
Monitor of Forced Migration (Soykan, 2012) in order to understand policy implications of 
the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.  
EU Commission documents analysed during this study consist of documents that set up 
objectives for migration and asylum reform as pre-conditions for Turkey’s accession to the 
Union and the documents that assess Turkey’s progress on those objectives. The Accession 
                                                          
1 The Law on Foreigners and International Protection is translated into eleven languages and these translations are 
available in the website of the Directorate General for Migration Management: <http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/11-dilde-
yukk_327_328_1174_icerik> . However, preceeding Laws are only available in Turkish and they can be searched from 
Turkish legislative information system: <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/> . Retrieved in January 9, 2015.  
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Partnership Documents for Turkey2 , adopted in 2001 and revised in 2003, 2006 and 2008, 
are documents prepared by the Commission, setting out long and short term objectives for 
Turkey on migration and other policy areas. Annual Progress Reports, published every year 
since 19983 assess progress on those objectives. In addition to these, three documents specific 
to migration policy have been fundamental for the analysis in this study: the readmission 
agreement signed between the EU and Turkey (Official Journal of The European Union, 
2014); the visa liberalisation road map (European Commission, 2013); and the report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on progress by Turkey in fulfilling 
requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap (European Commission, 2014). In this study, 
I also sought information concerning the EU relationship with Turkey, in the Council of the 
EU, the JHA Council, the Commission and the Parliament Conclusions and 
Communications4. These documents were only remotely relevant as they were not as detailed 
as those documents specifically prepared for the Union’s relationship with Turkey and did 
not add any further insights.  
As a response to each Accession Partnership document presented by the EU Commission, 
Turkey has prepared a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, first published 
in 2001 and revised in 2003 and 2008, to present its reform agenda to be undertaken as a 
response to its relationship with the EU5. Turkey also adopted a National Action Plan for the 
Adoption of the EU Acquis in the area of Asylum and Migration in 20056. Prior to the 
adoption of the visa liberalisation road map, this document established the basis for reforms 
Turkey is willing to undertake within the framework of its relation with the EU, in specific 
                                                          
2 Accession Partnership Documents are available at the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs’ website: 
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=46226&l=2> Retrieved in January 8, 2016. 
3 All of these documents are available at the Turkish Ministry for the EU Affairs’ website: 
<http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=113&l=2> Retrieved in January 8, 2016.  
4 An extensive document database is provided by the Commission in the following link: 
<http://europa.eu/publications/official-documents/index_en.htm>. Retrieved in January 9, 2016.  
Moreover, the websites of the specific EU institutions that provide official documents are as follows:  
Council of the EU: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents> 
European Parliament:  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/search/simple.htm;jsessionid=E478D22B3D0048D094C2AB4E55337C2B
?language=EN>. Retrieved in January 9, 2016.  
5 NPAAs are available at the Turkish Ministry for the EU Affairs’ website: 
<http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=113&l=2> Retrieved in January 8, 2016. 
6 The full text of the National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the area of Asylum and Migration is 
available at the Directorate General for Migration Management’s website: 
<http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/turkiye_ulusal_eylem_plani (2).pdf >. Retrieved in January 8, 2016. 
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policy fields of asylum and migration. This document is relevant for a comparison of reforms 
Turkey has agreed to undertake in relation to its accession conditionality; and reforms it has 
agreed to implement concerning the visa liberalisation road map, after the introduction of the 
visa incentive.  
The main international conventions referred to in this study are the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. For the purposes of this study, these 
agreements are significant, especially for understanding Turkey’s position as a party to the 
Convention, still maintaining the geographical limitation. As it is not a very contemporary 
topic, such analysis was not undertaken within this study, but implications of refugee status 
and the geographical limitation on each policy field introduced in this study were understood 
from secondary sources. Together with UNHCR and legal expert reports explicating 
implications of the UN based multilateral framework on EU external influences, there is also 
a vast literature on the specific case of Turkey and geographical limitation7. 
3.2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The research design of this study introduced above suggests an in-depth case study analysis. 
The qualitative data collection method of semi-structured interviews is particularly suitable 
for this. My choice to conduct semi-structured interviews is due to my expectations not only 
to obtain data on positions of actors on specific topics, but also to explicate the background 
story that they tell to justify their positions. Thus, I did not propose a strict questionnaire, but 
open questions that frame the contents of the interview, and allow interviewees to present 
their experiences, perceptions and priorities within that framework. I gave interviewees some 
flexibility to pursue the direction they prefer in answering these framework questions and to 
share their thoughts and subjective experiences.  
The main data I was trying to acquire from these interviews was based on actor policy 
preferences prior to the outcome; and the relative influence these preferences have on Turkish 
migration policy, through the mechanisms they facilitate. For the purposes of this research 
                                                          
7 The works of Ahmet Içduygu and Kemal Kirişci, cited in the Bibliography of this study, are especially relevant for such 
an analysis.  
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interviews with key officials were not only necessary to comprehend these policy preferences 
and influence mechanisms, they were also essential to examine the relationship between 
policy preferences, the influence mechanisms and the contextual differences. Examining 
these relationships through a document analysis is not reliable as consequentiality between 
policy preferences, context and outcome presented in the documents is not always 
straightforward. While a newspaper discourse analysis of high-rank official statements could 
partially overcome this shortcoming, declarations on contemporary affairs are often 
politically charged and reveal calculated opinions on actor negotiation positions, rather than 
pure policy preferences. However, key officials who were interviewed at a time after the 
policy outcome was set, are less likely to be politically charged, as their opinions would no 
longer influence outcome. Moreover, anonymity of interviews is a big advantage compared 
to newspaper analysis, granting relative assurance to interviewees to reveal their opinions 
without risking the political aftermath.  
In total, I had twenty one interviews with key policy officials from Turkey, EU and 
international organisations. I have conducted interviews with high and middle-ranked 
officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, 
and the Directorate General for Migration Management, the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs; 
Delegation of the EU to Turkey; IOM Turkey; UNHCR Turkey; the European Commission 
Directorate General for Home Affairs; and the European Commission Directorate General 
for Enlargement. I have also conducted six additional interviews with representatives of 
Turkish non-governmental organisations on migration and academia for purposes of 
gathering substantive and statistical information though an analysis of their policy positions 
are not of concern to this research. 
I chose interviewees with a “purposive” sampling, meaning the project’s purpose and the 
researcher’s knowledge has guided the sampling in parallel to the needs of the research, based 
on positional and reputational criteria (Tansey, 2007, p. 770). My sampling relied dominantly 
on the positional criteria as I identified my potential interviewees based on their positions, 
provided by their institution website. In line with the positional criteria, I interviewed higher 
rank officials, such as directors or heads of offices, in offices with a specific focus on 
migration within the Turkish state, and with a specific focus on Turkey and migration within 
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the EU Commission. In parallel to this study’s aims, I preferred to contact higher ranked 
officials, assuming they would be more capable of talking for the whole institution rather 
than lower ranked ones. Also based on positional criteria, I interviewed “experts” within 
these institutions, appointed to advisory positions, producing statistics and reports for the 
institution. I have asked interviewees to use their institutional voice, rather than their 
individual opinions, as I would be using their views in my research as representative of their 
organisation. I have asked them to state when they are suggesting an individual opinion, 
rather than their institutional position. While I have obtained more politically framed data 
from high ranked officials on policy making decisions of their institutions, data obtained 
from medium rank experts and advisors was more contextualised, consisting of policy 
reactions to domestic and international developments. 
I have mostly contacted my interviewees via e-mail, prior to going into the field. In total, I 
contacted thirty-nine officials via their work e-mail addresses, obtained from institution 
websites. I have previously met two of the officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Directorate General for Migration Management for another research project, 
thus, I knew their personal e-mails. I have also obtained the e-mail address of an official from 
UNHCR and another from the IOM, from my research network. Additionally, I sent seven e-
mails to the central e-mail address of offices. The central offices often forwarded my e-mails 
to officials to whom I have already sent an e-mail. Only the EU Delegation to Turkey 
forwarded me to an official whom I had not already contacted. In the end, I sent e-mails to 
forty-six officials or offices, requesting meetings by explaining this research project and got 
twenty-one positive replies. I have also contacted another three correspondents via telephone 
and got two positive replies. I also had four more interviews, in the “next room” facilitated 
by my interviewee introducing me to their colleagues in nearby offices. Although I had a 
total number of twenty-seven appointments for interviews, I had six cancellations prior to the 
meetings due to scheduling problems or other engagements. Thus, finally, I could conduct a 
total of twenty-one interviews with high and middle-ranked officials from the Turkish 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs; the Turkish Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General for 
Migration Management; the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs; the Delegation of the EU to 
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Turkey; IOM Turkey; UNHCR Turkey; the European Commission Directorate General for 
Home Affairs; and the European Commission Directorate General for Enlargement.  
I stayed in Ankara for a month in January 2014, to undertake the interviews with Turkish 
officials. I conducted twelve interviews in Ankara in January 2014, with officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Migration Department, and the Ministry for EU Affairs 
Directorate of Political Affairs; the UNHCR Ankara Office; the IOM Ankara Office and the 
Delegation of the EU to Turkey. In Ankara, I had additional meetings, based on information 
and data sharing with officials from Amnesty International. I had one Skype meeting with a 
senior policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2014 and made an 
additional trip to Ankara to meet with two key officials from the Directorate General for 
Migration Management in June 2015. I also had meetings with academic scholars from 
Bilkent and Hacettepe Universities in Ankara and Koç University in Istanbul, to discuss the 
subject and seek topical data. I made a field trip to Brussels in April 2014 to meet with EU 
officials and I had interviews with six high and medium rank officials from Turkey units of 
the DG Enlargement and DG Home Affairs. As the names of the offices also suggest, within 
the Turkish state, I visited offices with a specific focus on migration, while in Brussels, I 
visited DG offices with a specific focus on Turkey and migration.  
The main problem I had in reaching related officials was scheduling an appointment with 
officials from the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General for Migration 
Management. I contacted my potential interviewees in Ankara in late 2013 and asked for an 
appointment in January 2014. However, during this time, the Directorate was preoccupied 
with the implementation phase of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which 
was adopted in April 2013 and would enter into force in April 2014. I asked my other 
interviewees, especially ones in the IOM and the UNHCR for help but was informed they 
were not able to reach the Directorate either. I continued to send e-mails to the officials, and 
I only got a response on April 2015. I arranged another interview in June 2015 via e-mail, 
visited Ankara once more for these two meetings, and later added them to my analysis. I also 
had various other problems with lesser potential influence, which I did not pursue. For 
instance, I tried to establish meetings with officials from the Turkish Armed Forces, both 
Land Forces and the Coast Guard, considering it is the institution which, to a large extent, is 
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currently responsible for Turkish border protection. Although I was denied a meeting, they 
sent me topical data on detainment statistics, which were valuable for my research. Also, 
during the progress of research, I decided to abandon the issue of the border as a case study, 
so absence of an interview with the Turkish Armed Forces did not impact considerably on 
the quality of my research. In another instance, Turkish ministerial officials became less 
responsive to e-mails after events of 17 December 2013, which led to the criminal 
investigation of several key Turkish government officials. Also, some interviews scheduled 
for early January 2014, were more politically framed than I would prefer.  
During the interviews, there were no problems based on language and an interpreter was not 
needed. I undertook interviews with some Turkish officials in Turkish and others English. 
The main limitations that I experienced during the interviews were the impositions of 
anonymity and use of a voice recorder. Because of ethical review standards demanded by of 
the University of Sussex, I offered interviewees the opportunity to ask for anonymity and 
almost all requested it. Thus, to maintain a coherent research, interviewees were cited by 
name of institution and rank. One EU-level and three Turkish ministerial level key officials 
also asked not to be quoted. This constituted a problem for the research, which mainly uses 
quotes to present evidence for my claims. The information obtained from these unquoted 
interviews was presented in the empirical chapters without a reference to respect their wishes, 
while some officials were over-quoted in order to present evidence. In regard to the voice 
recorder, while representatives of international organisations mostly agreed its use; except 
for two, the Turkish state, governmental and EU Commission officials asked me to take notes 
instead. Although it is possible to grasp the general idea of the interview by taking notes, it 
was problematic capturing accurate quotes in hand writing. I had to ask interviewees to repeat 
statements, sometimes several times, to obtain an accurate quote.  
The structure of interviews was based on sixteen empirically informed questions which I sent 
to interviewees via e-mail prior to interview (see Appendix 1). Questions consisted of four 
parts, the first on their general organisational role, the second on their organisation position 
on specific policy fields selected for my research the third on their role in relation to other 
actors and the fourth on their reactions to changing context and future expectations. 
Considering possible time limitations, the fourth part consists of questions that do not directly 
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contribute to analysis of actor influences, but have potential to support the narrative with 
intriguing details. It was beneficial to have additional questions to introduce when the actors 
signalled more time, or to be able to omit a section when they had stated time limitations. 
Some interviewees preferred to abandon the question structure totally, and asked me to 
describe the essence of my research and talked accordingly. Though most of them answered 
my questions. Finally, having the structure of a questionnaire enabled me to systematically 
compare policy positions of interviewees.  
The first set of questions aimed to gather data on the organisations’ level of involvement in 
Turkish migration policy change, their policy preferences, and perceptions on the level of 
success of imposing them. Here, I asked interviewees general questions about migration 
policy change in Turkey, rather than directing them to case-specific claims in order to 
understand which policy field and instrument they talked about predominantly and where 
their main interests were directed. I asked questions about the role, status and main aims of 
their organisation, the reason for prioritising these aims and their perceived level of success. 
The interviewees responded to these initial parts of questions with longer answers in 
comparison to other parts, considering this part consists of more general questions, open to 
interpretation. However, this openness also led interviewees to misinterpret the substance of 
these questions and led some to give details about their organisations’ historical role and 
status, which could be easily obtained from their websites. For instance, in interviews 
conducted with representatives of the international organisations, especially UNHCR, 
interviewed officials overstressed their strict mandate. Also, in the ministerial offices and 
DG offices, officials elaborately presented their actions concerning migration policy change, 
undertaken in the last few years, which could also be obtained by analysing documents. 
However, all levels of actors responded substantially to the question concerning the basis of 
their decision to prioritise given aims by providing in-depth information, and began to hint 
at mechanisms they were employing in pursuit of these aims. The perceived level of success 
question following this, led them to establish parallels between the basis of their decisions 
and the outcome. In the end, the perceived level of success became an important question for 
further analysis, as their satisfaction with the current state of migration policy change 
established reactions to that question. 
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In the second part, I began to directly ask the organisations’ positions on policy instruments 
which would become case studies in this thesis. As expected, a proportion of reactions to 
these specific policy instruments varied depending on the focus of the organisation 
interviewed. Domestically, while the focus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry for the EU Affairs was directed to the readmission agreement and visa liberalisation, 
the Ministry of Interior’s focus was on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 
which they had spent the last two years preparing. Due to the Union’s present focus, officials 
from the Commission spent a long time talking about readmission and irregular migration, 
while legislative reform with an emphasis on asylum was the preferred topic of international 
organisations. Despite these selective responses, I managed to obtain rich and substantial data 
on all policy fields that I selected to analyse in this thesis, except for one. In the initial version 
of this thesis, I included the transfer of Turkish border management to a civilian unit as a 
case. However, most of the interviewees did not present an organisational position or policy 
preference on this matter. They mostly disregarded that part of the question. Moreover, I was 
not planning to include the Law on Foreigners and International Protection as a case study 
because it is a very comprehensive policy instrument, embedded in all of the cases presented 
in this study. I planned to explicate it within cases when it was relevant. In the interviews, I 
discovered that it was viable to establish legislative reform as a case study on its own. 
Although its implications are embedded in other policy fields, policy making is established 
as an independent process, with specific external influence mechanisms. Also, as its 
implementation was contemporary to the timing of the interviews, interviewees discussed it 
enthusiastically. Thus, I omitted the case study on borders and replaced it with a case study 
on legislative change. 
In the third part, I began to explicate actors’ perceptions and understandings over their 
relationships with one another, to understand how actors support or undermine each other’s 
level of influence on Turkish migration policy. I asked about possible alliances and 
disagreements between actors on policy preferences. Here, the answers of all key officials 
became more politicised as they began to state instances when their organisation was in 
cooperation or conflict with others and the ways they have tried to influence each other’s 
policy preferences. I also questioned their perception of power and the most powerful actor 
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in this policy reform agenda. Consistency in the answers given to this power question for 
each case study has enabled me to identify the actor, which other actors were directly aiming 
to influence, to facilitate policy in their preferred direction. These answers made it easier to 
seek influence mechanisms, as I assumed they would be directed to the actor identified in the 
answers for this question. In this part, I also attempted to explain and analyse policy making 
processes and forms of interaction among parties. However, very few interviewees responded 
elaborately to this part of the question. This final part became significant in identifying forms 
of interaction for each policy field. This part analyses horizontal or vertical mechanisms in 
each field, while frequent technicalised interactions facilitate the former, occasional higher 
level interactions facilitate the latter. 
In the fourth part, I asked questions about changes in actor policy preferences with respect to 
international and domestic context. This question helped to identify policy fields where actors 
had relatively more room for flexibility and ones where actor policy preferences were final. 
I concluded interviews with a question on predictions for the future of Turkish migration 
policy change. Some answers to this question were quite descriptive, revealing the calendar 
for implementation, stating reports that will be published in the near future and listing 
expected contextual developments like the elections. These types of answers were valuable 
to understand the expected future contextual facilitators and obstacles on policy 
implementation as well as to present the documents to follow during the implementation 
phase. However, for the purposes of this study, the few answers concerning future 
mechanisms the parties were planning to implement to maintain their influence upon each 
other, were more relevant.  
Although all interviewees were asked the same questions, some interviews took much longer 
than others. While the shortest one lasted for fifteen minutes, the longest one was around two 
hours. No interview was limited by time. As my questions were generally open to 
interpretation, none of the interviewees reacted negatively, or refused to answer any 
questions. However, as they were framework questions, each interviewee chose a different 
direction and a different focus in answering them. These differences among actor responses 
were also included in the analysis as an indicator of prioritised policy fields and relative 
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dominance of political, economic, or human rights based approaches adopted as priorities by 
representatives of these organisations.  
In most interviews, interviewees presented the organisations’ perceptions concerning policy, 
their priorities and their relations with other actors. In a few, they only repeated the official 
position of their organisation, which could have been easily obtained from their websites. 
The EU-level officials generally provided substantive views on their organisation’s position 
on migration, the policy making process behind closed doors and relations with Turkey and 
international organisations. Most of this data was unobtainable from any official document 
other than these interviews. This was surprising as I had been warned prior to going into the 
field by my research network, of EU officials’ tendency to repeat their organisations’ official 
line, and their reservations about presenting their views on politically charged policy fields. 
It has also been beneficial to have meetings in both DG Home Affairs and DG Enlargement. 
In the former I was able to meet with officials who have been directly involved in the policy 
and implementation phase with frequent visits to the field and was able to get the focused 
perception officials concerned with the application. In the latter, I was able to meet officials 
with a political perception, looking at the issue from a more general point of view. Being able 
to evaluate both perceptions enabled me to present the EU position more accurately. My 
meetings with Turkish officials had a similar pattern. Similar to the ones in the DG 
Enlargement, officials from the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the EU 
Affairs have presented dominantly expected political benefits from policy and steps to be 
taken if they were not met. However, officials from the Ministry of Interior focused more on 
the reform agenda, and possible facilitators and obstacles to its implementation. Unlike 
officials from the EU Commission and Turkish state, representatives of international 
organisations were cautious to present their perceptions beyond the official line. Except for 
a few instances, interviews held with representatives of international organisations ended up 
quietly descriptive, with a focus on activities undertaken by these organisations. However, 
this cautiousness is also valuable data, showing the hesitancy of these organisations in 
presenting a solid position in Turkish domestic politics, especially in policy fields that are 
not strictly defined within their mandate.  
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The performance of each interview also varied depending on the timing of the interview. For 
instance, I began to conduct these interviews just three weeks after the readmission 
agreement was signed, the Ministry for EU Affairs especially made an effort to promote the 
benefits expected from this agreement and the visa liberalisation road map to the public. They 
were preparing an information campaign. Thus, rather than presenting their concerns over 
each policy field, they had a tendency to focus on the readmission agreement. Moreover, 
interviews also coincided with the adoption of the Law and its entrance into force. Therefore, 
both officials from the Turkish state as well as international organisations were preoccupied 
with its implementation and issues related to the Law dominated interviews. Also, the process 
of adoption of the Law was satisfying for international organisations as the Directorate 
General for Migration Management had included them in decision making, during the 
preparation and implementation phase. Good relations established during legislative reform 
have overcome past grievances between these actors. Thus, because of the good environment 
established by the participatory process of the Law, I was not able to capture international 
organisation perceptions on their relationship with Turkish state in other policy fields.  
Despite problems related with sampling, anonymity and the substance of interviews, in 
general, interviews were adequate for an analysis of the dynamics of migration policy change 
in Turkey. I obtained rich data on each level of actor policy preferences and priorities and 
mechanisms implemented to influence policy change in line with these preferences and 
priorities. The gathered data is also viable for an assessment of the relative impact of 
influence mechanisms with cross-case comparison of the mechanisms the actors present, and 
their perceptions on their organisations’ level of success, regarding policy outcome. The 
interview data also established the dynamics of relations between actors, and a basis for 
identifying the relative influence of each actor for each policy field.  
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Chapter 4: Turkish Migration Policy Change in Context 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last decade, Turkey has been transforming its migration policy. While Turkish policy 
makers frame such transformation as an attempt to make migration beneficial for Turkey, a 
large portion of the reform agenda consists of externally influenced policy changes, 
introduced as a response to pressures generated by the EU and international organisations. It 
is not possible to evaluate Turkish migration policy change without these external influences. 
The contextual factors that generated these external influences, along with domestic need for 
a policy response, are the main themes of this chapter. Here, I present background, not of the 
overall migration history of Turkey, but the context that generated pressures for a policy 
response at domestic, EU and international level. The main function of this chapter is to equip 
the reader with contextual information necessary to situate analyses in the following four 
case studies within the broader framework of migration in Turkey. I aim to display problems 
in the existing migratory context and reveal occasions when this context has compelled the 
three levels of actors given in this study to establish policy responses.  
In this chapter, initially introduce the size, scale, scope and nature of immigration flows from, 
to and through Turkey. Then, I situate this demographic data within policy discussions as 
contextual evidence shaping actor preferences, priorities and reservations. In the first section, 
I establish a narrative of the migration story of Turkey, categorised under three main types 
of migratory flows the country experienced. Thus, I lay out the migration context of the 
country, to reveal areas potentially perceivable as requiring obligatory policy responses from 
the Turkish state and international institutions. Afterwards, in the second section of this 
chapter, I introduce the main actors that are influential in policy change in Turkey, displaying 
the role and function of each actor within Turkish policy making. In the conclusion I link 
these two, and introduce policy outcomes that will be analysed in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis.  
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4.2 International and Domestic Context: Migration in Turkey  
The history of migration in Turkey has long been perceived as a history of emigration, 
because of bias based on the influx of Turkish guest workers in 1960s to Europe, especially 
to Germany, continuing in the 1970s, reaching to Australia. However, since the 1920s, the 
country has experienced mixed flows of immigration and emigration. In the early Republic 
period of the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey has welcomed people from “Turkish culture and 
origin.” In the 1980s, asylum flows to the country from its Eastern neighbours, especially 
Iran, began to rise. With the end of the Cold War, migratory flows increased and diversified 
as Turkey began to receive immigrants from Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries. 
In parallel to these flows, irregular immigration to the country also increased. As a 
considerable portion of these immigrants intended to transit to Europe, Turkey also began to 
be labelled as a transit country. In the last decade, with the economic development of Turkey 
and a rise in the number of immigrants who migrate to Turkey with an intention to settle, 
migration scholars in Turkey began to categorize it as a “transition country,” in the process 
of transition from a country of emigration to a country of immigration (Abadan Unat, 2002; 
Içduygu & Kirişci, 2009).  
All of these migration flows, and many others elaborated below have shaped actor 
preferences, priorities and reservations, and as a result, triggered domestic and internal 
pressures for domestic change in the country’s migration policy. Before moving on to 
systematically examine these flows here, it is significant to mention the problem of 
categorisation of policy making in migration management. While policy responses to 
migration are shaped under three categories, regular, irregular and asylum flows, the 
distinction between irregular and asylum flows are rarely that clear. Empirical evidence 
suggests overlaps in categories of irregular migration and asylum. They are similar in terms 
of countries of origin and mode of entrance into the country. The status of rejected asylum 
seekers and irregular immigrants are almost identical (Içduygu, 2005). Moreover, immigrants 
can identify themselves as belonging to a different category. For instance, an individual 
immigrant could adopt the title of refugee and labour migrant interchangeably as a response 
to policy developments in the destination country. These complexities related to 
55 
 
categorisation also concerned policy makers in Turkey, during preparation of legislation, 
policy and implementation (Seyhan, 2014). Accepting overlaps between these categories, 
due to state’s need to divide security concerns and commitment to human rights, policy 
making and implementation is executed with strict division between these categories. While 
empirical evidence suggests a fairly blurred line between irregular immigrants and asylum 
seekers, this division is strict in legislation, policies and choice of implementing agencies. 
Moreover, Turkey’s international relations and responsibilities further consolidate this 
division as international pressures to curb irregular migration through the country supports a 
securitized approach. Turkey’s’ international responsibilities oblige it to approach asylum 
seekers from a human rights perspective. Considering the main research question of this 
thesis is focused on policy processes, this section will also adopt the policy-makers’ threefold 
policy response to categorisation as regular migration, irregular migration and asylum.  
4.2.1 Regular Migration 
Initial immigration flows to Turkey began right after establishment of the Republic in 1923, 
in the form of return migration from the Balkan countries, especially Greece and Bulgaria, 
of people from Turkish ethnicity and Islamic Faith. These flows were typically 
institutionalised by bilateral agreements (Eminov, 1997; Erdal, 2006; Kirişci, 2007). The 
legislative outcome of this state policy is the Law on Settlement8 of 1934, which specifically 
limits immigration and asylum to people of “Turkish descent or culture.” Despite its narrow 
scope, the Law remained in force until 2006, until the New Law of Settlement9 was adopted 
as a response to external pressures from the EU. However, this law also limited immigration 
to people of Turkish descent and culture, and it was inadequate in providing a legislative 
framework for asylum seekers or other categories of immigrants. Similar to the previous law, 
this New Law on Settlement was also limited to defining categories of people whose 
immigration were desired by the Turkish state.  
These initial immigration flows were followed by large scale emigration from Turkey, which 
began after an agreement signed between Turkey and West Germany in October 31st, 1961. 
                                                          
8 Law No. 2510; dated 14 June 1934.  
9 Law No. 5543; dated 19 September 2006.  
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It enabled German firms to hire Turkish workers with temporary work contracts (Içduygu, 
2010). Similar agreements with other countries in Western Europe followed. As an outcome 
of these bilateral labour migration agreements, between 1961 and 1974, a total number of 
around 800,000 Turkish workers went to Western Europe, 649,000 to Germany, 56,000 to 
France, 37,000 to Austria and 25,000 to the Netherlands. In 1974, Western European 
countries stopped accepting labour migration. However, most of the temporary workers 
expected to return after their work contracts ended, settled permanently and family 
reunification followed their permanent settlement in the 1970s. In the 1960s and 70s, the 
Turkish state response to these emigration flows was based on economic concerns, focusing 
on regulation of remittances and managed return migration. In the following decades, 
emigration to Europe continued in different forms such as refugee movements, triggered by 
the 1980 military coup d’état and clandestine labour migration (Mügge, 2011). 
Although there were cases of return migration to Turkey especially after the oil crisis on 
1974, the number of Turkish migrants living in Europe is still considerably high and growing 
due to family reunification, childbirth and continuing asylum flows from Turkey to Europe. 
Currently, there is a second, and a third, generation in Europe of Europe-born children of 
Turkish workers. Stable Turkish migrant stocks were developed in European countries such 
as Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands (Içduygu, 2010; Gassmann & Içduygu, 
2013). Since 2000, according to data provided by the United Nations Population Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Turkish migrant stock in EU member states has 
stabilized around 2.5 million, with an annual increase rate around 0.8 per cent10. Thus, regular 
migration of Turkish citizens is losing its significance. Only policies on integration of already 
existing migrants maintain their significance in bilateral relations with some European 
countries, especially Germany. There are no significant signs of migratory pressure from 
Turkey to Europe, or to any third country, by Turkish nationals. The flow data based on 
residence permits, provided by the OECD shows a declining trend in inflows by Turkish 
citizens to OECD member countries until 2007, and afterwards, the number stabilizes around 
60,00011 (see Figure 4.1).  
                                                          
10 The data is available in the website of the UNPD: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.  
11 The data is compiled by the OECD and obtained from the following website: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MIG.  
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Figure 0-1: Inflows of Turkish Citizens to OECD Countries, 2000-2013 
Together with the decline in the numbers of Turkish citizens immigrating to OECD countries, 
especially in the last two decades, immigration flows towards Turkey, is transforming the 
country into a “country of immigration” (Içduygu, 2006; Kirişci, 2008). There is a significant 
increase in regular immigration flows to Turkey, consisting of businessmen, professionals 
and students, as well as European retirees who are settling in the Aegean and Mediterranean 
coasts of Turkey. There are some indications that Turkey is increasingly becoming a country 
of immigration. Figure 4.2 shows, data provided by the UN population division on estimates 
of the net number of migrants (number of immigrants-number of emigrants). There is an 
increasing trend in Turkey, from -100,002 between 2000 and 2005 to 2,000,003 between 
2010 and 201512. 
                                                          
12 The data is available in the website of the UNPD: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.  
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Figure 0-2: Net Number of Migrants in Turkey (thousands), 1950-2015 
Although this number is significant; due the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis, such steep 
increase in the net number of migration does not directly indicate a direct transformation in 
Turkey’s migration identity. Following two indicators are more relevant in support of this 
transformation. The first one is the increasing trend of provision of residence permits to third 
country nationals. The number of residence permits provided by the Turkish state to foreign 
nationals almost doubled between 2010 and 2013, from 182,301 to 313,692 respectively13. 
Secondly, in parallel with residence permits, the number of work permits provided to third 
country nationals is also on the rise, increasing from 14,023 in 2009 to 45,834 in 201314. 
Foreign nationals who reside in Turkey are from a diverse range of countries, including 
Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia and Georgia 
(Düvell, 2014). This transformation in Turkey’s migration identity to an immigration 
country, attracting people from diverse backgrounds, will occur as one of the main 
justifications of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, in the next chapter of 
this study.  
                                                          
13 Data is obtained from the website of Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management: 
http://goc.gov.tr/icerik6/goc-istatistikleri_363_363_378_icerik. 
14 Data is obtained from the website of Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security: 
http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/ShowProperty/WLP%20Repository/csgb/dosyalar/istatistikler/yabanciizin_2013. 
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4.2.2 Irregular Migration 
Turkey became a destination for irregular migration after the 1970s, mainly as a result of 
political developments in neighbouring countries, including the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, regime change in Iran and insecurities arising in the Middle East by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Moreover, with the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and 1990s, economic migrants from these countries 
also began to migrate to Turkey. Though their entrance was typically legal, they became 
irregular by overstaying their visas. A review of scholarly literature on irregular migration 
shows it is difficult to give an estimation of the number of irregular migrants (Içduygu & 
Toktaş, 2005; Sirkeci, 2009). Derived from the nature of irregular and “undocumented” 
migration, there are only some indicative estimates available, for instance, an evaluation of 
figures of irregular migrants apprehended by the Turkish security authorities.15 These figures 
are indicative, but they help to draw a picture of the extent of irregular migration in Turkey.  
 
Figure 0-3: Number of Detained Irregular Migrants in Turkey, 1995-2015 
                                                          
15 Since the mid-1990s, this data is compiled by the Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of 
General Security of the Ministry of Interior.  
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Apprehension data obtained from the Directorate General of Migration Management16 
suggests a significant increase in the number of irregular immigrants apprehended from the 
mid-1990s until the year 2000. While around 11,300 immigrants were apprehended in the 
year 1995, this number reached 94,500 in 2000. This figure began to decline in 2001 and 
dropped to around 32,500 in 2010. It has been increasing since then, reaching an all-time 
high in 2015. These figures indicate an average annual number of around 55,500 
apprehensions of irregular migrants for the period 1995-2015, while the total number of 
apprehensions is around 1.1 million.  
The literature states two main categories of irregular immigrants among these apprehension 
cases. First, there are economic irregular immigrants, who are discussed under circular or 
shuttle migration headings. They typically enter the country regularly, but they overstay their 
visas, seek employment or residence, without having valid documents to do so. Secondly, 
there are transit irregular migrants who come to Turkey with the intention to transit through 
Turkey to immigrate to a country in the West, mostly in Europe (Içduygu, 2008; 2005). They 
are distinguished from the other category by irregular entrance and attempts to transit through 
the country. Apprehension statistics do not allow us to make a clear distinction between these 
categories. In the literature, this division is made through assumptions, derived from available 
empirical data. The following part of this section is based on these assumptions in an attempt 
to identify the composition, size and scale of each irregular immigrant group.  
Historically, irregular migration flows to Turkey began in the late 1970s, with the first 
category, shuttle or circular migration. This kind of migration refers to the mobility of people 
making multiple trips to Turkey for economic reasons. These immigrants typically enter the 
country legally and become irregular as a result of overstaying their visas, or working without 
permits. They are mostly nationals of Turkey’s neighbouring countries, with whom Turkey 
has a quite free visa regime17 including Moldavia, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, 
Romania and Bulgaria. While shuttle trading declined during the 1990s, nationals of the 
                                                          
16 For more information, see the statistics heading in the webpage of Directorate General for Migration Management: 
http://goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-istatistikleri_363_378.  
17 The nationals of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine can 
enter the country with a sticker type visa, which is easily obtained in the airport and the nationals of Iran, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan can enter the country visa-free. 
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above stated countries began to work in unregistered sectors such as domestic labour, 
entertainment, construction, agriculture and sweatshops.  
Currently, there are neither domestic nor external pressures for policy change to curb 
irregular migration of overstayers from the above countries. The main reason for this absence 
of pressure, is not necessarily sufficient management of these flows, but is related to the 
countries they typically come from. The mobility of people from post-Soviet Republics and 
Eastern Europe is not framed as a security concern as their border crossing is typically legal 
and public reaction to their presence is not politically charged. Moreover, some of their 
countries of origin, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have historical 
bonds with Turkey and others, such as Russia, have valuable economic ties. Turkey is not 
prepared to risk those links by curbing such de-politicised irregular migration. Irregular 
immigrants from this category do not concern the European Union either because a few of 
them attempt transit to Europe via Turkey, but most of them stay and work illegally within 
Turkey (Kirişci, 2007). This first category of circular or shuttle irregular immigrants are 
significant in relation to irregular migration trends in Turkey. However, due to the absence 
of solid pressure for a policy response to curb or regulate this kind of migration, they will not 
feature further in this study, because of its focus on policy change.  
In parallel to domestic and external pressures on Turkish policy makers, the main focus of 
policy change has been directed to the second category of irregular migration to, or through, 
the country. In the literature, Turkey is described as a “transit country18”, which irregular 
immigrants use as a stop on their journey to their destination country, typically in Western 
Europe. Various state officials and scholars argue that, and this is supported by data compiled 
by the General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command under the Turkish 
General Staff, that irregular migrants who come from the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, 
irregularly crossing eastern and southern borders of the country, are more likely to use Turkey 
as a transit country on their way to their destination countries in Western Europe. They tend 
to enter and leave Turkey irregularly from its land or sea borders, assisted by human 
                                                          
18 Even though the usage of this term could be controversial due to the indication of an intentional transition with the 
consent of Turkish authorities, existing literature on the issue dominantly uses this term. Thus, for practical reasons, this 
study will continue to use this term though cautiously, by being aware of its possible implications on the motives of the 
Turkish authorities. 
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smugglers or traffickers. Turkey’s eastern borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria are particularly 
prone to irregular border crossings because of geographical features and local political 
instabilities. While immigrants in this category typically use the land route on their journey 
to Turkey, they usually prefer the Mediterranean Sea route on their journey to Europe, 
especially to Greece. 
A data set, made available by the General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard 
Command on the total number of detained immigrants at the country’s various borders, gives 
an indication of the scale of irregular migration through Turkey. This data reveals the balance 
between the numbers of attempted entries to the country with attempted exits from it. It 
should be noted here that this data does not include asylum movement from Syria, begun in 
December 2011. Whereas asylum seekers typically enter Turkey irregularly and then apply 
for refugee status, Turkey has opened its borders for Syrians and accepted them under a 
different category as “guests” from the moment of entrance. This has been legalised under a 
conditional refugee categorisation introduced into the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection. Thus, although the data shows that irregular entries from Syria are on the rise 
since 2011, these entries do not include mass refugee movements from Syria entering the 
country from designated checkpoints.  
Table 4.1: Persons Detained in Turkish Borders 2004-2014 (January-June) 19 
Entry  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Syria 448 469 989 1373 1150 610 548 986 8910 11,454 42,381 69,318 
Iran 1983 502 988 818 1122 388 337 295 216 143 34 6826 
Iraq 127 144 1544 1153 756 859 646 463 293 126 388 6499 
Total 2558 1115 3521 3344 3028 1857 1531 1744 9419 11,723 42,803 82,643 
  
Exit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2014 Total 
Greece 87 47 62 519 1080 647 184 5251 6346 3592 1076 18,891 
Bulgaria 51 115 111 60 879 716 1708 3657 3365 3762 1323 15,747 
Aegean 941 1288 1392 4432 7502 3580 1069 340 2383 7357 3823 34,107 
Medit. 0 46 273 354 68 97 8 201 118 368 42 1575 
Total 1079 1496 1838 5365 9529 5040 2969 9449 12,212 15,079 6264 70,320 
Table 1: Persons Detained in Turkish Borders 2004-2014 (January-June) 
                                                          
19 This data set was provided by the Turkish General Staff upon my online request in the framework of the Law on Right 
to Obtain Information (Law No. 5432 and 6495). I have filled the following form and the data-set was sent to me via e-
mail: http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/BilgiEdinme/Bebasvuru.htm.  
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The data shows an increase in the number of persons detained at Turkish border areas, both 
borders of entrance and borders of exit, between 2004 and 2014. It suggests an annual number 
of 7867 attempted entrances and 6697 attempted exits, which means for every 117 
immigrants attempting to enter, another 100 immigrants attempt to leave. These detainment 
numbers show a balance between the irregular entry and exits. They are indicative of 
Turkey’s status as a transit country, and parallel to that, of, prioritisation of policies related 
to this status both by domestic and external pressures. 
So far, this section has elaborated irregular migration to and through Turkey, while irregular 
migration of Turkish citizens is not discussed. This is because of the negligible number of 
cases and lack of any internal and external pressures for a policy response. In the EU, Turkish 
citizens fall into irregular status mainly by overstaying, or violating the terms of their visas. 
Although the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey is still premature in 
implementation, in the framework of customary international law, Turkey is a good example 
of cooperation on readmitting its own nationals. The report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on progress by Turkey in fulfilling requirements of its 
visa liberalisation road map also stresses Turkey’s internal procedures for returning irregular 
migrants are “smoothly implemented” for Turkish citizens (European Commission, 2014).  
4.2.3 Asylum and Implementation of Geographical Limitation 
In Turkey, it is hard to distinguish between irregular migration and asylum flows, considering 
both begin with irregular entry to the country and both are outcomes of similar events, mainly 
in the southern and eastern neighbours of the country. Thus, as with irregular transit migrants, 
Turkey is a significant stopping point for asylum seekers too, who mainly comprise of Iranian 
and Iraqi citizens. The reason Turkey is a stopping point for asylum seekers, rather than a 
destination for seeking refugee status, is the geographical limitation clause Turkey maintains 
on the 1951 Geneva Convention. After the end of the Second World War, Turkey, as one of 
the original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
became a country of asylum but, in the 1967 Protocol of the Convention, the country chose 
to maintain the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Convention. This limits refugee 
status only to asylum seekers from Europe. By doing this, Turkey has formalised that it will 
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not grant refugee status to non-European asylum seekers and has embraced a two-tiered 
asylum policy, the first covering asylum seekers from European countries and the second 
dealing with people from outside Europe (Kirişci, 2007).  
In the framework of the first tier of its asylum policy, Turkey, during the Cold War received 
asylum seekers from Communist Bloc countries in Europe and granted them official refugee 
status. Turkey welcomed these refugees consistent with its alignment during the Cold War. 
Their numbers were considerably small and Western European countries were willing to 
accept them for resettlement. As a result, they did not constitute any socio-economic or 
political problem and were resettled easily by some international organisations (Kirişci, 
1996). During the Yugoslav Wars, Turkey granted asylum to around 40,000 predominantly 
Muslim asylum seekers, escaping from conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although these 
asylum seekers were eligible for refugee status in Turkey, they were only granted temporary 
protection, as they expected their escape to be temporary. Indeed they returned home after 
the end of the conflict, and did not generate pressures for a policy response. After the end of 
the Yugoslav Wars, except for around 300 Chechen refugees from Russia, the number of 
asylum seekers regulated under this first tier has been negligible (Kirişci, 2007; 2008). 
Currently, despite the geographical limitation, almost all asylum seekers in Turkey are from 
non-European countries, and governed by the second tier framework. Especially after the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, with increasing instability, political irregularities and turmoil in 
the region, e.g. the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Gulf Wars, recent Arab 
Revolutions and the Syrian Civil War, Turkey became a major destination for asylum seekers 
from the Middle East. Turkey grants them temporary protection while their asylum 
applications are processed, and if they obtain refugee status, they are re-settled in third 
countries. According to figures acquired from the UNHCR population statistics, the top ten 
countries of origin for asylum applications to Turkey are all evaluated in the framework of 
geographical limitation. In the eleven year period between 2004 and 2014, Turkey have 
received 226,397 asylum applications, in which around 93 per cent were from the top five 
countries of origin, while 85.5 per cent were from the top three, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan 
(see Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2: Top 5 Countries of Origin, Asylum Applications to Turkey 2004-201420 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Iraq 964 1,047 722 3,571 7,005 3,808 3,863 8,012 6,992 25,406 50,510 111,900 
Iran 2,029 1,716 2,619 2,032 2,392 2,259 4,124 4,318 3,841 6,813 8,970 41,113 
Afghanistan 341 364 317 753 2,794 1,653 1,874 3,097 4,635 9,130 15,652 40,610 
Syria21 16 10 8 25 24 53 57 208 40 123 8,366 8,930 
Somalia 308 473 790 1,223 772 312 511 780 822 1,320 642 7,953 
Top 5 3,658 3,610 4,456 7,604 12,987 8,085 10,429 16,415 16,330 42,792 84,140 210,506 
Others  250 311 645 764 824 858 1,126 1,439 1,227 3,757 4,690 15,891 
Total 3,908 3,921 5,101 8,368 13,811 8,943 11,555 17,854 17,557 46,549 88,830 226,397 
Positive Dec.’s  1,690 1,368 1,895 7,066 8,646 6,074 6,485 9,329 10,892 13,273 22,414 89,132 
Accept. Rate  43,2% 34,9% 37,1% 84.4% 62,6% 68 % 56,1% 52,2% 62,0% 28,5% 25,2% 39,4% 
Table 2: Top 5 Countries of Origin, Asylum Applications to Turkey, 2004-2014 
This data shows the incompatibility between Turkey’s asylum reality and policy reactions to 
it. This incompatibility is the root of external pressures for policy change, both from a 
humanitarian, and a realist perspective. From a humanitarian perspective, although the 
acceptance rate of Turkey is around world average22, external pressures for policy change 
legitimise their position by stressing the length of the process and the inability of refugees to 
obtain all of their rights related to this status, until resettlement, due to the geographical 
limitation clause. They often wait for years, while their rights corresponding to refugee status 
are delayed. The task of finding a place for resettlement is undertaken by the IOM and 
UNHCR Turkey, with the help of various international and non-governmental organisations.  
                                                          
20 The data is compiled from the UNHCR population statistics: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers. Retrieved 
May 23,2016.  
21 Majority of the Syrians were excluded from these general statistics, as they reside in Turkey with the temporary 
protection provided by the Turkish government. For up to date information on Syrians, please visit UNHCR’S Syrian 
Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
Retrieved in January 15, 2016.  
22 For more information, see UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013, Asylum and Refugee Status Determination: 
http://www.unhcr.org/54cf9a629.html.  
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Figure 0-4: Asylum Applications to Turkey, 2004-2014 
Given the high and ever increasing number of asylum applications to Turkey (see Figure 
4.4)23, and continuing uncertainties in the Middle East, especially Syria, the EU also 
approaches e geographical limitation from a realist perspective. Turkey’s right for 
resettlement obliges some member states to accept unwanted refugees and conditions in 
Turkey push asylum seekers to EU countries through irregular means. The resettlement 
statistics of the IOM suggest that only 3 per cent of resettlements from Turkey are directed 
to EU member states24 which suggests the second reason is more viable. A socio-economic 
analysis of the push factors that lead refugees to reach Europe by irregular means is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, perceptions of EU-level officials on why refugees do not 
stay in Turkey, and Turkish apprehensions on the EU’s motives will be further elaborated in 
Chapter 7, as they have significant impact on EU influence on Turkish asylum policies.  
                                                          
23 The data is compiled from the UNHCR population statistics: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers. Retrieved 
May 23,2016.  
24 This data is compiled from the resettlement statistics in the IOM’s website <http://www.turkey.iom.int/operations.htm>. 
Retrieved in January 15, 2016.  
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Figure 0-5: Syrian Persons of Concern in Turkey, 2011-2015 
As Turkey was already struggling with its asylum system; with the inflow of Syrian asylum 
seekers, escaping from conflict in Syria, beginning in December 2011 (see Figure 4.5)25, 
Turkish apprehensions about lifting geographical limitation, were further strengthened. The 
number of Syrians entering the country are excluded from data presented in Table 4.2 as 
Syrians reside in Turkey with a special kind of temporary protection provided by the Turkish 
government, though they are identified as “persons of concern” by the UNHCR. By 
December 2015, the number of these persons of concern was around 2,503,54926 though the 
actual number of Syrians residing in Turkey is assumed to be much larger due to the open 
border between Turkey and Syria. Figure 4.5 shows the sharp increase in these numbers. It 
indicates Turkey’s ever-increasing need to maintain its claim for resettlement as the country 
hosts the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2014).  
  
                                                          
25 The data is obtained from the UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response webpage: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.  
26 The data is obtained from the UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response webpage: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.  
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4.3 A Review of Actors involved in Turkish Migration Policy Change 
Following a contextual background section to situate actor influences in the case studies to 
the overall migration experience of Turkey, in this section, I introduce the main actors 
involved in Turkish migration policy change, their domains of interest and the logics of their 
action. In this section, I aim to reveal priorities, capabilities and limitations of both external 
and domestic actors involved in Turkish migration policy, within the contextual peculiarities 
of Turkish politics and policy making. Accordingly, the main function of this section is to 
explain actor influences with respect to their overall presence in Turkey and their level of 
inclusion in Turkish politics and policy making.  
4.3.1 EU Level Actors: the European Council, the Commission, and the Delegation in Turkey 
The European Commission is the Union’s supra-national executive body, competent to 
pursue negotiations with candidate and third countries. Consequently, the Commission and 
its relevant Directorate Generals (DGs) are the main correspondents of Turkish policy makers 
during selection, adoption and application processes of the reform agenda. In the case of 
migration policy change, the relevant DGs are the DG for Migration and Home Affairs and 
the DG for Enlargement, sustaining the relationship with Turkey during policy compliance, 
and assessing progress. While the reform agenda, in the form of transferring EU institutional 
legal frameworks to third countries, is administered by the Commission, it needs to get a 
mandate from the Council to negotiate any further concessions, outside of the 
institutionalised policy compliance framework. In the process of policy change, the Council 
mainly functions by authorising or restricting the Commission by establishing its mandate, 
negotiating concessions in return for policy compliance.  
The Council determines the scope of rewards and, in parallel, the mechanisms of influence 
to be employed by the Commission. In politically significant issues that require an imminent 
policy decision, the Council introduces concessions to the negotiation table, for the 
Commission to negotiate. For instance, before the introduction of the visa liberalisation road 
map to Turkey, in return for signing the readmission agreement, the Council granted the 
Commission the mandate to negotiate visa liberalisation with Turkey. This mandate was 
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presented in a Conclusion, issued in a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Interior in 
June 2012, inviting the Commission to take steps towards visa liberalisation (Council of the 
European Union, 2012). It initiated the negotiation process between the Commission and 
Turkey which eventually led to the introduction of the visa liberalisation road map. Thus, 
although negotiations are pursued by the Commission, the terms of negotiation are 
determined by the Council and member states. These terms end up defining the influence 
mechanisms that are available for the Commission to use. 
The Commission has a permanent representative in Turkey, The Delegation of the EU to 
Turkey, located in Ankara, which is not involved in policy negotiations, it represents the EU 
Commission at a diplomatic level and maintains external relations with Turkey. It is a 
diplomatic mission and the Head of the Delegation holds the rank of an ambassador. It 
employs around 120 EU and Turkish national experts, to monitor Turkey’s progress for 
accession. After this monitoring, the Delegation submits reports to the Commission, to 
provide a basis for preparation of the annual progress reports for Turkey. It also allocates 
funds generated by pre-accession assistance the country receives from the EU in its candidacy 
framework. This allocation is especially significant for agenda-setting purposes. Typically, 
project ideas are presented to the Delegation by Turkish institutions and selected by 
consultation between representatives of the Commission and Turkish authorities. Then, the 
programmes that receive EU funds are chosen by mutual deliberation prioritizing objectives 
set out in strategic documents such as the Accession Partnership Document, the National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis or the annual National Programme of Turkey.  
In policy areas where there is very little political pressure for reform, as migration was in 
Turkey prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, allocation of this pre-accession assistance is 
valuable, providing resources for domestic change. As a prominent issue in Turkey’s 
relations with the EU, but at the background in domestic politics, migration policy change in 
costly areas would seem out of reach without this assistance. The Delegation website 
suggests that between 2007 and 2013, around 7%, of EU pre-accession assistance was 
allocated to support 34 projects in policy fields related to Justice, Freedom and Security27. 
                                                          
27 For more information on the EU support on reforms and development in key sectors, see the website of the Delegation 
of the EU to Turkey: http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-funding-in-turkey/eu-funded-programmes.html.  
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These projects include various programs on migration policy development and 
implementation, such as the establishment of an integrated border management system in 
Turkey, with a budget around 40 million Euros, modernisation of the Turkish asylum system, 
with a budget of around 62 million Euros and establishment of reception and removal centres, 
with a budget around 11.5 million Euros. Moreover, twinning programmes are also 
significant to introduce best practices of member states by linking related institutions in 
member states with Turkey. In Turkey, the largest number of twinning projects were 
completed under Justice and Home Affairs. In the period between 2002 and 2008, 30 out of 
a total number of 91 twinning projects were in this area with a budget of 40.6 million Euros. 
In particular projects included the development of a training system for border police in 
cooperation between the Turkish Ministry of Interior and Spanish counterparts and support 
to set up an asylum and country of origin system project in cooperation between the Turkish 
Ministry of Interior and migration-related state institutions in Germany, Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands and are evaluated as successful institution building  (ECORYS Research 
and Consulting, 2011).  
Whereas assistance in the framework of the country’s accession is managed by the 
Delegation, transformation commenced with the visa liberalisation road map, mainly 
administered by the Commission’s DG Enlargement and Migration and Home Affairs. 
During implementation of the road map, the Commission became more directly involved in 
Turkish policy. After the readmission agreement signed in parallel with initiation of dialogue 
on visa liberalisation with Turkey in December 2013, the Commission organized a number 
of missions in Turkey, in order to monitor progress made in benchmark areas. The most 
substantial Commission mission concerned passports, identity cards, civil registration and 
issue of travel documents in order to understand Turkish legislation, mechanisms and 
procedures. These missions, led by EU experts assigned by the Commission, have meetings 
with Turkish authorities, examine data and analyse the Turkish system, for drafting reports. 
These reports are regularly presented to the Council for approval to proceed with 
implementation. While, the EU Parliament is not directly involved in these discussions, after 
full implementation approved by the Council, Parliament’s approval will be sought for 
granting visa liberalisation to Turkey. The ultimate stated objective of these missions is to 
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present the Council and Parliament a fool-proof Turkish system, which guarantees legal 
travel for all people passing through its borders. 
In conclusion, presence of the EU in Turkish migration policies continues, split into two 
interdependent branches. Primarily, although weakened, accession conditionality still 
remains. While hard to imagine a viable accession prospect to shape Turkish policy makers’ 
decisions, pre-accession assistance is still effective in agenda setting and prioritizing some 
policy areas over others in accordance with the EU Acquis. Secondly, after the readmission 
agreement was signed simultaneously with initiation of dialogue on visa liberalisation in 
December 2013, a policy conditionality framework was established within the visa 
liberalisation road map. This more technicalized conditionality framework, with shorter term 
incentives, enabled EU influence on Turkish migration policies to continue in a more focused 
manner by detaching it from the politically charged accession process. In this second kind of 
external influence, the Commission emerged as an influential actor, considering the 
international negotiation characteristic of the policy. Moreover, the Commission got directly 
involved in the implementation phase with monitoring missions specific to this policy area. 
Thus, through focusing on a policy area, technicalising it and establishing an international 
negotiation on its own terms, the Commission guaranteed inclusion in Turkish migration 
policies, despite the decline in Turkish accession prospects.  
4.3.2 International Organisations 
The main international organisations actively involved in policy-making but more 
specifically in policy implementation in Turkey are the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). These are 
also included in the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management’s website, as 
stakeholders28 for migration management and policy making in Turkey. Despite this 
emphasis, their inclusion in policy making processes is very recent. However, they are 
                                                          
28 For more information see the Stakeholders section of the Directorate’s Website: http://goc.gov.tr/icerik6/international-
organisations_915_1044_1046_icerik.  
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extensively involved with the implementation phases, both as consultants and, in some cases, 
as implementing bodies. For instance, the role of finding a country for refugee resettlement 
belongs to the UNHCR and the IOM. They, with the assistance and funding from various 
international agencies,29 resettle refugees in the USA, Canada, Australia and Europe. Instead 
of challenging existing legislation, in the implementation phase, these international 
organisations aim to implement best practices, derived from existing legislation. They avoid 
putting further pressure on Turkish policy makers, which could cause further exclusion from 
policy processes and lead to criticisms for interfering in areas where the state is the sovereign 
decision maker. As a result, organizations tend to hold back for preventing further exclusion 
from implementation. This tendency has changed recently, during preparation of the new 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection, when the Directorate General of Migration 
Management invited these organisations as advisory bodies. It is the first step of diversion 
from centralised state migration policy making, leading to a more participatory process. 
4.3.3 Domestic Actors: Ministries, Political Parties and Turkish Civil Society 
Numerous actors including political parties, interest groups, non-governmental organisations 
and the bureaucracy are involved in the change in Turkish migration policies. The scope of 
their activities and influence are inevitably shaped by the country’s centralised state tradition 
as well as its rapprochement with international organisations and with the EU. Each actor 
focuses on a different policy field within migration policy-making depending on its domain 
of interest. While political parties and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focus on policy fields 
with electoral potential, practitioners in the Ministry of Interior focus on the viability of 
implementation. Human rights organisations typically work on asylum seekers and business 
groups show an increasing interest in the issue of visas. This section introduces domestic 
actors involved in migration management including ministries, political parties, interest 
groups and non-governmental organisations aiming to reveal the scope of their activities in 
migration policy. It will describe to the reader Turkey’s domestic political environment, as a 
basis for understanding actor preferences in case study discussions. It will also structurally 
                                                          
29 For more information see IOM Turkey, Refugee and Migrant Resettlement Webpage: 
http://www.turkey.iom.int/operations.htm.  
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enable the researcher to refer to upcoming case study chapters, to understand the position of 
a domestic actor in detail.  
4.3.3.1 Ministerial Actors: Turkish Ministry of Interior, Foreign Affairs and EU Affairs  
The website of the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry 
of Interior, lists a total of twenty-one ministries as stakeholders30 in migration management, 
including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the Ministry for 
European Union Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Economy. In a liberal democracy, conflicting agendas in policy making is expected in diverse 
Ministries. However, since 2002, Turkey is governed by a single party, and agendas of each 
ministry are developed in harmony with each other. Thus, except for expected disputes 
between political bodies focused on international relations, such as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; and policy making and implementing bodies regulating the domestic arena, such as 
the Ministry of Interior, there are no visible conflicts among these governing bodies, nor any 
clash of agendas.  
Political bodies shaping Turkey’s international relations and migration policy change, are the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the competent body in negotiations between the EU 
and Turkey and the Ministry for EU Affairs, a separate body, founded to ensure coordination 
between line ministries. In meetings held with high and medium rank officials from these 
ministries31 implementation of the readmission agreement between EU and Turkey is stated 
as the main priority, followed by border management. These ministries mainly stress the 
transformative impact of EU and Europeanisation in migration management. Officials in 
these ministries have emphasized that they support this policy change framework, for 
drawing Turkey closer to the EU in general and providing incentives such as visa 
liberalisation in particular. 
                                                          
30 For more information see the website of Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration 
Management: http://goc.gov.tr/main/Eng_3  
31 The meetings with the officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs were held in 14.01.2014 in Directorate of Political 
Affairs, Ministry for the European Union, Mustafa Kemal Mh. 6.Cd. No: 4, Bilkent, 06800 Ankara, Turkey.  
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Preferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for EU Affairs are mainly 
significant in the negotiation process of international cooperation and agreements, such as 
the readmission agreement, but these agreements, together with all migration related 
domestic reforms, are adopted and implemented by the Ministry of Interior. This is the central 
actor, in Turkish migration policies, the main policy maker and implementing body for 
migration policy change. The Ministry of Interior is further empowered with the 
establishment of the Bureau for Development and Implementation of Border Management 
Legislation and Administrative Capacity within the Ministry of Interior in 2008, which later 
in April 2013 transformed into the Directorate General for Migration Management.  
The Directorate General for Migration Management32 unifies migration policy 
implementation in a civilian authority, which has been dispersed among many authorities, 
most of whom have a securitised perspective on migration management, organised under the 
General Directorate of Security and Turkish Armed Forces. Preparation and implementation 
of the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection is undertaken by this institution. 
It was granted a mandate to undertake operations related to foreigners and international 
protection under the new Law and in 2015, it has established its provincial organisation. The 
Directorate is also in charge of implementation of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, 
including management of removal centres. It is growing to become the unifying state 
organisation for all migration policy making and implementation, and promising more 
effective civilian migration management in Turkey.  
4.3.3.2 Turkish Parliament and the Political Parties 
Since 2002, Turkey has been ruled by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In 2002, 
only the Republican People’s Party (CHP) could enter Parliament. Since the 2007 general 
elections, political parties represented in the Turkish Parliament, are those which have passed 
the 10 per cent election threshold in the latest general elections. These are: the ruling right-
wing Justice and Development Party (AKP) occupying around 56 per cent of the seats in the 
Parliament; the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) with an average of 23 per cent 
and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with around 10 per cent. In the 2007 
                                                          
32 For more information see: http://www.goc.gov.tr/.  
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and the 2011 elections, Kurds were represented by independent MPs, due to the 10 per cent 
threshold, though in 2015 People’s Democratic Party (HDP), a pro-Kurdish political party 
entered the elections and passed the threshold. Between 2007 and 2015, the pro-Kurdish 
movement was represented in parliament with an average of 7 per cent of seats. Thus, since 
2002, the Turkish Parliament consists of a single ruling party with a majority of seats, and 
dispersed opposition parties with diverse agendas and priorities. Sayarı suggests that, after 
the AKP won the majority of seats in parliament in three (four by 2015) successive elections 
and began to govern Turkey without a coalition, Turkish party politics developed a 
“predominant party system.” Moreover, the Turkish party system has stabilized since 2002, 
as electoral swings and party switching were replaced by majority governments by the AKP 
(Sayarı, 2012, p. 188). This system has implications for migration policy adoption and 
implementation. Weakness of opposition in the Turkish political party system is one of the 
main reasons possible veto players in migration policy are disempowered, and the AKP is 
enabled to pursue an agenda on migration parallel to its domestic and foreign policy interests.  
Numerical distribution of parties in the Turkish political system is not the only reason for 
opposition’s weakness in implementing their will on migration policy change. Until the 
Syrian refugee crisis peaked in 2013, migration was not a politicised, and close to bottom of 
the opposition parties’ prioritised policy areas. As stressed in the first section of this chapter, 
Turkey has very recently become a country of immigration. According to statistics provided 
by the IOM, in 2013, only 2.5 per cent of the Turkish population were immigrants, a large 
proportion of Turkish culture or descent. Apart from around these 1.8 million33 resident 
immigrants, immigration flows to Turkey were considered temporary. That is why, despite 
the significant location of the country in one of the main migratory routes between Europe, 
the Middle East and North Africa, issues related to migration have only recently begun to be 
politicised, with inclusion of the Syrian refugee crisis on political party agendas. Thus, until 
very recently, there was an absence of party politics on migration. None of the major parties 
campaigned for, or against immigration in national elections that were held on 12th June 2011. 
The only instances when immigration became an issue of discussion at a political party level, 
                                                          
33 For more information see the webpage of UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/index.shtml.  
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concerned Turkish immigrants in Germany, where they have faced high-level criticism on 
integration or experienced a xenophobic attack.  
The level of politicisation of migration in Turkey is rapidly increasing in parallel to the 
number of Syrians migrating to the country. A report published by the Hacettepe University 
Migration and Politics Research Centre on Turkey’s public opinion on Syrians, revealed that 
a majority of people who support the return of Syrians are voters of these two opposition 
parties. Clearly, while supporters of the governing party as well as opposition party who 
mainly represent Turkey’s Kurdish population are more attentive to the Syrians, the majority 
of the opposition tend to disclaim them (Erdoğan, 2014). The basis of public apprehension 
in Turkey was initially framed around security and economy, typical of initial public response 
to a refugee crisis elsewhere. Official positions of opposition parties have been transforming 
in response to their constituencies. In the 2015 elections, all of the major parties in Turkey 
incorporated the asylum issue in their election manifestos, consistently with their foreign 
policy visions. While the majority AKP stressed the humanitarian dimension of its non-
discriminatory open door policy, the nationalist MHP and pro-Kurdish HDP party disputed 
this non-discriminatory policy. While the MHP has opposed AKP policies for not providing 
sufficient care for Syrian Turkmens, the HDP claimed that they discriminated against Syrian 
Kurds. The HDP has maintained a humanitarian discourse, while the MHP, approached it 
from a national security angle. The CHP, the main opposition party, focused on the economic 
aspect, questioning the Syrians’ position in the job market, investments, even in tourism. 
While both the CHP and MHP have mentioned return and resettlement, the ruling AKP did 
not imply temporality (Tuğsuz & Yılmaz, 2015). All these discussions suggest an increase 
in the level of politicisation in migration policy. While policy analysed in the framework of 
this study took place at a time when migration policy area was immune from any considerable 
political debate, the domestic context is changing. This change is expected to be an important 
element when making predictions for the future, on the level of politicisation of migration 
policy.  
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4.3.3.3 Civil Society: Non-Governmental Organisations, Business Networks and Labour Unions 
in Turkey 
In parallel to increasing migration and asylum flows to Turkey and its rising significance in 
the international and EU migration regime, civil society and non-governmental organisations 
within the country have enhanced their scope and influence. Non-governmental organisations 
such as Amnesty International, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and 
Migrants (Ankara), the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, the Human Rights Association 
(IHD), the International Strategic Research Organisation (Ankara), the Migrant Solidarity 
Network (Istanbul), The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People 
(Mazlum-Der), the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HYD) and some informal networks are 
actively working on the issue, providing humanitarian or legal assistance and also supporting 
awareness programs. They are in close cooperation with both international organisations such 
as the IOM, UNHCR, the EU, and government agencies. 
Traditionally, Turkish policy making in any area is centralised and casts out any NGO 
involvement. In recent years, although the general state approach remains reluctant towards 
NGOs, there are some individual efforts from state bureaucracy to establish state-NGO 
cooperation in the migration policy field. These efforts are both a result of EU pressure to 
include NGOs in policy processes as well as the de-politicised, technical character of 
migration policy making within the country, enabling use of technical assistance from NGOs. 
For instance, officials from the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General of Migration 
Management, cooperated with representatives of non-governmental organisations in the 
process of preparing the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. It was an impetuous 
process, necessitating technical assistance from these organisations. However, it would be 
unrealistic to expect this traditionally constructed environment of mistrust to be replaced by 
cooperation any time soon. Despite cooperation during the preparation of the Law, when the 
Syrian refugee crisis erupted with initial inflow of 8.000 asylum seekers in December 2011, 
NGOs in Turkey were denied access to camps or to any information on conditions of asylum 
seekers. An official representing Amnesty International Turkey has stated, the state can easily 
leave human rights organisations out of the decision process and there is no national or 
international institution to challenge the states’ authority Thus, representatives of human 
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rights organisations indicate that, state institutions are not considered allies. They are 
decision-making authorities and do not deliberate with human rights organisations during 
decision-making processes. Therefore, NGOs working on migration policy end up reacting 
to state policies rather than participating in preparation. The most effective reaction to 
malpractices in state policies are sought in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
by NGOs working in Turkey. Amnesty International in particular, uses the ECtHR as an 
authority to balance state practices. 
In Turkey, business networks and labour unions do not have the clear positions on 
immigration which are typical in Western migrant receiving liberal democracies. Turkish 
business and labour unions did not develop a tradition like their Western counterparts to 
influence state migration policy decision making on labour migration, mainly due the 
persisting labour surplus in the country with a 2000 to 2013 annual average general 
unemployment rate of 9 per cent, raising to 14 per cent for the 20 to 35 age group34. However, 
apathy towards labour migration does not imply no influence at all on migration policy. 
Turkish business networks are interested in visa policies, particularly negotiations with the 
EU on Schengen visa facilitations. The Turkish Industry and Business Association 
(TUSIAD) and the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD), 
Turkey’s largest and most influential business interest groups, continuously lobby within 
Turkey as well as in Europe on visa liberalisation for Turkish businesses35. Moreover, these 
businesses also facilitate and benefit from the newly established visa diplomacy. As 
explained in the previous section, this new approach to visas, established in the last decade, 
refers to facilitating visas or lifting restrictions for countries that have significant economic 
and strategic links with Turkey. Although this new approach to visas is counter-productive 
to visa facilitation negotiations with the EU, because most of them are in the negative visa 
list of EU Schengen regulation, it is ultimately beneficial for both small and big businesses, 
stabilising and strengthening the Turkish economy against a possible Euro-crisis.  
                                                          
34 These statistics are obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute Website: 
http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/isgucuapp/isgucu.zul.  
35 For more information, see: (a)The press release on the “common position” of TUSIAD and its various European 
counterparts: http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/basin-bulteni-ek2-2012-60.pdf ; (b) An interview with the head of 
MUSIAD Munich Office: http://www.musiad-munchen.de/index.php/tr/basinda-musiad-munchen/arsiv/49-zaman-
isadamlarina-vize-cilesi-sona-ersin. Retrieved in December 29th, 2014. 
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4.4 Conclusion: Contextual Peculiarities and their Impact on Actor Influences  
In this chapter, I have initially elaborated the contextual factors in Turkey, which have 
generated need for a policy response, both by domestic and external actors. Presenting these 
factors in a background chapter in a structured manner, is important for identifying 
problematic policy fields that require a policy response; and providing a basis for 
understanding each actor’s policy preferences. In the second part of this chapter, I presented 
capabilities, role and function of involved external and domestic actors in Turkish migration 
policy change. I introduced their historical policy positions, their presence in Turkish 
migration policy change so far, and their capabilities. In this section I conclude these 
discussions by linking these two parts, and introducing main policy responses relating to 
context and actors capability. Thus, here I establish a transition to the case study chapters, 
where I examine actor influences with analysis of interview data.  
Evidence provided in this chapter suggests, since the mid-2000s, that migration of Turkish 
citizens, regular or irregular, is losing its significance as a priority concern for Turkish policy 
makers, and external actors, beginning with EU and individual member states. For the last 
two decades, there has been no significant domestic or external pressure for a policy response 
to Turkish immigration, or asylum pressure by Turkish citizens. The main source of external 
pressure to Turkey concerns third country nationals, and management of irregular migration 
through Turkey, consisting of transit migrants from its East and South. This pressure is based 
on data of the number of detainments on both sides, given the equilibrium between borders 
of entry and exit in this study, and the politicised, securitised nature of irregular migration. 
The policy response of the EU introduced to overcome this pressure is the readmission 
agreement, with its controversial third country national clause. External pressures over 
irregular migration have spilled over to policy on regular migration, as Turkey’s visa policies 
and especially its newly established visa diplomacy grants visa-free travel to citizens of some 
countries in the EU’s negative visa list.  
This background revealed the insufficiency of Turkish legislation concerning comprehensive 
migration law, prior to adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 
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April 2013. The context given in this chapter significantly presented pressures for a policy 
response, as a priority policy for all levels of actors. While at the domestic level such 
pressures mainly concern economy, international organisations focused on international 
protection and EU pressures were mainly generated by concerns over management of 
irregular migration. Similar insufficiency is also present in the country’s asylum policies, as 
the incompatibility between Turkey’s asylum policies and its asylum reality shows. Despite 
the geographical limitation clause Turkey maintains, which grants refugee status only to 
asylum seekers escaping from events arising in Europe, almost all asylum seekers within the 
country are from Turkey’s south and east. Such incompatibility generates external pressures 
both from a humanitarian and also a rationalist perspective, considering that asylum seekers 
in Turkey end up as transit refugees because of resettlements generating from this clause. 
While Turkey refuses to lift its geographical limitation with apprehensions over international 
burden sharing, no external pressures provide a solution to these apprehensions. 
The actors in this chapter identify their priorities depending on this context, while their 
capabilities and limitations are mainly determined by their competence in the given policy 
field and their presence in Turkish migration policy making. The transformation in Turkey’s 
status from a country of emigration to a country of immigration and the sense of urgency for 
a policy response to the Syrian refugee crisis is also transforming Turkish policy, making it 
more participatory, in contrast to the country’s centralised state tradition. Thus, it is a valid 
time to discuss external influences. In the past, they consisted solely of EU conditionality. 
Now, international organisations directly represented at policy tables. Turkey is also slowly 
abandoning its securitised approach to migration, at least institutionally, as it transfers 
migration management to a civilian unit, discontinues some national police and armed forces 
services. Moreover, political parties in Turkey are beginning to discuss immigration, based 
on a response to the Syrian refugee crisis. All of these are manifestations of the 
transformations Turkey is experiencing, changing from a country of emigration to a country 
of immigration, where both external actors and the main constitutive features of liberal 
statehood influence state capacities on migration policy. However, unlike Western countries 
of immigration, in Turkey, external influences have preceded the impact of these constitutive 
features. Turkey began to become a country of immigration, after it established structured 
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top down mechanisms for EU policy compliance, and bottom-up mechanisms on policy 
implementation with international organisations. This feature distinguishes the Turkish case 
from Western countries presented in the literature review and intensifies the role of external 
influences. 
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Chapter 5: Case Study 1, Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection 
In April 2014, a year after its adoption by the Turkish Parliament, the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection (Law No. 6458) entered into force. The Law is a comprehensive 
legislation addressing both regular and irregular immigrants, managing their entry, exit and 
residence. As the title suggests, the Law consists of articles concerning both international 
protection and rights of foreigners within the country. It establishes clear procedures for 
asylum seekers, simplifying identification and registration; and introduces additional 
categories for non-European asylum seekers who cannot be granted refugee status because 
of the geographical limitation clause Turkey maintains in the 1951 Geneva Convention. This 
Law transformed Turkish legislation on migration, which previously consisted of articles 
from a diverse range of legislation, leading to misinterpretation in operation. By introducing 
a single legal document and legal definition for categories of foreigners within Turkey, the 
Law has eliminated the complications of the previous system and simplified implementation 
for practitioners in the field. This Law also centralised migration policy by assigning a single 
authority, the Directorate General for Migration Management, with responsibilities for 
migration policy making and implementation. An analytical discussion of the contents and 
scope of this Law is beyond the purpose of this study, though corresponding studies are 
available in the literature (Soykan, 2012; Açıkgöz & Arıner, 2014; Kilberg, 2014). Adhering 
to this study’s aims, in this chapter, I examine processes of preparation, introduction and 
brief implementation of this Law. I review the context and analyse development of actor 
responses, mainly in the form of influence mechanisms.  
5.1 EU-Level Actors 
Facilitating legislative reform in Turkey’s migration policies has long been in the EU’s 
agenda. Apprehensions over absence of comprehensive immigration legislation in Turkey 
appeared in EU progress reports since 1999. Though, it was not a priority in comparison with 
border management or the readmission agreement. Turkish policy makers also formally 
introduced a legislative reform agenda, responding to external pressures from the EU in 
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Turkey’s 2005 Action Plan for Asylum and Migration36. This document stated the steps 
needed to fulfil the EU accession conditionality requirements in relation to migration policy. 
As the external incentives model anticipates, eventually, with the decline in Turkish 
accession prospects, the power of conditionality inevitably declined as policy reform linked 
to conditionality slowed down. In the late 2000s, with Turkey needing to respond to transition 
from a country of emigration to one of immigration and asylum, the EU trigger for 
comprehensive migration legislation began to gain domestic support. Therefore, the EU has 
aimed to re-establish its influence on Turkish legislative reform by linking this policy field 
to the policy conditionality framework established between readmission and visa 
liberalisation and by directly participating in policy making processes by providing technical 
and financial assistance.  
The EU began to re-establish its influence on Turkish legislative reform via policy 
conditionality, after the Commission began to indicate the link between overall Turkish 
migration policy reform and visa liberalisation. Although none of the interviewees from the 
Commission have implied such indication prior to the Council has granted the Commission 
a mandate to negotiate visa concessions with Turkey in June 2012 (Council of the European 
Union, 2012), Turkish officials, both from the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs37 have 
suggested the unofficial presence of this issue linkage since 2008, which was only officially 
documented in July 2013, three months after the adoption of the Law. However, this policy 
conditionality framework did not add much to EU leverage on Turkey as Turkey had already 
framed legislative reform as domestic need, not a response to EU conditionality. They also 
did not welcome further additions to the linkage between visa liberalisation and signing the 
readmission agreement, already perceived by Turkish ministries as politically balanced.  
In preparing the Law, the EU has more successfully exerted influence as an advisory body in 
policy tables, with means to support its policy preferences by technical and financial 
assistance. The Delegation of the EU to Turkey has assumed an advisory role and directly 
                                                          
36 National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration adopted in 25 
March 2005 is available in the DGMM’s website: < http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/iltica-ve-goc-ulusal-eylem-
plani_327_344_699 > 
37 This data is obtained from two interviews. An interview with a senior policy advisor from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was undertaken in October 17, 2014 via Skype. Another with a migration expert from the Ministry of Interior, 
Directorate General for Migration Management, was undertaken in June 17, 2015 in Ankara.  
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influenced policy through deliberation, also by allocation of technical and financial 
assistance in their priority areas for policy change. Commission officials have specifically 
stressed financial rewards for capacity building as EU level mechanisms to influence policy 
in this area. A policy officer from the DG Enlargement of the European Commission stressed 
the significance of the assistance Turkey is eligible for in the following way:  
“Turkey gets a lot of EU money, EU taxpayers’ money with the aim for Turkey to pass 
legislation, to strengthen its institutions, to develop systems and mechanisms in order 
to improve its effectiveness and the management of the overall situation (Official B, 
Brussels, 25 April 2014).”  
This stress on financial assistance, as a form of burden sharing, given to Turkey as a token 
of EU’s commitment to this reform process had significant legitimising power for domestic 
stakeholders. Though except the stress on financial assistance, migration legislation is not a 
policy field where Turkish policy makers supporting change can effectively use the EU as a 
source of legitimisation against possible veto players and their political constituencies. The 
external dimension of EU migration policies is frequently approached sceptically by policy 
makers in countries of origin and transit. The Union is accused of externalisation policies, 
shifting its asylum and migration burden to third countries; failing to introduce sufficient 
burden sharing mechanisms and strengthening its borders by establishing a non-entry regime, 
despite asylum flows experienced by its neighbours (Boswell, 2003; Coleman, 2009; Geddes, 
2011; Langbein, 2014; Ratzmann, 2012; Vachudova, 2000; Wierich, 2011). These criticisms 
and scepticism also dominated Turkish policy maker and state elite discourses, while a 
problem of trust to the EU persists. For instance, when the normative basis of the Law was 
questioned by stakeholders, Turkish policy makers presented involvement of international 
and non-governmental organisations in policy processes as a source of normative 
legitimisation.  
Not the EU itself, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) supporting the EU 
position, has supplied European normative claims. The Court has been a catalyst for reform 
during the preparation of the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection. Most 
significantly, in September 2009, in the Case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, the 
ECtHR sentenced Turkey for wrongful detention of two Iranian asylum seekers in a Turkish 
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reception centre38. The Court reached a verdict on, due to the insufficiencies in Turkish 
legislation to provide effective remedies for asylum seekers, it would no longer oblige 
applicants with exhaustion of domestic remedies before applying to the ECtHR as a higher 
authority. Although there were several court decisions against Turkey on asylum in the last 
two decades39, this was the primary one stressing upon the lack of sufficient legislation for 
managing migration and asylum. It signalled an escalation in the number of cases relating to 
the “exhaustion of national remedies” clause. This decision was identified as a catalyst for 
reform by various state officials. A senior migration management policy advisor for the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry called this event “a miracle that emphasized the necessity of a new 
Law (Official A, Skype Interview, 17 October, 2014)” considering this decision both 
strengthened the leverage of policy makers wanting domestic change and led to an increased 
consciousness in Western partners about the Turkish situation. While the Court initially 
aimed to raise awareness of a human rights abuse, it ended up raising awareness on a policy 
void, and supported policy reform. As a result of international moral-consciousness raising, 
because of the Court’s decision, leverage of the actors in Turkish domestic migration 
governance who worked for domestic change increased significantly. 
Triggered by accession conditionality, supported by EU assistance and accelerated by the 
ECtHR’s international consciousness raising, the outcome of this legislative reform satisfied 
prioritised policy preferences of the EU. Both the Delegation and the Commission prioritised 
transfer of migration management to a civilian authority. An official from the Delegation of 
the EU to Turkey has stated: “Our main aim is to strengthen this instrument to transfer 
migration management to civilian measures (Official B, Ankara, 16 January 2014).” A high 
ranking policy officer from the DG Home Affairs also supported this by suggesting: “Our 
approach is you always try to have an overall migration management held within civil 
authorities (Official C, Brussels, 30 April 2014).” Another high ranking policy officer from 
DG Enlargement added reasons for this by stating:  
“Coordination and leadership are very important because de facto there are many 
services and many authorities involved within this area. For example, in border 
management, you have the military, you have the gendarmerie, you have the police, 
                                                          
38 For a full text of the verdict see: <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#> Retrieved in March 20, 2015. 
39 For a full list see: <http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/aihm-kararlari_327_345> Retrieved in March 20, 2015. 
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and you have the customs, you have the governorships, you have in some cases the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, you have the Ministry of Agriculture…. So you 
have a lot of authorities and the question is everyone could be good at their work, but 
in the end, the outcome may not be satisfactory. So there is a need for leadership, for 
a holistic approach and for integrated management (Official A, Brussels, 25 April 
2014).” 
These claims indicate that the shape of policy change satisfies EU priorities, as a coherent 
civilian institution was established with the Directorate General for Migration Management, 
extending its authority after the introduction of the Law. The EU now has a single authority 
as correspondent on migration matters However, a significant point that needs to be stressed 
here is that, this outcome is not the result of EU pressure directly in this policy field but in 
another one. This Bureau, which later became a Directorate, was initially established as a 
response to pressures generated during the negotiation process of the readmission agreement, 
where the EU influenced policy through policy conditionality. Thus, EU external influence 
on readmission spilled over to legislative reform benefiting EU policy preferences.  
In conclusion, despite EU’s inability to implement any efficient policy specific influence 
mechanisms, the outcome ended up being satisfactory for EU, due to five main reasons. 
Firstly, the initial road map for such policy change, was established through accession 
partnership documents and Turkish national plans developed as a response to it, while 
Turkey’s accession prospects were viable. Afterwards, with migratory pressure, and a 
contextual need to introduce new legislation, Turkey had these documents as frameworks to 
establish its responses to these pressures. These documents were in line with the EU Acquis 
from the beginning. Secondly, despite declining accession prospects, Turkey continued to 
receive EU assistance, allocated to the EU’s prioritised policy fields. Thirdly, ECtHR 
decisions established international consciousness rising and normatively supported EU’s 
claims for migration policy change. Fourthly, higher EU influence on other policy fields, i.e. 
the agenda triggered by readmission negotiations, spilled over to this one, influencing policy 
change indirectly. Finally, as will be discussed in the next section, the involvement of 
international organisations on Turkish migration policy change resulted in a Law compliant 
with the international migration regime. Parallels between this regime and the EU Acquis 
finally led to legislation compliant with EU policy preferences. In the report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress by Turkey in fulfilling 
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the requirements of its visa liberalisation road map, the Law is stated as a satisfactory 
legislation providing effective migration management but with concerns about its 
implementation and secondary legislation expressed (European Commission, 2014).  
5.2 International Actors 
The Law on Foreigners and International Protection was welcomed by international 
organisations mainly for introducing necessary human rights principles to Turkish migration 
legislation. UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming has commented on the Law’s adoption 
as a “reflection of Turkey’s strong commitment to humanitarian values and principles40.” 
Indeed, Turkey’s membership of a range of international and regional institutions as well as 
participation in several international conventions, provided a foundation for policy makers 
to determine the nature and scope of the Law. Moreover, the IOM and the UNHCR have 
actively participated in the preparation phase, and they are also expected to undertake some 
projects for its implementation.  
As the theoretical discussion in this study also suggests, organisations of the international 
migration regime have limited capabilities to enforce conditionality. Thus, although they 
have evolved to become valuable partners for Turkish policy implementing bodies in the 
field, their capabilities for triggering a reform agenda remain limited compared to 
organisations which can introduce a conditionality framework. Given this, these 
organisations benefit from the EU trigger for policy reform and present policy preferences 
only after this. In the case of the Law, this trend has persisted as the initial push for 
introduction of it came from the EU in the framework of accession conditionality. However, 
together with accepting the significance of this initial push, officials from both the UNHCR 
and IOM have persistently stressed that this Law was not a direct adoption of the EU Acquis, 
but it was prepared considering the country’s circumstances and international 
responsibilities. A protection assistant from UNHCR Turkey has indicated the EU’s 
significance, but also the limits in the role of the EU in adoption of this law, by stating:  
                                                          
40 April 12, 2013. “UNHCR Welcomes Turkey’s New Law on Asylum.” UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/5167e7d09.html> Retrieved in March 20, 2015. 
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“The EU is important in terms of adopting a good practice example. This example was 
instrumental in the process of preparing the new Law. However, the EU does not alter 
Turkey’s international obligations (Official B, Ankara, 15 January 2014)41.” 
Similar to this emphasis upon Turkey’s international responsibilities, independent of its 
relations with the EU, a project expert from IOM Turkey, stressed the significance of 
preparing a Law suitable to the peculiarities of the Turkish case, together with accepting the 
significance of related EU instruments: 
“Turkey has aimed to harmonize its legislation with the EU acquis, but the important 
thing was to avoid the reflection of the EU’s wrong practices. We did not make a copy 
paste law from the EU. We took the sensitivities into consideration (Official B, Ankara, 
17 January 2014)42.” 
In this policy field, while the EU was significant, providing the initial push through 
consequentiality, progress of the preparation process was supported normatively by technical 
assistance from international organisations. This led to direct participation by international 
organisations in the preparation process of the Law presenting policy preferences and 
priorities with direct attendance in policy meetings. The following quote by a project officer 
from the IOM Turkey shows the level of participation, as well as the paradigm shift in 
Turkish migration policy making, from a state-centric approach to a more participatory one:  
“This is a process that we take an active role in institutionally. In the preparation 
process of the Law, we were given the opportunity to present our institutional views at 
the Parliamentary Commission Meetings. We have attended the committee meetings of 
the Law. We were given the opportunity to speak up. IOM and UNHCR took an active 
role in the process. Both of these institutions took active roles separately on the issues 
related to migration and asylum. This was a highly participatory and transparent 
process. It was so precious to us. Primarily, the Ministry of Interior contacted us for 
contributions and partnerships. This has both motivated and encouraged us. We gave 
                                                          
41 The original Turkish text is as follows: “AB bir iyi uygulama örneğinin benimsenmesi açısından önemli. Bu örnek, 
kanunun hazırlanmasında etkili oldu. Ancak AB, Türkiye’nin uluslararası yükümlülüklerini değiştirmez.” 
42 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Bu kanunu yaparken evet AB’ye uyum olabilir ama önemli olan yanlış 
uygulamaların yansımasına da engel olmaktı. Copy-paste kanun yapmadık, hassasiyetler göz önüne alındı.” 
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all of our support in this regard and we are continuing to give it (Official A, Ankara, 
17 January 2014)43.”  
Such direct contribution of international organisations is rare in Turkey due to the centralised 
decision making process. However, the sense of urgency for comprehensive migration 
legislation; establishment of a new, inexperienced, but participatory Bureau, a relatively low 
level of politicisation prior to Syrian refugee flows and a higher level of technicalisation 
facilitated direct participation by international organisations. These factors are further 
elaborated within the domestic framework level in the following section. 
During the preparation of the Law, together with providing necessary technical support, 
international organisations also acted as mediators between policy maker bodies, 
bureaucracies, practitioner bodies and civil society. A high-rank official from UNHCR 
Turkey defines the organisation’s position taken during these negotiations as follows: “In the 
negotiations and during the preparation of this law, the UNHCR has acted like a government 
agent (Official A, Ankara, 14 January 2014)44.” Thus, during the process of preparation of 
the Law, while, socialisation to international norms was presented as legitimisation, siding 
with UNHCR enabled Turkish policy makers to further strengthen their normative claims 
against any possible domestic veto players. In the past, Turkish policy makers have used a 
similar form of legitimisation, in terms of adherence to EU norms, justifying claims for 
reform in a wide range of policy areas, such as democratic consolidation. However, unlike 
democratic consolidation, in migration policy, the EU faces harsh criticisms against the 
Acquis for its shortcomings on a human rights emphasis. Moreover, practitioners especially 
in the Turkish Ministry of the Interior have doubts about EU burden sharing mechanisms and 
worry about the increase in the country’s migration and asylum burden because of reforms. 
Thus, it was tactical for Turkish policy makers for domestic change, to turn to international 
                                                          
43 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Kurumsal olarak aktif rol üstlendiğimiz bir süreç söz konusu. Kanunun 
hazırlanma sürecinden tutun, TBMM Komisyon toplantılarında kurumsal görüşlerimizi belirtme fırsatı verildi. Kanun için 
komisyon toplantılarına katıldık. Bize konuşma fırsatı verildi. IOM ve UNHCR aktif rol aldı. Bu 2 kurum da göç ve 
mülteciler konularında ayrı ayrı aktif bir rol aldı. Son derece katılımcı ve şeffaf bir süreçti. Bu bizim için çok değerliydi. 
İçişleri bakanlığının bize ilk yaklaşımları, bize ilk onlar geldiler katkı ve ortaklık için. Bu bizi çok cesaretlendirdi ve 
heveslendirdi. Bu konuda tüm desteğimizi verdik hala da veriyoruz.”  
44 The original Turkish text is as follows: “UNHCR bu müzakerelerde ve bu yasanın oluşturulmasında bir “hükümet 
ajanı” gibi hareket etti.” 
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organisations’ normative power to legitimise the contents of the Law against stakeholders 
such as political parties, practitioners and civil society within the country.  
To continue their activities in cooperation with policy makers and practitioners and to avoid 
exclusion on grounds of limiting state sovereignty, these organisations act cautiously in their 
involvement with state policy making and legislation. Instead, they aim to be more active in 
the implementation phase, in respect of available policies and legislation. During preparation 
of this Law, UNHCR especially limited demands for avoiding exclusion. For instance, 
parallel to its mandate, UNHCR was expected to put pressure on Turkish policy makers to 
lift the geographical limitation. However, UNHCR did not insist on it because of its political 
significance for the Turkish state and officials. A high-rank official, from UNHCR Turkey 
have stated his discomfort with the following:  
“Did the UNHCR act according to the international norms? In this law, there is no 
mention of lifting the geographical limitation, no mention of asylum. Progressive steps 
are taken, but this is not a reforming law (Official A, Ankara, 14 January 2014)45.”  
These critical words by a UNHCR official of the organisation’s inability to push for further 
alignment with the international migration regime exemplifies how these organisations 
hesitate on long-term policy preferences, such as removal of the geographical limitation for 
UNHCR, to avoid exclusion from the policy implementation phase. However, in this policy 
field, such hesitation ultimately benefited these organisations. They have presented their 
principles, instead of policy implications of these principles. They have avoided politically 
charged policy discussions which would frequently result in their exclusion. Maintaining 
their normative presence and in detailed discussions accommodated these basic principles to 
the government’s main apprehensions on international protection. Thus, they have 
contributed to a legislation, which the representatives of both organisations are content with. 
For instance, a project officer from the IOM Turkey suggests:  
                                                          
45 Original Turkish text is as follows: “UNHCR normlarla mı hareket etti? Bu yasada coğrafi kısıtlamanın kaldırılmasına 
dair bir şey yok, iltica yok. Progressive adımlar var ama bu yasa bir reform değil” 
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“Certain principles have been introduced with the Law: human rights and security 
balance, participation, transparency. It became a Law that everyone considers their 
own. It is not perfect, but certain issues were handled. The first Law is very important 
(Official A, Ankara, 17 January 2014)46.” 
These organisations are expected to undertake significant roles in the implementation of the 
Law, cooperating with the Directorate General for Migration Management. Currently, the 
IOM already has significant programs relating to counter trafficking and assistant voluntary 
return, and it provides technical cooperation on migration to the Turkish government. 
Moreover, it facilitates the resettlement of refugees to third countries. Meanwhile, although 
UNHCR has transferred its duty as the main authority for refugee status determination after 
adoption of the Law, it still has significant presence on asylum policy implementation, 
especially in the management of refugee camps within the country. Thus, although in the 
preparation phase of the Law, international organisations influenced legislative change in 
Turkey by providing technical assistance and debating basic principles, their greatest impact 
is expected during implementation. With a functional approach to legislation, these 
organisations have guaranteed presence during implementation where they can strongly 
influence policy implementation of best practices.  
5.3 Domestic Actors 
The Introduction of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection is the only policy 
instrument, among the four that is analysed in this study, to gain support from all levels of 
domestic actors. The adoption process reflects a new and unique occurrence in Turkish policy 
making, moving away from strong state tradition and including civil society, non-
governmental organizations and academia in policy making. A senior migration management 
policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stressed the participatory nature of the 
policy making process with the following words:  
                                                          
46 The original Turkish text is as follows: Belli temel prensipler ortaya konuldu. İnsan hakları ve güvenlik dengesi, 
katılımcılık, şeffaflık. Herkesin benim kanunum dediği bir kanun oldu. Mükemmel değil ama belli hususlara dokunuldu. 
İlk kanun çok önemli. 
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“The IOM and UNHCR were invited to the preparation and inscription of the law. 
Academia was also invited. NGOs were also called in and with the Directorate’s will, 
even the NGOs that are in the state’s black list, were invited. There was actual 
participation from these institutions (Official A, Skype Interview, 17 October, 2014)47.”  
An explanation of this participatory approach lay in actors who constitute Turkish 
representative democracy: public opinion, political parties, interest groups, and their 
perceptions against migration policy making. Although in Western liberal democracies, these 
actors typically demand more restrictive policies, in Turkey, because of the de-politicised 
and technicalised nature of migration, they either participate in technical discussions or do 
not participate at all. Politically, costs related to migration reform are not considerable, 
because of lack of interest from the public, political parties or interest groups. Until the Syrian 
refugee crisis began in 2011, Turkish political parties did not campaign at all on migration 
related issues. There was also a scarcity of civil society working on migration management 
while most NGOs are focused only on asylum and refugees. Moreover, bar associations and 
unions in Turkey do not have the motive or the infrastructure to examine migration. A 
UNHCR official has supported the idea de-politicisation ensuring policy makers more room 
for manoeuvre: “We still do not have a well-established immigration policy, but this is also 
an advantage, because in the lack of a policy, there is no opposition (Official A, Ankara, 14 
January 2014)48.” In this technicalised environment, policy makers benefited from the 
expertise of actors involved, without struggling with political agendas. An official from 
Amnesty International Turkey confirmed this argument, stating:  
“Normally, state tradition in Turkey excludes NGOs from the policy making processes. 
Resulting from its de-politicisation, migration is one of the first policy areas where 
NGO involvement is possible (Ankara, 15 January 2014)49.” 
The de-politicised nature of this policy instrument was also visible in the ratification process. 
The Law was ratified and adopted by the Turkish Parliament on 4 April 2013 with the 
                                                          
47 The original Turkish text is as follows: “IOM, UNHCR, kanunun yapım ve yazılımına davet edildi. Akademi de davet 
edildi. STK’lara da aynı şey söylendi hatta Büro’nun iradesi ile devletin kara listesindeki STK’lar bile çağrıldı. Bu 
birimlerden fiili katılım oldu.” 
48 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Hala bir göç politikamız yok ama bu aynı zamanda bir avantaj çünkü politika 
yoksa muhalefet olmaz. Bilgi ve ilgisizlik bir yandan lehimize çalışan bir şey.” 
49 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Devlet geleneği STK’ları politika yapımından dışlıyor. Göç, politik bir konu 
olmamasından ötürü STK katılımının mümkün olduğu ilklerden.”  
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approval of both government and opposition parties. This is rare, considering the polarised 
nature of the Turkish Parliament and the major parties’ tendencies to vote against draft bills 
proposed by the other. While the main reason for this consensus in migration policy is its 
technical nature, further credit should be given to the Directorate General of Migration 
Management, which succeeded in distancing itself from political discussions and prepared 
the legislation in participation. In an interview, a project expert from IOM Turkey, stressed 
the significance of establishing a non-politicised unit, by stating: “In this process, it was 
important to establish a general directorate with a vision, which is not political but 
functional. It is crucial to sustain this cooperation (Official A, Ankara, 17 January 2014).” 
A migration expert from the Directorate General for Migration Management, implies such 
functionality emphasising migration management consisting of policy responses based on 
compiling data:  
“The main aim of our organisation is ‘managing migration.’ Under the Turkish 
National Police’s authority, they were responsible for 90.000 people annually, 
however now 40.000.000 people enter or exit the country annually. We have 
established our own system accordingly. The Goc.net website will be available soon. 
We have divided the statistics into some parameters to obtain better data (Official A, 
Ankara, 17 June 2015)50.” 
Together with low levels of politicisation in migration policy, domestic consensus on the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection was also due to the lack of any 
comprehensive legislation prior to this Law. Thus, constitutionalism, as a normative limit to 
state capacities, promoting a more liberal migration regime, did not effectively restrict 
Turkish migration policy making. Until the adoption of this law, migration management in 
Turkey was regulated through some outdated secondary legislation under Passport Law and 
the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey as well as through some 
administrative regulations. Insufficiency of previous legislation and the establishment of a 
Directorate specifically founded for drafting the Law, enabled policy makers to manoeuvre 
in a relatively free manner in the absence of veto players or any opposition (Açıkgöz & 
Arıner, 2014). In the end, these actors formed the basis of constitutionalism in Turkish 
                                                          
50 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Kurumumuzun amacı ‘göçü yönetmek.’ Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü zamanında 
90.000 kişiye bakıyordu ama şimdi 40.000.000 giriş çıkış söz konusu. Kendi sistemimizi kurduk. Göç.net yakında 
kullanıma açılacak. Parametreleri parçaladık, güzel istatistikler elde ettik.” 
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migration policies in Turkey, with a Law in a de-politicised environment, promising a more 
liberal approach towards migration. Various principles that were non-existent in migration 
legislation in Turkey, have been incorporated into the Law and are guaranteed 
constitutionally. Coordination of Refugee Rights, an association consisting of five main 
human rights organisations51 working on the issue, published a declaration on June 2014, 
stating this Law as a significant opportunity to respond to needs of migration management in 
Turkey52. Both non-governmental and international organisations that are active in Turkey 
had a consensus on the significance of constitutionalisation of policy, despite stressing the 
Law’s shortcomings for some cases of international protection.  
Although interest group pressure is absent from Turkish legislative reform in migration 
policy, during the preparation of the Law, state bureaucrats, policy makers and government 
took into consideration possible pressures from the global labour market. Policy makers did 
not experience any pressure from business groups, but their initial aim of preparing this law 
was based on economic grounds, to make migration economically beneficial. The 
introduction of the Law occurred at a time when Turkey was beginning to be recognised as 
a country of immigration, rather than just a country of emigration or transit. Initially, the Law 
was presented as a necessity to make migration flows constructive for Turkey. A director 
from the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs highlighted the need for immigration legislation 
relating to domestic developments in Turkish economy by stating:  
“Turkey’s economic development has been the main facilitator behind the introduction 
of the Law. In an attempt to convince decision makers and institutions on new 
legislation, economic development was introduced as the main factor. There was a dire 
need for a significant policy to be applied to foreigners, in the process of Turkey 
becoming a main country of destination (Official A, Ankara, 14 January, 2014)53.”  
                                                          
51 These five organisations are: Helsinki Citizens Assembly; Human Rights Association; Human Rights Agenda 
Association; Association for Solidarity with Refugees and; Amnesty International Turkey Office. 
52 June 20, 2014. “20 Haziran Mülteciler Günü Açıklaması (20th June, Day of Refugees Declaration).” Amnesty 
International Turkey. <http://www.amnesty.org.tr/icerik/37/1378/20-haziran-multeciler-gunu-basin-aciklamasi> Retrieved 
in March 20, 2015.  
53 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Aslına bakılırsa ekonomik gelişme kanunun çıkmasına etken oldu. Karar 
vericiler ve kurumlar ikna edilirken bu da ortaya konuldu. Türkiye’nin hedef ülke haline gelmesiyle yabancılara 
uygulanacak anlamlı bir politikaya ihtiyaç duyuldu.” 
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Likewise, under the general justification section of the initial Proposal on the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection, emphasis on Turkey’s rising economic power and 
continuing instability , resulting in increased numbers of regular and irregular migration 
dominate the reasons why this law shall be prioritised in Turkish General Assembly’s agenda. 
In this case, domestic limits to state capacities on migration policy making did not have a 
direct impact in the way they were theorised for traditionally migrant receiving countries. 
Eventually, these features led indirectly to more liberal policies. This is not only an outcome 
of different migration experiences of two categories of countries, but also an outcome of 
different institutional structures, party politics and forms of economic development. 
Representative democracy is the main feature of Turkey where it was expected to result in a 
more restrictive migration policy but the direct opposite occurred. Due to lack of 
politicisation in the policy field, actors related to Turkish representative democracy did not 
function as limits to state capacities for more restrictive policies. Conversely, this de-
politicisation and technicalization enabled various non-governmental organisations and 
interest groups to be included in policy processes, as they would be typically considered as 
inconveniences lengthening the process, and would be excluded from policy making in 
politically charged areas. This participatory process led to more liberal legislation. 
Constitutionalism feature of Turkey did not limit state capacities either. Instead, the absence 
of an all-encompassing law for migration management and the establishment of a new 
Directorate, specifically for this legislation, enabled policy makers to act in relative freedom. 
However, considering this Law will be the primary constitutional limit for state capacities 
and the approach was participatory, almost independent from political pressures, it is 
expected to constitute a liberal constraint in the future. And finally, business networks did 
not have a significant influence on Turkey in the form of interest group pressure. However, 
policy makers, state bureaucracy and government officials used Turkey’s economic growth 
and its transition to a migration receiving country, as justifications for this law. Thus, 
expectations from migration legislation is framed around ensuring Turkey benefits from a 
global market economy, to gain further support for this legislation. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The initiative for Turkey to reform its migration legislation came from the EU by adding 
legislative reform to the agenda of Turkey’s accession conditionality framework. However, 
with the decline of the country’s accession prospects, the conditionality framework began to 
lose power for facilitating reform. The push that initiated the actual reform process came 
from domestic contextual factors, supported by the spill-over effect of EU policy 
conditionality established upon the possible readmission-visa liberalisation deal. This spill-
over has initiated the establishment of a new Bureau in Turkey in 2008, which was later 
transformed into the Directorate General for Migration Management, the state body 
responsible for the preparation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. The 
establishment of the Directorate has become important as it centralised the domestic position 
for legislative reform as a technical and functional body essentially established to undertake 
reform. Such technicality and functionality enabled the Directorate to adopt a participatory 
approach, which escalated the relative influence of international organisations. While EU 
influence continued through deliberation and agenda setting facilitated by technical and 
financial assistance, the Directorate undertook this reform process a safe distance from the 
EU, framing legislative reform as a domestic need, not a requirement of Turkey’s relationship 
with the EU. The re-framing granted the Directorate a higher level control on migration 
policy change, enabling it to prepare a law corresponding to Turkish priorities and liberated 
from the EU’s conditionality framework, which suggests policy transfer from the EU acquis.  
This domestic need determined the content and timing of legislative reform and lies upon 
two developments. Firstly, the increase in the number of immigrants who migrate to Turkey 
with an intention to settle distorted the understanding that Turkey is a country of emigration, 
re-established it as a country in transition to a country of immigration. This transformation 
established the basis for the Directorate’s claim for a new migration legislation, to make 
immigration beneficial for Turkey, as an economically developing transition country. 
Secondly, absence of a coherent asylum legislation in Turkey to manage the asylum 
movements, which were relatively high in number even before the Syrian asylum crisis, and 
international pressures from international organisations and the ECtHR, stressing this 
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absence, increased the sense of urgency, and the proportion of asylum related terms within 
the Law. Especially the ECtHR decision stressing absence of legislation caused domestic and 
international moral consciousness-raising and accelerated the process. These two contextual 
circumstances established the basis for re-initiating legislative reform primarily built upon 
the EU push, but frozen as a result of decline in the accession conditionality.  
During the preparation of the Law, due to low levels of politicisation, Turkish policy makers 
acted with relative freedom from public opinion, political parties, interest groups and the 
mass media. Thus, one might assume their insignificance in promoting more restrictive 
policies would free policy makers from the burden of legitimisation. However, migration in 
Turkey is governed by a number of stakeholders from approximately twenty one Ministries, 
each having its own priorities. As a result, in the Law, the Directorate General of Migration 
Management used external influences to legitimise this reform agenda against possible 
domestic veto players. While financial assistance from the EU was presented to legitimise 
economic costs of the agreement, Turkey’s participation in the global migration regime 
provided a normative basis and a human rights based legitimisation for this policy change. 
While the European Court of Human Rights imposed its preferences and reservations through 
individual court cases, introduced by networks among transnational and domestic actors, the 
IOM and the UNHCR were directly involved in policy processes and guaranteed involvement 
in the implementation phase. During the preparation of this Law, the inclusion of these 
organisations helped to present the Law as human rights based legislation. This presentation 
would not be possible if the sole source of external influence was the EU, due to the Union’s 
inability to establish itself as a normative power in migration management.  
The outcome of this legislative reform process, the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, was dominantly shaped by the Directorate as a response to the domestic and 
international context. It was able to act with relative independence from both domestic and 
external influences as a result of this policy instrument’s low level of politicisation and its 
framing as domestic need. Both international organisations and the EU were present in policy 
discussions, though international organisations were more influential through social policy 
learning, due to trust established from long-term presence in the field. The EU influenced the 
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policy outcome through technical and financial assistance, valuable resources which direct 
policy makers to prioritise policy fields where assistance is granted.  
When focus is directed on policy preferences of each level of actors and fulfilment of these 
preferences, it is seen that all levels of actors are highly contented with the outcome. This 
does not imply fulfilment of policy preferences of all levels of actors, but suggests a 
favourable outcome. The Law has satisfied policy preferences of external actors to an extent 
the Directorate found fitted the sensitivities of Turkish migration management. For instance, 
despite external pressures, the Law still maintains the geographical limitation. However, the 
actors’ basic policy principles were fulfilled. This is mainly due to their initial policy 
preferences and insistence on basic principles, and not policy implications. Unlike other case 
studies analysed here, in this legislative reform process, there was no significant conflict of 
interests among actors. Overlaps between EU and international organisation priorities 
complement each other by using diverse mechanisms in different phases of policy. The EU 
initially triggered it, the Directorate undertook the reform agenda, international organisations 
provided technical support and normative legitimisation while the EU provided financial 
backup. In upcoming cases, these three level actors tend to legitimise their positions against 
each other, or aim to change the other’s policy preferences through leverage. Here, in the 
absence of any significant conflict of interests, all three levels have supported policy reform 
agenda in a similar direction.  
 
  
99 
 
Chapter 6: Case Study 2, EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement 
In international relations, readmission agreements are proposed to enable parties to readmit 
irregular immigrants who are their own nationals and nationals of third countries who have 
transited through their territory. In essence, these agreements arose to simplify removal 
procedures for irregular immigrants. The introduction of readmission agreements in EU 
immigration policy was also based on simplification of return procedures of irregular 
migrants from signatory countries as well as transit migrants from third countries. 
Established by the supra-national governance of migration principle after the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the common migration policy of the Union used readmission agreements as 
tools to manage migration in cooperation with third countries (Kruse & Trauner, 2008).  
Theoretical perspectives on EU-third country relations highlight their asymmetrical nature. 
In a relationship where third countries are involved with an interest or a demand, power 
asymmetry empowers the EU in its relations with third and candidate countries (Elgström & 
Strömvik, 2005). Migration policy, presents an empirical challenge to this theoretical 
understanding, especially in cases of major countries of origin or transit bordering the EU, 
such as Libya, Morocco and Turkey. In migration relations, these third countries can be 
empowered and gain some negotiating leverage, due to increasing significance, politicisation 
and securitised perception of migration in the EU. Paoletti, has revealed such empowerment 
in the case of Italy, Libya and the EU, where Libya utilised securitisation of migration, as a 
powerful asset in its relations with these entities (Paoletti, 2009). In this chapter, I anticipate 
a similar empowerment for Turkey in the case of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
because of the dynamic nature of the process. As negotiations progressed, the context has 
changed, to weakening the EU’s initial position and empowering the Turkish government’s.  
To make this chapter clearer, I introduce a brief timeline of the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement below. However, neither this timeline, nor a discussion on the nature and contents 
of the agreement is within the purposes of this study. In the literature, there is research 
available focusing on these agreements’ legal nature and implications (Aka & Özkural, 2015; 
Billet, 2010; Kruse & Trauner, 2008); refugees and human rights dimensions (Abell, 1999; 
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Coleman, 2009); negotiation processes (Bürgin, 2013; Dedja, 2012; Içduygu & Aksel, 2014; 
Roig & Huddleston, 2007; Wolff, 2014); and implementation in third countries (Korneev, 
2014). Instead, aiming to explain reasons behind the policy, in this chapter, I analyse the 
relative impact of each actor, through a three-level analysis of the preparation, negotiation 
and the conclusion process of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement.  
6.1 EU-Level Actors 
It is theoretically viable to assume dominance of EU-level actors in influencing domestic 
change in the framework of an agreement whose terms were introduced by the EU itself. The 
attributes of asymmetrical power relationships between the EU and candidate countries 
support this perception. It is expected for candidate countries, to fulfil EU requirements with 
little room for negotiation, in the framework of the accession conditionality framework. 
However, this section presents peculiarities related to the nature of Turkey-EU relations and 
irregular migration policy area which establishes empirical challenges to these theoretical 
understandings. In the fourth chapter, I already stressed the significance of irregular transit 
migration through Turkey and revealed the necessity of international and EU-level 
cooperation for managing this. Because of this, Turkey has been successful in claiming 
significant concessions from the EU during the readmission negotiation process. The 
prominence of the issue led the Commission and the Council to abandon persisting in 
negotiating the readmission agreement in the framework of Turkey’s accession conditionality 
and establishing a separate negotiation process with its own terms and concessions. Then, 
the EU would introduce a visa liberalisation road map, instead of, the visa facilitations the 
EU’s preferred option. Thus, from Paoletti’s (2009) findings and this outcome, this section 
initially reveals factors that enabled Turkey to negotiate such concessions from the EU, and 
constitutes an empirical deviation from theory on asymmetrical power relations. It presents 
the processes and international context which assigned further leverage to Turkey to 
challenge the asymmetrical nature of EU third country negotiations.  
In the last decade, the EU induced reform agenda on Turkish migration policies focused on 
conclusion of a readmission agreement between the parties. The main EU demand was the 
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readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons who have transited through 
Turkey. This main demand was also Turkish officials’ main apprehension, based on concerns 
of a burden the country was not institutionally, economically and politically prepared to bear. 
While Turkey aimed to delay negotiations, insisting on concluding readmission agreements 
with countries of origin first, enabling return of readmitted immigrants; the Commission 
linked progress in the country’s EU accession talks onto the progress on readmission. 
Following this, Turkish officials agreed to negotiate a readmission agreement with the EU in 
March 2004, announcing their intentions to readmit Turkish nationals and permanent 
residents to Turkey, and official negotiations began in May 2005 (Coleman, 2009). This was 
barely a concession considering Turkey already had a good record of readmitting those 
groups, though officials aimed to postpone the third country nationals’ clause until a solid 
incentive from the EU was introduced, either in the form of accession or policy 
conditionality; and until the country concluded readmission agreements with immigrants’ 
countries of origin first (Coleman, 2009). Although Turkey succeeded in concluding some 
readmission agreements54, except for Pakistan, none of these countries were the major 
countries of origin for the transit migrants. Concluding a readmission agreement with 
countries of origin has been difficult for Turkey, with the lack of an incentive to present in 
return. As a result, these attempts to decrease Turkey’s burden, did not relieve apprehensions 
about this agreement. 
In December 2006, the EU’s main incentive of accession offered during these negotiations, 
was interrupted with the EU decision to freeze the opening of eight out of thirty-five 
negotiation chapters, because of Turkey’s failure to fully implement the Customs Union 
Agreement to all EU member states by declining to open its ports to Cypriot traffic. After 
this decision, readmission negotiations were also abandoned. In 2009, the Republic of Cyprus 
unilaterally blocked the opening of six chapters in Turkish accession negotiations, including 
Chapter 24, on Justice Freedom and Security. This blockage further weakened Turkey’s 
incentives for signing a readmission agreement, considering the negotiation chapter covering 
the issue was blocked and progress in the readmission agreement would not result in progress 
                                                          
54 Turkey concluded readmission agreements with the following countries: Greece (2001); Syria (2001); Kyrgyzstan 
(2003); Romania (2004); Ukraine (2005); Pakistan (2010); Nigeria (2011); Russian Federation (2011); Yemen (2011); 
Bosnia Herzegovina (2012); Moldavia (2012).  
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in an accession negotiation chapter (Bürgin, 2013). Thus, negotiations stagnated in 2006, 
continuing until 2010. (Nas, 2011). 
Although the decline in Turkey’s accession prospects was presented as the main reason for 
abandoning progress on the readmission agreement; progress of accession was not Turkish 
negotiators’ main expectation from this agreement. They initially agreed to negotiate this 
agreement with expectations of establishing a link between readmission and visa facilitations. 
The EU has established this link in readmission negotiations with third countries since 2004, 
with the Western Balkan states, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. In 2007, the 
Commission offered Turkey negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement as well, though 
these negotiations would only start after Turkey concluded the readmission agreement. 
Moreover, the Commission introduced visa facilitations with a narrower scope, similar to the 
ones offered to the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Turkey did not consider this offer to be 
satisfactory, because of the limited scope of the proposed visa facilitation agreement and over 
claims that facilitations, and even liberalisation, were already granted, but not implemented 
in Turkey’s Association Agreement. Moreover, the procedures introduced in Turkey, were 
different from the Balkan countries. They were presented with a visa liberalisation road map 
in conclusion of their readmission processes. This raised further concerns over unequal 
treatment to Turkey. Framed around these three claims, (i) the proposed incentive shall 
adequately meet the burden of the agreement; (ii) Turkey already deserves a visa-free regime 
with the EU in the framework of its Association agreement; and (iii) Turkey seeks fair 
treatment, Turkish policy makers refused to settle for any incentive other than visa 
liberalisation, as compensation for concluding a readmission agreement with the EU.  
Aiming to obtain visa liberalisation, Turkey re-started technical discussions in 2008 and 
negotiations were officially re-launched by the EU in 2010. After negotiations between 2004 
and 2010, the parties finally agreed a draft agreement in January 2011. In the following 
month, due to strong opposition from EU member states, especially Germany and France, 
the Council only gave the Commission a mandate to initiate a visa dialogue with Turkey to 
negotiate limited visa facilitations, without any target for visa liberalisation (Council of the 
European Union, 2011). While the Turkish Foreign Minister officially stated that any offer 
other than visa liberalisation was not acceptable for implementing the agreement, the Council 
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did not present further incentives for the Commission to negotiate because of the low priority 
given to migration related issues during the Hungarian and Polish presidencies in 2011 
(Bürgin, 2013).  
After this offer was found unsatisfactory by Turkey, in 2011, the country’s significance to 
migration related issues began to increase because of asylum and migration flows caused by 
the Arab Spring, and transit through Turkey to Greece. This development strengthened 
Turkish policy makers’ position for persisting on visa liberalisation as a balanced shorter-
term deal, independent from the accession process. This was also found legitimate by 
Commission officials who recognised the significance of cooperation in migration policy, 
and such cooperation solely in the accession framework of was unsustainable. A high-ranking 
official working in the Turkey unit of the European Commission’s DG Enlargement stressed 
the significance of engagement between the parties, independent from the accession process:  
“It’s actually strictly speaking, enlargement and migration, in this case readmission 
and visa liberalisation are two different strands. We have readmission agreements and 
visa liberalisation processes with countries, who, for instance, have no prospect of 
accession to the EU. Beyond accession, we need to cooperate. Readmission and visa 
liberalisation processes confirmed that there is room for cooperation outside of the 
accession process (Official C, Brussels, 29 April 2014).” 
Commission officials interviewed in this study, have not only stressed the significance of 
keeping migration related issues immune from complexities related with the accession 
process, they have also signalled the suitability of readmission for establishing a negotiation 
process beyond accession, considering it is an international agreement, negotiable with any 
third country. The need to keep negotiations on readmission immune from politics and the 
deadlocks of the negotiation process by introducing a balanced shorter term deal to Turkey, 
became significant, for guaranteeing continuation in this separate relationship. A policy 
officer from the Commission’s DG Home Affairs stated the significance of this continuation 
and the need for a balanced shorter term deal:  
“Turkey is a candidate country… our relations should normally lead to enlargement, 
taking particular requirements leading to enlargement. This was more of a 
philosophical and far reaching aim, but more to the ground, our short and mid-term 
aim is, I mean, we have a clear issue with Turkey, Turkey is a very important country, 
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for migration reasons. It is a transit country for irregular migration as well. Addressing 
this issue is crucial… But we see it as a joint endeavour. In any case, migration 
management is a joint endeavour. So, we need to always look for convergence, this is 
important for us to address irregular channels. But Turkey also has its priorities, so 
hence we end up with visa dialogue (Official C, Brussels, 30 April 2014).”  
Added to the increased importance of Turkey responding to the changing context, another 
development that has facilitated the readmission-visa liberalisation deal has been the rotation 
and replacement of high ranking officials in the Council and member states by officials who 
made the negotiation environment more favourable. This has also become an enabling factor 
for Turkey to negotiate a better deal than the Council was willing to offer. A senior migration 
management policy advisor at the Turkish Foreign Ministry has strongly stressed the 
significance of personalities in transforming these negotiations:  
“In the EU’s Home Affairs meeting in February 2011, an unsatisfactory situation arose 
for Turkey. However, in the meantime, Denmark came into the presidency of the 
Commission and personalities played a major role in the progress and conclusion of 
the negotiations (Official A, Skype Interview, 17 October, 2014).55” 
In the first half of 2012, the Danish presidency aimed to conclude the readmission agreement, 
before the Cyprus presidency would most probably interrupt negotiations during the next 
term. Moreover, a change in Germany’s approach towards visa liberalisation and a change in 
government in France in favour of relations with Turkey enabled the Council presidency to 
act in relative freedom in cooperation with the Commission, preparing a document acceptable 
both by the Turkish government and the Council (Bürgin, 2013). By the end of Denmark’s 
presidency, in 21 June 2012, the Council gave a mandate to the Commission to negotiate visa 
liberalisation with Turkey by introducing benchmarks to be completed on road to visa 
liberalisation (Council of the European Union, 2012).  
Visa liberalisation has notable political significance in the Turkish domestic arena, further 
elaborated in the domestic level section. Introduction of the full implementation of the EU-
                                                          
55 Original Turkish text is as follows: “Avrupa Birliği’nin Şubat’taki Home Affairs toplantısında Türkiye için tatminkar 
olmayan bir durum ortaya çıktı. Ancak bu sırada Danimarka Komisyon Başkanlığı’nı sürdürmeye başladı. Müzakerelerin 
sürdürülmesi ve sonlandırılmasında personality’ler büyük rol oynadı.”  
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Turkey readmission agreement as the primary condition in the visa liberalisation road map, 
is therefore presented as a balanced deal. As a senior official of the DG Home Affairs stated:  
“… We believe that the agreement is a very good agreement. I see the deal is balanced, 
visa dialogue was also something very dear to Turkey so I think we are both winners 
(Official C, Brussels, and 30 April 2014).”  
Despite its political significance, the visa liberalisation road map did not fully overcome the 
apprehensions of Turkish implementing bodies, such as the Turkish National Police and the 
Directorate General for Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior. They had 
reservations over burden-sharing, in respect of financial and technical assistance. These 
reservations diminished with introduction of technical assistance clauses in the agreement. A 
senior policy advisor for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated the forms this 
assistance will take by interpreting clauses in the agreement:  
“… This technical assistance clause actually implies financial assistance as well, 
without suggesting it implicitly. Between the lines, “general sources” of the EU are 
mentioned. This means Turkey would not only benefit from the funds related to its 
accession process to the EU, the funds we call IPA funds, it would also get a 
contribution from a more general budget (Official A, Skype Interview, 13 November, 
2014).”  
These assurances for assistance, have been valuable for overcoming the Ministry of Interior’s 
reservations. Moreover, much needed flexibility absent in the accession process, was present 
in these negotiations and deliberation based on such flexibility further facilitated preparation 
of an agreement satisfactory to both sides. The draft text of the agreement was negotiated 
thoroughly and amended in detail. This detail-oriented approach is most visibly seen in the 
joint declaration added to the end of the agreement stating that it would be implemented in 
“good faith.” This declaration guaranteed the EU would primarily show an effort, sending 
third country citizens to their countries of origin, before sending them to Turkey. It is 
significant parties did not perceive these details as given and aimed to produce a definitive 
document for sufficient implementation.  
The EU and Turkey signed the readmission agreement on 16th December 2013, in parallel 
with the launch of a dialogue on visa liberalisation. With the introduction of the visa 
106 
 
liberalisation road map56, presenting a package of reforms and introducing an implementation 
framework, one of the most structured negotiation processes between the EU and Turkey 
began. Almost all officials interviewed in the EU Commission stated that Turkey overcame 
deadlock in the relations by signing the readmission agreement; as the Council presented the 
lack of concessions from the Turkish side as a justification for using its power to block 
negotiations. As soon as Turkey presented a concession by signing the readmission 
agreement, the Council was trapped to act accordingly. As a senior official from the EU 
Commission, DG Home Affairs puts it:  
“On our side, for a long time, the power has been on the Council who used this power 
to block the Commission. Turkey believed, by hard negotiations, they were doing on 
their best advantage, but they were supporting the blockage that the Council was so 
willingly implementing. When they accepted the readmission agreement, they liberated 
the Commission, who is their best friend within the EU, from the blockage. If Turkey 
plays a fair game in the negotiations, Turkey and the Commission can act as a team 
and in a few years’ time, the Council will have to recognize Turkey’s progress (Official 
A, Brussels, 28 April 2014).” 
After the Council’s blockage on relations was lifted, the level of consultation and deliberation 
between parties increased. Since the establishment of the road map, Commission officials 
have taken frequent visits to Turkey, in addition to the establishment of two permanent 
missions in the country for its implementation. There are also relatively independent 
technical staff involved in these missions as experts. They have the task to contribute to the 
Communication presented to the Council by the Commission, concerning developments 
related to implementation of the visa road map. The scope of their task is explained by a 
senior official from the EU Commission, DG Enlargement:  
“In these missions… we are accompanied by a number of experts from the member 
states. The role of these experts will be to draft technical assessments, on the situation 
in Turkey, to make their comments about weaknesses, about strengths, about 
challenges, about issues to be addressed… And on the bases of these assessments and 
on the bases of the Commission’s and EU Community’s priorities, we will draft the 
Communication. The experts are member states’ experts. We choose them on the bases 
                                                          
56 See the Road Map towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf. Retrieved in February 4, 
2014.  
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of experience, of availability. We are trying to diversify (Official A, Brussels, 25 April 
2014).” 
The participation of these independent experts in the process promises to reinforce trust 
between parties, especially on issues related to the assessment. Also, their involvement 
provides a venue for unofficial socialisation with practitioners in the field, which is valuable 
for the overall progress of the policy implementation. 
At the end, Turkey’s “success” in this negotiation process could be disputed considering the 
process concluded only with a road map for signing an actual agreement. It is expected the 
Council will push for further assessment to delay visa liberalisation for Turkey. Moreover, 
controversies that have arisen from similar arrangements with the Western Balkan countries 
are not encouraging, that the EU will lift visas with Turkey anytime soon. Currently, the 
Council, especially Germany is discussing re-introduction of visa obligations to these 
countries, because of the misuse of the visa free travel scheme for seeking asylum in the 
EU57. In Turkey, establishment of a negotiation process for the readmission agreement, 
outside of the accession process, also strengthens Turkey’s position for possible EU 
retractions. As stressed throughout this thesis, Turkey’s accession prospects are low and the 
country is not willing to bear the burden of the readmission agreement for the distant 
possibility of accession. Thus, unlike the Western Balkan countries, Turkey can actually 
denounce the agreement if conditions set in this separate negotiation process are not met, 
without any concern for possible EU retractions on accession. The readmission agreement 
Turkey has signed with the EU is an international agreement with provisions for 
denouncement and appeal. In the absence of any significant progress from the Council or 
Parliament to ensure visa liberalisation, while Turkey fulfilled the visa road map provisions, 
it may retain a hard-bargaining strategy to denounce the agreement. This clause, as a last 
resort for Turkey, was highlighted by officials from the EU Commission. A senior official 
from DG Enlargement stated:  
“Turkey retains the right, if for instance, we make the proposal to change visa 
regulation and, if say, the Council drags its feet, the Parliament drags its feet, or 
                                                          
57 For more information see “EU Commission reports on visa free travel from the Western Balkans”: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4482_en.htm.  
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member states oppose it, at the end of the day they don’t really want to give visa-free 
access. Turkey then retains the right to denounce the readmission agreement (Official 
C, Brussels, 29 April 2014).”  
These denouncement and appeal clauses guarantee that for continuity of relations on 
migration policy, EU institutions need to show some progress on visa liberalisation, 
considering the accession prospect is no longer a credible term at the table and no party can 
risk the severance of relations in migration management.  
This section presented peculiarities related to the nature of Turkey-EU relations and the 
irregular migration policy field. Due to the growing importance of irregular transit migration 
through Turkey and a number of enabling factors, Turkey has been successful in claiming 
significant concessions from the EU. These enabling factors came from different sources and 
the most significant ones were not directly related to the negotiation process. The 
commitment of the Danish Council Presidency to conclude this negotiation process before 
Cyprus’ presidency influenced the negotiations more than any negotiation tactic possibly 
facilitated by Turkish negotiators. Moreover, concluding these negotiations was precipitated 
by the EU response to migration flows as a result of the Arab Spring. This was conveniently 
added to the Danish presidency’s intentions, empowering the Turkish position. The decline 
in accession prospects for Turkey, accepted by both parties, also functioned as an enabling 
factor, establishing a more flexible negotiation framework liberated from the rigid 
assessments of accession. Rather than the one-way system of the usual accession process, 
where the Commission dictates terms and timetable, in this case, Turkey altered the EU terms 
and timetable fundamentally, and even dictated some significant negotiation terms.  
This section identified three main issue linkages, used by the EU to influence Turkish 
migration policy regarding the readmission agreement. First, in 2004 the Commission linked 
progress in accession to advancement of the readmission agreement. This facilitation of 
accession conditionality proved ineffective due to the decline in the country’s accession 
prospects with the partial freeze in relations in 2006, followed by Cyprus’ unilateral decisions 
in 2009. In the meantime, Turkish officials began to openly express their interest in a visa 
facilitation agreement in return for signing a readmission agreement. As a result, the second 
issue linkage was introduced in 2007, when the Commission introduced limited visa 
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facilitations to Turkey. Due to limited scope and terms different to the visa facilitation 
agreements introduced to Eastern Europe, this offer remained inconclusive. After the 2011 
visa dialogue setback, increasing significance of the country on migration due to the flows 
occurring as a result of the Arab Spring, and the change of presidency in the Council led to 
the introduction of a final issue linkage. In June 2012, the Council gave a mandate to the 
Commission to negotiate visa liberalisation with Turkey. This final issue linkage led to the 
conclusion of the negotiation process with a readmission agreement, though the EU needed 
to introduce further mechanisms to guarantee implementation. These issue linkages show 
that negotiations over a readmission agreement began as a subset of accession, but then 
evolved, establishing its own separate trajectory. During the long negotiation process, the 
significance of migration for the EU has increased to a level that progress could no longer be 
risked by keeping it dependent on the progress of accession. This finding also shows that for 
candidate countries, a promise for accession is not decisive to determine the scope and nature 
of relations between parties. On the contrary, when parties are stuck in deadlock, persisting 
in using accession conditionality as a negotiation framework it is ultimately 
counterproductive. This case shows such engagement outside of accession is not only 
possible, but also more efficient to facilitate a negotiated agreement. 
6.2 International Actors 
International organisations active in Turkey did not directly participate in the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement negotiations. They were concluded between the Turkish state and the 
EU. The visa liberalisation road map is also an EU made document, introduced by the 
Council and amended with suggestions from the Commission and, to a limited extent, from 
Turkish officials. Through an analysis of interviews conducted with key officials from 
representatives of international organisations in Turkey, I have identified three main reasons 
why these organisations did not participate in these negotiations. First of all, they were 
excluded from these negotiations, because of the centralised nature of the negotiation 
process. Politicisation of negotiations with introduction of threats, retractions and issue 
linkages led to further centralisation. This exclusion due to the politicisation of the 
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negotiation process is further discussed below, under the domestic actors section, by 
introducing the similar exclusion Turkish non-governmental organisations have experienced.  
Secondly, beyond their exclusion, the nature of the negotiation process which progressed 
with long interruptions and some hard bargaining methods, discouraged both the IOM and 
UNHCR to actively participate in negotiations, concerned over taking sides and losing their 
presence in Turkish migration policy making. An official from UNHCR Turkey expressed 
the organisations reasoning with the following:  
“From time to time, UNHCR had to put some distance between itself and the EU. The 
main political reason behind this disengagement is that UNHCR has been trying to 
avoid being an organization that implements whatever the EU dictates. We couldn’t be 
in the position of the EU’s spokesmen. EU-Turkey relations always experience ups and 
downs, however, UNHCR could not allow any ups and downs in the implementation of 
international standards (Official A, Ankara, 14 January 2014). 58”  
Similar to these organisations decisions to lay low during policy making processes in other 
policy fields, averting exclusion from implementation; in this negotiation process, they 
established a safe distance from the EU, to prevent interrupting their relations with Turkey, 
in parallel to possible interruption in relations between EU and Turkey.  
Finally, these organisations avoided getting involved in these negotiations to maintain their 
normative standings on asylum and migration. As a result of possible human rights violations 
related with readmission agreements, representatives of both the UNHCR and IOM Turkey 
have stated that an involvement in these negotiations would lead to controversies over their 
normative consistency. Since the introduction of the first EU level readmission agreements 
in the early 1990s, UNHCR has taken a stance against these agreements, criticising absence 
of asylum-related provisions. The organisation has claimed, that this not only jeopardizes the 
states’ responsibility for providing fair procedures for determination of refugee status, it 
could also lead to refoulement as a result of a chain of readmissions. Regarding this, a “safe 
third country” concept implemented together with the readmission agreements, is specifically 
                                                          
58 The original Turkish text is as follows: “UNHCR zaman zaman AB ile arasına mesafe koydu. Bunun ana politik sebebi 
ise UNHCR’ın AB’nin diktesini uygulayan bir kurum olmaktan kaçınması oldu. Kendimizi AB’nin sözcüsü konumuna 
düşüremezdik. AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde iniş ve çıkışlar oluyor ancak UNHCR international standartların uygulanmasında 
iniş çıkışlara göz yumamazdı.” 
111 
 
controversial as states can refrain from obligations of fair status determination and shift the 
responsibility to the first safe third country through a chain of readmissions (UNHCR, 1994). 
These concerns of burden shifting are specifically relevant to countries at the periphery of 
the European Union, like Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, where asylum systems are 
overburdened.  
For these three reasons, both IOM and UNHCR Turkey did not actively participate in 
negotiations. Instead, they were indirectly involved in promoting emphasis on some issues 
and providing advice on how to address them. They mainly explain their positions on the 
human rights dimension of the issue and specify preferences based on best practice. A policy 
officer interviewed in the IOM Ankara Office has summarised their role during the 
negotiations:  
“We are not active actors in the negotiations, Turkey is on its own in the negotiation 
process. We can only demonstrate our support for the consideration of certain matters 
and introduction of certain instruments… we can reveal the best practices in policy 
making and the reasons for these changes. We prepare and present some analyses, 
reports and desk reviews to reveal the elements, cause, effect and the outcomes of the 
process (Official A, Ankara, 17 January 2014).59” 
Indeed, during negotiations, these organisations had only limited participation as advisory 
bodies, expressing their priorities and comprehensions, though without any mechanisms to 
influence Turkey to alter the direction of domestic change. However, these organisations are 
expected to play considerable roles during implementation of the agreement together with 
the visa liberalisation road map. It is typical for these organisations to avoid, or to be excluded 
from, participation in politicised processes of policy making, but afterwards to get involved 
in the best implementation of available policies. The IOM is especially experienced in 
providing assistance for implementation of the readmission agreements, with a wide range 
of countries at the peripheries of the EU, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This assistance is usually in the form of institutional 
capacity building through training and technical assistance. In its Turkey office, officials who 
                                                          
59 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Müzakerelerde aktif aktör değiliz, TR bunu kendisi sürdürüyor. Fakat belli 
hususların dikkate alınması ve belli enstrümanların ortaya konması konusunda ancak destek olabiliyoruz … varsa politika 
yapımında iyi uygulamaları, değişiklik sebeplerini ortaya koyabiliyoruz. Sürecin unsur, neden, etki ve sonuçlarını ortaya 
koyacak şekilde bazı analiz, rapor ve desk review ların sunumlarını yapıyoruz.”  
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were interviewed also stressed their role in terms of enhancing the country’s institutional 
capacities. Above-mentioned project officer from IOM Ankara stated “There will be a good 
process of institutionalization. We have influence in terms of institutional capacity (Official 
A, Ankara, 17 January 2014).60” The IOM’s role in the implementation phase signifies 
continuation of a trend in Turkish migration policy making. While state and government 
officials often exclude international organisations from policy decisions due to expectations 
of political gains and an aim to conclude policy making without facing complications 
introduced by these agencies, they need assistance from these organisations to implement 
these policy decisions. As a result, these organisations become influential in capacity 
building, and are able to shape implementation of these policy decisions. This trend was 
visible in the implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, implied 
in the implementation of the readmission agreement and the visa liberalisation road map, and 
continued in the country’s asylum policy.  
In the implementation of the readmission agreement and visa liberalisation road map, the 
IOM is actively involved in completion of benchmarks related to border management. The 
organisation supported the integrated border management action plan and prepared necessary 
risk assessment guidelines in cooperation with Frontex. Currently, it is working on a cross 
border project between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, aiming to ensure continuous border 
communication through some parallel and common templates, aiming to share information 
among border staff. For this project, and many similar, involving cross border cooperation, 
the existence of the IOM as an honest broker is specifically significant, considering 
hindrances resulting from historically established lack of trust between parties. As seen in 
the implementation phase of the Greek-Turkish bilateral readmission protocol, this lack of 
trust can easily politicise technical issues and block the effectiveness of any agreement. These 
projects implemented by the IOM not only enhanced institutional capacities, they also made 
necessary border cooperation possible, through bridging provided by the IOM. Moreover, 
the IOM’s assisted voluntary return programme, implemented since 1979, becomes relevant 
for implementation of readmission agreements, preventing a chain of readmissions for 
immigrants who had intentions of going back to their countries of origin.  
                                                          
60 The original Turkish text is as follows: “İyi bir kurumsallaşma süreci olacak. Biz kurumsal kapasite yönünde etkiniz.” 
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In conclusion, both the IOM and UNHCR Turkey did not participate in the EU-Turkey 
negotiations of the readmission agreement. This was due to the centralised nature of the 
politicised negotiation process. These organisations also evaded participation in these 
negotiations for reasons related to instabilities of the EU-Turkey relations, as well as for 
concerns over their own normative identities, which they were unwilling to compromise by 
involvement in such controversial agreements. During the negotiation process, these 
organisations were only present to promote discussion of some issues. However this presence 
was not supported with any mechanisms to enforce Turkey to direct domestic change in 
accordance with their policy preferences. This nonparticipation in the negotiation process is 
changing drastically in the implementation phase as these organisations’ expertise for 
capacity building is becoming essential. As it is common in Turkish migration policy making, 
in this policy field too, international organisations did not participate in policy decisions, but 
enforced their will through the implementation phase by assisting establishment of necessary 
institutional capacities, enabling them to enforce preferred best practices. 
6.3 Domestic Actors 
During the EU-Turkey negotiations over a readmission agreement, domestic actors who had 
the potential to claim their interests and influence outcomes were the Turkish parliament, 
civil society, public opinion, political parties, business groups and state institutions that are 
responsible for policy implementation, such as the Turkish National Police and the 
Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior. Each of these 
actors were relevant in the negotiation process of the agreement, establishing domestic 
pressures necessary for Turkish negotiators (a) to maintain their position on visa 
liberalisation (b) to negotiate terms for financial and technical burden sharing and (c) to 
ensure the agreement was concluded with respect to human rights. Their capabilities to 
establish such pressures were important in determining the outcome of the negotiation 
process and the expectations over implementation.  
Domestic pressures for visa liberalisation in return for a readmission agreement mainly came 
from Turkish public opinion and business groups. Their perspective against readmission was 
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mainly shaped by expectations from visa liberalisation rather than the agreement itself. For 
public opinion, political parties, and the mass media, the issue of visas is not only significant 
for removing travel barriers, but also symbolically significant for challenging Turkey’s status 
as the “other” of Europe. In Turkey, especially in the last decade, public opinion on being a 
part of the EU has been replaced by closeness to the EU and visa liberalisation was 
successfully presented by Turkish policy elites as a main indicator of that closeness. 
According to the 2015 Spring Eurobarometer, support for membership of the EU declined to 
33%, while it was 62% in autumn 200461. However, in 2015, a national survey by the Centre 
for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Turkey revealed that a majority of 
public opinion, 22.7% consider the EU as the main entity for Turkey to cooperate with for a 
stronger economy and foreign policy, followed by the Arabian Peninsula at 11.1%62. 
Moreover, the Turkish electorate aspiration to maintain their links with relatives or children 
abroad is undeniable. For instance, according to Eurostat, in 2012, around 20,000 Turkish 
students registered in EU higher education institutions63, while the total number of Turkish 
nationals living in the EU was around 4 million. In these circumstances, interviewed policy 
makers implied that visa liberalisation for all Turkish citizens to the EU has a domestic, 
electoral power even exceeding EU membership, though they avoided to use such wording 
because of concerns over maintaining Turkey’s claims on accession. In 2012, a political 
figure, former Turkish Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bağış declared the following:  
“The readmission agreement will be indexed to our citizens’ visa-free travel. We will 
complete the process in 3-4 years. For our citizens, visa-free travel is more important 
than accession64.” 
Issues related to visas, are the only areas in Turkish migration policy, where Turkish business 
groups are interested in policy change. Despite their political differences65, representatives 
from two of the most significant business associations in Turkey, the Turkish Industrialists’ 
                                                          
61 Eurobarometers are available in the following link:  
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. Retrieved in February 04, 2015.  
62 The survey is available in the following link: http://www.edam.org.tr/tr/File?id=2164. Retrieved in February 04, 2015. 
63 For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/educ_momo_dst.  
64 July 11, 2012. “Halk Üyelik Değil Vizesiz AB İstiyor (Public does not want Membership, They Prefer Visa-Free EU)”, 
Radikal.  
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1093806&CategoryID=78> Retrieved in 
July 31, 2014. 
65 For a comparative analysis of these associations see Öniş & Türem, 2001. 
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and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Independent Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) agree on the need for determination in this issue at 
all costs. Both organisations supported the agreement to obtain visa liberalisation in return 
and expressed contentment on its conclusion. The main claims of Turkish business groups 
are formed around inconsistencies of Turkey’s Customs Union agreement. In line with 
Sassen’s theory (Sassen, 1996), these business groups stress the incompatibility of free flow 
of goods, capital and information with restrictions on the mobility of people. This also 
contradicts the competition principle implemented by EU Law, disadvantaging Turkish firms 
in the EU market by allowing them to ship their goods, but, blocking entrance of personnel. 
In relation to this, one of the most significant claims on the issue of visas came from these 
actors, when two Turkish lorry drivers were denied access to Germany with their vehicles. 
In the Soysal and Savatlı case66, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled against 
Germany for violating terms of the 1973 Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement 
with Turkey (Köktaş, 2009). There are various similar national and international court 
decisions for the Netherlands and UK as well. However, these court cases did not expand to 
become a norm and visa free travel for service providers continued to be tied to harsh 
procedures.  
Parallel to these groups’ claims on visas from EU member states, Turkish policy elites 
shaping terms of this readmission-visa liberalisation deal, sustain their pressures for a visa-
free regime with a stance built upon these groups’ grievances. Indeed, these groups’ cases 
are the most relevant, since they do not benefit from any facilitations for obtaining visas, 
while, in Turkey, diplomats, members of the parliament, ministers, state bureaucrats, long 
term civil servants, public officers and their families do not need a visa for short term stays 
in the EU. Thus, the conditions for Turkish business people is specifically significant who, 
because of their business links, act in a more transnational manner than most groups though 
their travel rights are limited. A policy officer from the EU Commission’s DG Enlargement 
division, described the rationale behind the Turkish negotiators’ emphasis upon conditions 
of Turkish businesspeople:  
                                                          
66 C-228 / 06 Soysal and Savatlı v Germany, judgment of 19 February 2009.  
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“Turkey, has long requested the abolishment of visa obligations Turkish citizens need, 
in order to travel to EU member states. Not all citizens need a visa because, for example 
Turkey has four types of passports as I remember. Diplomatic passports do not need a 
visa, special passports do not need a visa. So actually when we say Turkish citizens 
need a visa we mean that a big number of Turkish citizens need a visa to travel to the 
EU member states while others do not need visas. Among other things, Turkey is 
complaining about visa obligations of Turkish businesspeople, lorry drivers and many 
others, students, scientists and so on (Official B, Brussels, 25 April 2014).”  
Accordingly, although these business groups were not directly involved in this negotiation 
process their claims for visa liberalisation enabled Turkish negotiators to remain persistent 
during negotiations. Moreover, business groups, public opinion and political actors acted 
coherently, supporting the agreement for liberalisation. As a result, policy makers did not 
have to balance preferences of these parties. Coherent domestic pressure from these groups 
strengthened Turkish negotiators’ leverage to not compromise their demand for visa 
liberalisation.  
While coherent domestic pressure from these groups enabled Turkey to negotiate 
concessions from the EU, absence of such pressure from the Turkish Parliament limited its 
capabilities to demand further concessions. In international negotiations, typically, domestic 
pressures for maintaining further concessions from third parties come from Parliament, 
shaped around the threats to veto if domestic constituency preferences are not met. However, 
this trend is absent from Turkish international negotiations. The Parliament rarely, if ever, 
vetoes any agreement signed by government officials. Since 2002, the AKP has held an 
average of around 56 per cent of seats in the Turkish Parliament and members of parliament 
elected from this party consistently act as a voting bloc. Thus, although international 
agreements need to be ratified in the Turkish Parliament, this process does not constrain 
negotiators because of the distribution of MPs in Parliament.  
This appears like an enabling factor for Turkish negotiators, in terms of release from 
Parliamentary pressures and being able to negotiate in a relatively free manner. However, the 
absence of parliamentary restrictions decreased Turkish negotiators’ leverage and 
empowered the EU. In a negotiation process such as readmission, where Turkey is not 
demanding an agreement, but seeks compensation for the EU request of an agreement, 
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Parliament’s possibility to veto the agreement could increase compensation. With a passive 
Parliament, guaranteed to ratify any agreement concluded by government officials, EU 
officials were aware that they were negotiating with a few policy officials and Ministers, 
rather than the whole Parliament with concerns over constituencies. Absence of 
Parliamentary restrictions also justifies the Council’s efforts until 2011, to conclude the 
agreement with visa facilitations, despite political pressures for obtaining visa liberalisation. 
Concerns for ratification in the Turkish Parliament could prevent the Council from adopting 
such a hard bargaining position, considering the agreement would just be vetoed in 
Parliament. Aware of the compliance of Parliament, the Council sustained its pressure on 
Turkish negotiators, though their persistence coupled with some other enabling factors 
revealed in this section, led to a more satisfactory agreement for Turkish officials.  
The state institutions that are responsible for migration policy implementation, mainly the 
Turkish National Police and the Directorate General of Migration Management under the 
Ministry of Interior were the main actors to put pressure on Turkish negotiators as well as 
EU institutions to ensure sufficient financial and technical burden sharing. While bodies 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the EU Affairs were more focused on 
satisfying pressures from political actors, these implementing bodies insisted on ensuring 
sufficient burden sharing mechanisms being added to the agreement. This also drew the 
attention of Commission officials. A high ranking official from the international affairs unit 
of the DG Home Affairs suggested:  
“The Ministry of the Interior comes from the angle of Turkey, in which there are 
already many problems. Things that the EU request are an additional burden. The 
Ministry for EU Affairs have a different angle. They should be the best advocate for 
our cause, but they need to show the political masters and public opinion that they are 
not betraying Turkey by cooperating with us (Official A, Brussels, 28 April 2014).” 
A policy officer from the same unit also stated:  
“When you speak to the Turkish authorities and their Ministries, each Ministry 
basically looks from their own perspective. You speak to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, they will always look at the general picture. They will not care so much about 
the detail. Sure, overall they defend the interests of Turkey. It will be easier to try to 
reach a solution with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not because they are easier to 
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handle, but sometimes you get drawn into the details between technicians. This leads 
you to sometimes forget the broader picture. Whereas if you have a broader picture, 
then you can forget about details if the overall picture is good for your country, then 
you can progress. That’s more the reasoning of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the 
Ministry of Interior will always tell you about the details (Official C, Brussels, 30 April 
2014).” 
Awareness about these factions led Commission officials to conclude that, if the EU wants 
to close a deal with Turkey, it has to satisfy these actors. As a result, detail, or more precisely 
implementation, oriented pressures from institutions under the Turkish Ministry of Interior 
led to inclusion of financial and technical assistance clauses in the agreement. Thus, these 
differences in opinion between Turkish Ministries also acted as an enabling factor, for Turkey 
to conclude the readmission agreement by negotiating further concessions than the EU was 
willing to provide.  
Despite government and state institution satisfaction with the visa liberalisation road map 
and financial and technical burden sharing, there are significant reactions against readmission 
agreements from non-governmental organisations, think tanks and academia. These reactions 
are primarily due to possible human rights violations related to the agreement, based on the 
risk of a violation of terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention, by not giving irregular migrants 
a chance, or time, to apply for refugee status and causing refoulement by a chain of 
readmissions. Moreover, many NGOs are specifically uneasy about the introduction of visa 
liberalisation in exchange for a readmission agreement, silencing possible opposition by 
introducing incentives in an indirectly related policy field. The coordinator for refugee rights 
of Amnesty International Turkey stated:  
“It is surprising to see the parallelism between the readmission and visa liberalisation. 
Normally, visa liberalisation shall not be conditional to readmission. We are uneasy 
about this bargain. Readmission, if implemented in this state, will end up causing 
violation of rights (Ankara, 15 January 2014).67”  
Despite their apprehensions, these organisations could not constrain negotiators and were 
ultimately incapable of establishing necessary pressures to determine the outcome of the 
                                                          
67 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Geri kabul ve vize paralelliği şaşırtıcı. Vize muafiyetinde normalde bu ibare 
olmamalıdır. Biz bu pazarlıktan rahatsızız. GKA’nın bu haliyle imzalanması hakların engellenmesine yol açar.”  
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negotiation process. The main reason for their incapacity has been their exclusion from 
processes because of the highly politicised and thus centralised nature of this agreement. An 
attaché assigned to the border management division of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 
had these insights, explaining this centralisation:  
“Readmission negotiations are much more centralised… In the policy fields that are 
more politicised, centralisation increases and the involvement of other actors’ 
decreases… The readmission could have been signed years ago, but politics got in the 
way (Official A, Ankara, 16 January 2014).”  
Officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs has also commented on the centralisation and lack 
of transparency in negotiations over the readmission agreement. A high ranking official from 
the directorate for political affairs of the Ministry for the EU Affairs verified this 
centralisation with the following statement:  
“The negotiation process and the road map were occasionally kept secret from the 
member states as well. There has been a lack of transparency even against them. The 
negotiations with the Commission on the road map was kept behind closed doors. The 
important thing is not the process of the negotiations, but its outcome. Transparency 
would affect the outcome. Due to the nature of the negotiations, it is not necessary to 
disseminate what is spoken inside. After the negotiations are concluded, there can be 
a dissemination of information about the process, then, the transparency would not 
cause shortcomings. We need to avoid misinforming the public. Transparency may 
cause this misinformation (Official A, Ankara, 14 January, 2014).68”  
This statement adequately summarises the politically fragile nature of negotiations. It also 
suggests, despite their inclusion in the processes of preparation of the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection, the general state trend excluding international organisations and 
civil society from policy processes persists, due to political considerations. Moreover, in the 
absence of an established constitutionalism on migration and refugee protection, these actors 
had no resources to get involved in the processes and, finally, preferences of politically and 
economically prevalent actors had the major influence in the policy processes.  
                                                          
68 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Üye ülkelerden bile zaman zaman müzakere süreci ve yol haritası gizli tutuldu. 
Onlara karşı bile şeffaf davranılmadı. Komisyon’la yol haritası konusunda bulunulan görüşmeler kapalı kapılar ardında 
oldu. Önemli olan müzakerelerin süreci değil sonucudur. Şeffaflık bu sonucu etkilerdi. Müzakerelerin doğası gereği ne 
konuşulduğunun dışarı verilmesinin gereği yoktur. Sonuca vardıktan sonra süreçle ilgili bilgilendirme yapabilir, o zaman 
sıkıntı olmaz. Kamuoyunun yanlış bilgilendirilmesinden kaçınmak lazım. Şeffaflık buna sebep olabilir.” 
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In conclusion, added to its importance and the change in the wider environment, domestic 
pressures also became enabling factors for Turkish negotiators to influence the outcome of 
the readmission agreement and visa liberalisation negotiations. Turkish public opinion, 
political parties and business groups’ approach to visas had a significant impact on domestic 
pressures necessary for Turkish negotiators to maintain their position on visa liberalisation 
and negotiate quite significant concessions from the EU. While Turkish negotiators 
recognised public demand for visa liberalisation, expecting electoral gains, they chose to 
stress the grievances of these business groups at the negotiation table, to sustain pressure for 
a visa free regime with the EU. On the other hand, the absence of parliamentary pressures 
caused Turkey to lose leverage and enabled the Council to persist its hard bargaining by re-
offering visa facilitations until migration flows resulting from the Arab Spring made an 
agreement imminent, empowering Turkey.  
The Turkish National Police and the Directorate General of Migration Management under 
the Ministry of Interior became the sources of domestic pressure for ensuring sufficient 
financial and technical burden sharing. Domestic confrontation between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Interior, established the necessary checks and balances system, 
initially expected from but unfulfilled by Parliament. The negotiating officials, under the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have benefited from this friction, as a justification for insisting 
upon financial and technical burden sharing. In a negotiation process where Parliament’s 
power to veto was almost absent, implementing bodies under the Ministry of Interior claimed 
a similar role with power to deny sufficient implementation. As a result, these 
implementation oriented pressures from the Turkish Ministry of Interior guaranteed inclusion 
of financial and technical assistance clauses in the agreement which also enabled Turkey to 
conclude the readmission agreement by negotiating further concessions.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This case study has shown that despite expectations from the asymmetrical power relation 
between the EU and Turkey, the negotiation process of the readmission agreement between 
the parties did not conclude with the sole adaptation of EU preferences and expectations. 
121 
 
Instead, Turkey was more influential than expected from its position as a candidate country, 
and it could negotiate significant concessions from the EU. In this chapter, I identified the 
domestic, international and EU level factors that empowered Turkey and enabled the country 
to be influential in negotiations over an EU-Turkey readmission agreement. At the EU level, 
arguably the most significant factor has been the increasing prominence of irregular 
migration and the EU’s urgent need to cooperate with Turkey in managing these flows. By 
2011, Turkey was especially empowered by the sense of urgency emerging in Europe as a 
response to migration flows arising from the Arab countries, during and in the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring. Moreover, Cyprus’ inherent opposition to Turkish accession and any 
possible concessions or incentives to Turkey, paradoxically empowered Turkey to claim 
them. While the apparent blockage of Turkey’s membership both necessitated and enabled 
parties to establish a negotiation process outside of accession, expectation of a blockage in 
EU-Turkey relations during Cyprus’ Council presidency, encouraged the Council to rapidly 
conclude negotiations during Denmark’s presidency. At the international level, non-
participation of international organisations in the negotiation process enabled Turkish 
negotiators to act more freely during the negotiation process. At the same time, these 
organisations provided assurances to Turkey of assistance during implementation, which 
helped Turkish negotiators to overcome policy implementing bodies’ apprehensions over the 
conclusion of the negotiations. At the domestic level, the value of visa liberalisation for the 
Turkish public was added to pressure rising from grievances of business groups. This 
strengthened Turkish negotiators to maintain their persistence on visas. On the other hand, 
absence of concerns over ratification from the Turkish Parliament, stripped Turkey of 
significant leverage in negotiations demanding further concessions from the EU.  
Overall, the majority of factors listed above are results of contextual changes that arose from 
the dynamic nature of the negotiation process. These changes weakened the EU’s position 
by the end of negotiations and empowered Turkey to persist in its demands for further 
concessions. The empirical evidence suggests that, in the EU-Turkey negotiations over a 
readmission agreement, contextual changes occurring during the process, were the central 
elements that shaped the outcome and empowered Turkey to seek further concessions. Here, 
EU institutional complexities, causing EU-third country negotiations to take much longer 
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than bilateral international negotiations, disempowered the EU, while EU-level and Turkish 
domestic context changed in a way that increased Turkey’s leverage. Thus, this case not only 
constitute an empirical challenge to the outcomes of asymmetrical relations between the EU 
and candidate countries, it also challenges the efficiency of EU negotiation techniques with 
third countries. These usually lead to long negotiation processes in an attempt to satisfy all 
EU institutions as well as member states. This challenge could be added to debates on supra-
nationalisation of some policy areas, which persist around political concerns, and the member 
states’ uneasiness to grant authority to the Commission to negotiate with third countries. The 
EU shall also consider the supra-nationalisation of some issues to ensure shorter negotiation 
processes, to prevent the possibility of losing leverage in increasingly significant policy 
fields, as a result of lengthy negotiations.  
Ultimately, this case study has revealed the possibility of relations between the EU and 
Turkey, beyond accession. In the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, real progress was made 
through incentives and concessions established outside of accession negotiations. Although 
EU-Turkey relations on migration policy were initially a subset of the accession process, due 
to the increasing importance of migration, they were separated with an independent 
trajectory. Here, together with accepting the political significance attached to the 
continuation of the accession process, the parties could not risk continuation of the talks on 
irregular migration, in the scope of the to the politically charged accession process, where 
relations were frequently interrupted. Thus, this case also suggests, the commencement of 
the EU accession process with a third country is not decisive on continuation of relations in 
the accession framework. Conversely, in policy fields with increasing importance, 
establishment of a separate process with its own concessions and incentives, as begun 
between these parties after the Council introduced visa liberalisation in 2012, establishes a 
more direct way to reach a negotiated agreement. This establishment has shown the 
possibility of alternative trajectories to sustain relations between the EU and candidate 
countries, and questions the accession framework’s decisiveness as a structure for facilitating 
policy change.  
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Chapter 7: Case Study 3, Turkish Visa Policy and Adoption of the EU 
Visa Lists 
On the subject of regular migration, this thesis analyses Turkish visa policy as a case study, 
due to the complex presence of external influences, more specifically the EU, aiming to 
balance its position with respect to Turkish state sovereignty and its own interests. The main 
contested policy element in this field is on Turkey’s adoption of EU negative and positive 
visa lists, to harmonise its visa regime with the EU. The EU visa lists determine countries 
whose citizens are required a visa to enter the Schengen area. These lists are a product of the 
Schengen agreement and introduced in Council Regulation 539/2001. There are around 135 
states and non-state entities in the negative visa list and 46 in the positive visa list69. Adoption 
of these lists was established as a non-negotiable requirement for candidate countries during 
their accession process, while progress on reform in their visa policies became an important 
criterion in annual progress toward accession reports. In the framework of its accession 
conditionality, Turkey is also required to adopt EU positive and negative visa lists, by 
establishing a visa free regime with countries in the positive list and introducing visa 
requirements for ones in the negative list. To fulfil this requirement, Turkey needs to impose 
visa requirements to countries which it has a visa-free or a sticker visa regime, as other 
candidate countries in Eastern Europe also did. 
Fulfilling this requirement is more complex for Turkey, as unlike post-communist countries 
in the Eastern Europe, Turkey has been using visa facilitations as tools of foreign policy since 
the mid-1950s, primarily to present its allegiance during the Cold War and afterwards with 
the expectations of political or economic gains (Açıkgöz, 2015). Traditionally, Turkey has a 
liberal visa regime, dependent on the country’s foreign policy but also as much on its 
economic interests from trade and tourism. Since the mid-2000s, with a foreign policy called 
“visa diplomacy”, this liberal regime has culminated in numbers of visa exemption 
agreements, offering visa facilitations to third countries for strategic or economic gains. 
                                                          
69 Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [2001] OJ L 81/1. 
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Moreover, Turkey has historical and ethnic bonds with some countries such as Iran and 
Azerbaijan, with whom it persists in maintaining a visa-free regime (Aygül, 2013). As a 
result, for Turkey, adopting those lists does not only refer to introducing visas to some third 
countries, it also means retracting some previous concessions. While the EU demands that 
Turkey introduces visa requirements to various countries that it has an established visa-free 
or sticker visa regime with; Turkey favours maintaining the existing regime until accession 
to the EU is secure and even negotiates to maintain some after accession. In this policy field, 
Turkey is facing a significant dilemma between keeping good relations with the EU within 
or outside of its accession process, and its political and economic interests with neighbouring 
countries (Düvell, 2014). 
In this chapter I focus upon Turkey’s level of compliance with EU positive and negative visa 
lists, and analyse how Turkey determines its priorities on its visa regime. Proceeding from 
the previous section’s findings, in this chapter, I expect to find limited EU influence on 
Turkey’s visa policies in comparison to the negotiation process of the readmission agreement. 
The main incentive for this policy change is still accession conditionality, and due to the 
decline of Turkey’s accession prospects, the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and 
Turkey does not empower the EU as much as it used to, when a solid accession conditionality 
was present. As a result, the EU was expected to present some incentives and concessions 
beyond accession conditionality. However, in Turkey’s visa policy, where there is no sense 
of urgency for a policy response, the EU was not able to present any significant incentives or 
concessions for long term returns. Instead, the EU linked visa policy to an already existing 
incentive, presented in return for the readmission agreement, the visa liberalisation road map.  
7.1 EU-Level Actors 
In the early 2000s, at the peak of the country’s accession prospects, Turkey began to reform 
its visa policies in compliance with the EU, and introduced visas to some countries in the 
EU’s negative visa list, despite the traditionally liberal nature of its visa policies. The 
Commission’s annual progress reports for Turkey show that, until 2006, Turkey made 
progress, harmonizing its visa policy with the EU by imposing visas to some countries on the 
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EU’s negative visa list. During this time, the only EU incentive for Turkey to adopt these 
lists was the accession conditionality. This functioned as an adequate incentive for Turkish 
compliance, until the decline in accession prospects in the mid-2000s, especially resulting 
from the interruption of accession negotiations in 2006. This was a result of Turkey’s Cyprus 
policy and the Council’s decision to freeze negotiations on eight Chapters. With this 
development, Turkey did not only halt efforts for compliance, but also began to act directly 
on non-compliance by lifting visa obligations for some countries in the EU’s negative visa 
list. After 2006, Turkey began to adopt a liberal visa regime which would later transform 
itself to “visa diplomacy.” With this new approach, the Turkish government stopped 
prioritizing EU requirements, lifted the visa obligations for many countries of the EU 
negative list, including Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Libya, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Russia and Syria and introduced sticker visas that can be easily obtained at 
around fifty airports. These drawbacks and the suspension of efforts to harmonise Turkish 
visa policies with the EU are the direct outcomes of decline in Turkish accession prospects 
and the parallel decline in the power of accession conditionality.  
Table 7.1: Changes in the Turkish Visa Regime, Before and After 200670 
  Countries on the EU’s negative visa 
list whose nationals are added to 
Turkey’s visa free regime  
Countries on the EU’s negative visa 
list whose nationals are removed 
from Turkey’s visa free regime  
Before 
2006 
2001  Kazakhstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
2002  Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman 
(sticker-type border visas)  
2003  Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Fiji Islands, Grenada, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Saint Lucia, 
and South Africa 
2005  Marshall Islands and Micronesia 
After 
2006 
2006 Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
 
2009 Jordan, Kosovo, Libya and Syria  
2010 Cameroon, Lebanon, and Russia  
2011 Georgia, Sudan and Yemen   
2013 Belarus, Colombia, and Moldova   
Table 3: Changes in the Turkish Visa Regime, Before and After 2006 
                                                          
70 The dates that are given in this table correspond to the year when the parties have agreed to remove the visa obligation 
for travel to Turkey, though the implementation of some of those agreements may have been delayed.  
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Despite this decline in the power of accession conditionality, the Commission did not attempt 
to establish a separate trajectory for this policy field, as it has successfully done for the 
readmission agreement. Officials from the EU Commission still continue to frame the issue 
as a requirement for accession. They present the adoption of these lists as an indispensable 
step for progress in accession negotiations, and resent the changing direction of Turkish visa 
policy. For instance, a policy officer from the Commission’s DG Home Affairs stated:  
“We have profound concern with this policy. I totally understand that Turkey has its 
own visa policy, just like any other country in the world. The policy that Turkey was 
carrying on for a couple of years, somehow clashes with enlargement. Because in 
enlargement, you try to strive, even if you’re not a full-fledged member, but if you want 
to negotiate, the negotiations are about how to align your law, Turkish law, with the 
EU law. And it happens that, visa policy is an EU competence, which means that, white 
and black lists, as we call it, of the EU would become binding on Turkey eventually. 
Now, the issue is that, Turkey is granting visa-free access to all those countries which 
are on the EU black list, we will have inevitable clash. Because on one hand, 
negotiations will be difficult with us, because we will be telling you, listen, you have 
Syria, you have I don’t know, Iraq, Morocco on those lists. Those are all countries 
from which we request visas. Until you have settled it, we cannot progress in the 
negotiations (Official B, Brussels, 28 April 2014).” 
This statement shows how the Commission frames compliance on visa lists as a requirement 
for a future member state. However, as the credibility of the accession framework declined, 
Turkey began to seek alternative partners for obtaining some positive gains from its visa 
regime, which the EU was then unable to give. As Turkey deepened its relations with these 
alternative partners, the political commitment and in parallel to it, the cost of severing such 
commitment increased for Turkey. Currently, the cost of retracting from the visa diplomacy 
established with the country’s south and east does not meet with distant prospect of accession, 
as the discussion in the next section further elaborates. The post-2006 visa exemption 
agreements signed with countries in the EU negative visa list have further increased the 
expected cost of compliance. The Commission officials are particularly concerned with these 
developments. In light of these new arrangements, it not only questions Turkey’s dedication 
to its relationship with the EU, it is also uneasy about possible tensions in the international 
arena, expected if ever Turkey aligns its visa policy with the EU. A policy officer from the 
Commission’s DG Home Affairs Unit explains these possible tensions:  
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“If Turkey eventually agrees to re-align its laws, then there will be another set of 
tensions with those countries. Because obviously no-one likes to see himself being put 
back on the blacklist by anyone. I saw it for example, between Poland and Ukraine, 
where there was previously a free visa regime. After the entry of Poland into the EU, 
it introduced visas, and you know, as much as at the political level people understand, 
people on the ground, they don’t care, all they could see that yesterday they could cross 
the border without any problem and today they need to queue up for a couple of days 
for the visa. So, this inevitably brings tensions (Official C, Brussels, 30 April 2014).” 
As Turkey continued to reform its visa policies in non-compliance with the EU, the 
Commission maintained its position on not offering Turkey any incentive for compliance 
other than the remote possibility of accession. This attitude reflected the low significance of 
visa policy. Moreover, the EU officials were aware of Turkish government officials’ position 
to postpone this policy change until accession, to prevent a political backlash from allies in 
the East, before compensation was guaranteed by the West. However, in 2011, when the 
Syrians began to come to Turkey from the country’s southern borders, benefiting from the 
visa free arrangement between the countries, the issue gained importance and was ultimately 
included in the visa liberalisation road map as a benchmark. The Commission added visa lists 
to the road map to overcome member states’ worries against transit migration through 
Turkey, especially from Syria, which is expected to increase if Turkey is granted visa 
liberalisation. A high ranking official from the Commission’s DG Enlargement stressed the 
significance of alignment of Turkish visa practices with the EU’s:  
“… This was one of the key demands by some member states and it’s formulated in a 
bit of an ambiguous way in the road map. You have member states who ask that Turkey 
aligns with EU’s visa policy. When member states ask this, they have this Syria thing 
in mind. Because we are going to have a visa-free regime with Turkey but Turkey does 
not have the same visa policy as the EU, towards foreign, other third countries. It 
means that, as long as there’s free movement of people between Syria and Turkey, all 
these Syrians one day, they might go to the Schengen area. It will be easier for them if 
they already had free access to Turkey, then it will be less difficult for them to join the 
Schengen area in one way or another, than if there was a visa obligation between 
Turkey and Syria, you see (Official C, Brussels, 29 April 2014).” 
In 2014, the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress by Turkey in fulfilling requirements of its visa liberalisation road map71 has 
                                                          
71 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress by 
Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of its Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, COM (2014) 646 Final (October 2014).  
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highlighted the Commission’s demand to discontinue issuing visas at borders for the 89 
countries including ones representing a high migratory risk to the EU (European 
Commission, 2014). As the report suggests, currently, there are not any substantial policy 
changes in this policy field. Moreover, except for the demands for reform on e-visas and 
visas on the border, there are no prospects for further progress as Turkey continues to value 
its relationships with those countries that are on the EU negative visa list. The inadequacy of 
the issue linkage established between the visa liberalisation road map and the adoption of the 
EU negative and positive lists to facilitate compliance to the EU is the main reason behind 
the EU’s low level of influence in this policy field.  
7.2 International Actors 
Nation states typically claim absolute sovereignty on visa policies. As a result, international 
organisations rarely comment on nation-state choice of visa policies, to avoid criticism of 
interfering with state sovereignty. International organisations that are active in Turkey did 
not intervene in Turkish visa policy for this reason, also because it was irrelevant for their 
mandates, unrelated to any significant international human rights norms. This phenomenon 
presents a diversion from the other three case studies that have been undertaken in this thesis. 
Visa policy is the only area where international organisations do not have any comments on 
policy change. Thus, in the absence of a normative framework, neither one of the actors are 
able to strengthen or justify their position with reference to pressures from international 
organisations. This non-involvement automatically lifts normative claims from policy, 
suggesting the outcome is solely determined by a cost-benefit calculation made by domestic 
actors, more specifically by policy elites. Visa policy is also the only case study here where 
non-EU nation states have an interest in policy and are directly affected by the outcome of 
domestic change in Turkey. A change in Turkish visa policy cannot be perceived solely in a 
framework of relations with the EU. Wider international relations and the country’s foreign 
policy objectives will also be considered. That is why, unlike other case study chapters in 
this study, this case study, introduces a brief analysis of Turkish international relations, to 
show the shift in Turkey’s geopolitical position away from the EU, while it overlooks the 
non-existent international organisation involvement on policy.  
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Turkey’s non-compliance with EU visa lists, is not a sole outcome of the Turkish policy elite 
dissatisfaction with progress in the EU accession process or with concessions introduced by 
the EU. It is also an outcome of change in Turkish foreign policy, aiming to diversify the 
objectives of its international relations and to improve political and economic relations with 
the Middle East and North Africa (Suvankulov, Akhmedjonov, & Ogucu, 2012). Under AKP 
rule, Turkey has lost its identity-based commitment to the EU in its foreign policy and 
established a new, pragmatic foreign policy approach, determined by a cost-benefit 
calculation (Oğuzlu, 2008). Beginning in its second term in 2005 and continuing until today, 
AKP governments have been shifting their priorities in their foreign policy, from a deep 
commitment to EU accession to a looser commitment, mainly due to disappointment with 
progress of Turkey’s accession process but also resulting from the AKP’s neo-Islamic 
identity. While AKP commitment to Turkey’s EU accession prospects were loosened, the 
country’s Eastern neighbours were the centre of attention. The AKP focused particularly on 
using the “soft power” of trade and diplomacy to develop its relations with neighbouring 
countries (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009).  
Turkish officials interviewed in this study frame Turkish policy preferences on the country’s 
visa policy, around economic and strategic expectations. Because of this, a comparison of 
data on Turkish trade to these countries and the EU is relevant to indicate the benefits of this 
visa regime for Turkey and the cost of abandoning such a regime to comply with the EU. 
Indeed the Turkish government’s expectations for these visa waiver policies were met in the 
economic front. Turkey’s trade relations with its Eastern neighbours has been catalysed and 
also stabilised by the removal of visa requirements for nationals of six Arab countries in the 
late 2000s, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Following 
initiation of economic relations with these visa policies, Turkey signed free trade agreements 
with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Between 2004 and 2014, despite the Civil War in Syria, 
Turkish exports to these six countries have more than quadrupled, from around 1.78 billion 
US dollars to 7.87 billion US dollars. Imports have also risen from 700 million US dollars to 
1.5 billion, though a significant decrease is observable in imports from Lebanon and Syria, 
due to conflicts in these two countries72. Despite these increases in imports and exports, these 
                                                          
72 The data is obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.  
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trade relations should not be overvalued. Even with these increases, in 2014, these six 
countries only had a share around 0.5 per cent of Turkish exports. However, these trade 
relations are significant in terms of both generating and being supported by frequent high 
ranking official visits from Turkey to these countries. From these visits, several agreements 
have emerged, in policy areas of agriculture, commerce, education, the military and 
transportation. As a result, economic interdependence established by the trade links, led to 
an improvement in diplomatic and security relations as well and further strengthened 
Turkey’s ties with this region. 
Along with these newly-established relations, there are also some continuities in Turkey’s 
international relations, criticised in the framework of its EU accession. These continuing 
relations, especially with Iran, are even harder to dispute than the above introduced new ones 
and establish further challenges to Turkey’s alignment with EU visa policies. Turkish policy 
makers consider Iran to be an historical partner which Turkey drew away during the early 
Republican period, due to fears of Islamic fundamentalism spilling over from Iran to Turkey. 
Since it came to power in 2002, the AKP government has embraced Islamic identity instead 
of renouncing it, and it has been re-establishing links between the two countries in fields of 
security and economy (Ehteshami & Elik, 2011). Since 2004, Turkish exports to Iran have 
increased from around 800 million US dollars to 3.9 billion in 2014. With this increase, Iran 
became the tenth destination country of Turkish exports, with a share of around 2.5 per cent 
in Turkish exports. Iran is also the sixth country of origin for Turkish imports with 9.8 billion 
worth of imports, and has a 4.1 per cent share in Turkish imports73. Since the end of the Cold 
War, Turkey has also been re-developing its diplomatic and economic relations with the post-
Soviet Turkic Republics in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, and more recently, with Russia. 
In the late 2000s, to show good faith, Turkey established visa-free regimes with Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Russia. The Turkish 
government has been trying to improve its relations with these countries, especially aiming 
to complete energy related projects in cooperation with these countries, to establish Turkey 
                                                          
73 The data is obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.  
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as an energy corridor for pipelines transporting Black Sea and Caspian oil through Turkey to 
Europe. 
Although the increase in trade between Turkey and its Eastern neighbours is noteworthy, EU 
member states are still Turkey’s main trading partners, with a share around 43.5 per cent in 
Turkish exports and 37 per cent in Turkish imports in 2014. While Germany is the major 
partner for Turkish exports with an average share of 10 per cent , UK, Italy, France, Spain, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Poland are all top twenty destination countries for 
Turkish exports. The discussion above does not suggest a complete shift in Turkish foreign 
policy. Rather, it suggests a diversification of focus from a purely Western orientation to a 
wider area. Öniş and Yılmaz define this as a “shift from a commitment to deep 
Europeanisation to loose Europeanisation and a simultaneous shift to soft Euro-Asianism” 
(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 20). Thus, together with maintaining a looser commitment to 
Europeanisation, Turkey shifts its foreign policy focus from the EU and seeks alternative 
partners, in an era when the country’s EU accession prospects are extremely low.  
In such an environment, Turkey’s visa policy is no longer a sole part of its migration policy, 
but a reflection of the country’s approach to its foreign policy, and its allegiances. A change 
in Turkish visa policy requires and also signifies a shift in Turkish foreign policy focus, as 
removal of current visa arrangements are likely to damage these established relations. Thus, 
unlike the other policy instruments, Turkey’s harmonisation efforts concerning EU negative 
and positive visa lists are dependent on a number of variables in the international context of 
Turkey’s international relations with its other partners. Turkey’s visa policy is neither a pure 
policy change, as it was in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, nor a bilateral 
negotiation process between the EU and Turkey as in the readmission agreement. It is a 
component of multi-faceted international relations, influencing and influenced by relations 
with third parties.  
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7.3 Domestic Actors 
While EU expectations over influencing Turkish visa policies are centred on possible risks 
related to unwanted migration flows, the country’s visa policies have been shaped by its 
foreign policy interests or expectations over economic gains (Açıkgöz, 2015). Especially 
since the mid-2000s, the governing AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been shaping 
Turkey’s visa policy in parallel to its foreign policy goals, as an emerging power in the region 
seeking a proactive role in the future of the region. Such change in the country’s visa policies 
is clearly an outcome of disappointment the country faced in its EU accession process. After 
the decline in the country’s accession prospects in the mid-2000s, the Turkish government 
aimed to enhance economic relations based on trade and tourism with its Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood, presenting alternative partners to its business elite. Also, the 
economic crisis the EU was facing at the time has supported these aims as Turkey was seen 
as stronger with the diversification of its trade partners. In parallel to the traditional Turkish 
state perception against visa policy, the AKP government continued to approach the 
country’s visa regime pragmatically, to compensate for the decline in the relations with the 
EU by establishing close relations with alternative partners.  
As noted above, in this policy field, the Turkish policy elite is relatively independent from 
the external limits to state capacities established by the international normative framework 
and, except for the business groups who have not yet revealed a precise position on the matter, 
they are independent from domestic limits as well. Turkish business groups, especially the 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the Independent Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD), continuously stress the significance of the 
implementation of the visa liberalisation road map and the eventual establishment of a visa 
free regime with the EU. However, as data presented in the previous section shows, they also 
benefit from Turkey’s current visa regime. Considering that adoption of the EU’s negative 
and positive visa lists are added to the visa liberalisation road map, Turkish business groups 
face a dilemma too, similar to the Turkish policy elites’ though they have not yet stated a 
position to influence policy.  
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This relative independence from external and domestic limits enables Turkish policy makers 
to shape their policy preferences pragmatically, around their cost and benefit calculations. In 
the centre of these calculations, there are uncertainties related to EU commitment to its 
relationship with Turkey both in the framework of accession and the visa liberalisation road 
map. At the time when interviews were conducted, the visa liberalisation road map was 
already introduced; and the adoption of the EU negative and positive visa lists added to this 
document as prerequisites of visa liberalisation. However, none of the Turkish government 
officials met during the fieldwork of this study, mentioned this issue linkage. Turkish policy 
makers overlook this issue linkage and sustain the accession conditionality framework, as 
they prefer to stall EU induced policy change, until sufficient compensation from the EU is 
guaranteed. And according to Turkish government officials that were interviewed during this 
study, both in the Ministry of Interior and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the only 
acceptable compensation is accession. According to them, Turkey needs to sufficiently align 
itself to the EU by accession and become part of the Schengen arrangement, before the 
country can risk such a bold foreign policy move by re-introducing visas to its Eastern 
partners and compromising relations with them. A senior official from the Ministry for EU 
Affairs put it bluntly, that, with a rationalist perspective, the country would only implement 
this domestic change after it becomes a member of the EU:  
“Positive and negative visa lists will be implemented after the accession to the EU. 
Right now, Turkey has a sui generis visa policy. Turkey is providing visa liberalisation 
to the different regions where it is doing business. This is a foreign policy tool, in the 
same way that it is a foreign policy tool for the EU. These lists do not have any meaning 
for us, we just see visas as a foreign policy tool. Also, there is not a clear framework 
for the official Schengen negotiations between Turkey and the EU. These are the 
considerations that will be implemented during the accession process, maybe even 
after the accession. As there are still discussions on delaying Turkey’s introduction to 
Schengen even after the accession (Official A, Ankara, 14 January, 2014).74”  
This cost-benefit calculation further reveals itself when Turkey’s relations with its stronger 
neighbours are questioned. In particular, the country’s partnership with Russia on trade and 
                                                          
74 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Negatif ve pozitif vize listeleri üyelikten sonra uygulayacağımız hususlar. 
Türkiye’nin su andaki vize politikası nevi şahsına münhasır. Farkli bölgelerde iş yapıyor ve oralara vizeyi kaldırıyor. Bu 
bir dış politik aracı. Nasıl AB için dış politika aracıysa. Bu listeler bizim için bir anlam taşımıyor. Vize bizim için de bir 
dış politika aracı. Resmi Schengen müzakereleri çerçevesi daha açık değil. Üyelik sürecinde hatta üyelikten sonra 
uygulanacak hususlar bunlar. Biliyorsunuz Tükiye’nin üyelikten sonra bile Schengen’e alınması geciktirilebilir.” 
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energy-related deals is relatively new and volatile. A visa liberalisation agreement was signed 
between the parties in 2010 and has strengthened this partnership. For such a new 
relationship, the retraction of a newly established visa liberalisation regime could very well 
compromise the relationship. A senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
remarked:  
“Signing a visa liberalisation agreement with Russia was a very significant 
development for us. This is an issue, mainly influenced by the international juncture. 
In the future if the EU demands us to re-introduce visa requirements to Russia, we will 
have to do a situational analysis between markets. This may cause us to consider 
postponing the positive-negative visa lists considerations for a few years (Official A, 
Skype Interview, 17 October, 2014).”  
Turkish government officials from both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have also stressed the significance of Turkey’s relationships with some Middle 
Eastern countries. These continuing relations, especially with Iran and the Gulf region, are 
considered the outcome of an historical continuity and cannot be challenged. A senior 
migration and policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that, in an 
attempt to ensure compatibility with EU visa legislation, sticker-type on the border and an 
online e-visa regime was introduced to nationals of Gulf countries, including Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. He argued that, despite 
the introduction of the new Law, this visa regime was intentionally governed in a very relaxed 
manner. He suggested that even after Turkey’s membership of the union, Turkey might ask 
for special treatment considering the value of its links with these countries by stating:  
“… Visas were introduced to some countries in the EU’s negative visa list, though 
visas were easily obtained at the border. Despite the new law, the issue of visas 
continued to be governed in a very relaxed manner. Turkey has a special relationship 
with Iran and the Gulf countries. Turkey’s position is very different from the rest of the 
EU and thus the country does not yet need to adopt EU visa lists. For instance, Turkey 
indicates that it will not introduce visa obligations to some countries in the EU’s 
negative visa list, such as Iran. Maybe in the future we could suggest a practice in 
which Turkey refuses to introduce a visa obligation to Iranian citizens, but readmits 
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any Iranian citizens detained irregularly in the rest of the Europe (Official A, Skype 
Interview, 13 November, 2014).75”  
In conclusion, adoption of the EU’s negative and positive visa lists by Turkey is an outcome 
of a cost and benefit calculation, where Turkish policy makers adopt a bargaining position to 
ensure economic and political gains presented from the EU will meet the costs of risking 
Turkey’s ties with its Eastern neighbourhood. These costs and benefits will be identified by 
Turkey and the EU, according to international and domestic context. There are not any other 
limits to Turkish state capacities on decision making. These visa lists do not have any 
implications in the global human rights regime and none of the international or non-
governmental organizations are concerned about Turkey’s compliance or non-compliance. 
Moreover, domestic and international conjuncture is shaping up against this policy change 
as a considerable portion of Turkish investments and trade continues with various countries 
in EU’s negative lists such as Russia and the ones in the Gulf Region and the Middle East.  
It is necessary for the EU to introduce new incentives for this policy field if it seeks 
convergence. Long-term gains attached to accession conditionality do not present any viable 
political gains to justify concessions to the domestic arena. Nor do they compensate for 
Turkey’s possible losses resulting from introducing visas to third countries. Likewise, the 
issue linkage established between the visa liberalisation road map and adoption of the EU 
negative and positive visa lists proved inadequate for facilitating compliance to the EU as the 
visa liberalisation road map was already established as a compensation for a politically and 
financially costly arrangement, the readmission agreement. Linking another issue to the same 
incentive introduced for an already costly reform framework was not welcomed by the 
Turkish policy elites. In these circumstances, Turkish officials also deny risking their existing 
relations with other third countries when there was no imminent concession. Thus, it is 
expected that Turkey will continue stalling domestic change, even though the issue is linked 
                                                          
75 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Sınırda vize uygulaması başlatıldı. Yeni kanuna rağmen vize çok laubali bir 
sistemle yönetilmeye devam etti. Türkiye’nin İran ve Körfez ülkeleri ile kendine has ilişkileri var. Türkiye’nin konumu 
AB’den farklı olduğu için AB vize listelerini kabulüne henüz gerek yok. Türkiye İran’a hiçbir şekilde vize 
uygulamayacağını belirtiyor. Belki gelecekte Türkiye’nin İran vatandaşlarına vize uygulamadığı, ancak öteki AB 
ülkelerinde düzensiz yakalanmaları halinde bu kişileri geri kabul ettiği bir uygulama önerebiliriz.” 
136 
 
to the visa liberalisation road map. Turkish officials will continue to seek sufficient 
compensation, which, in their opinion, is accession and full integration to the Schengen area.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This section was built upon Turkish policy elite’s main dilemma on the country’s visa policy, 
maintenance of good relations with the EU and ensuring the implementation of visa 
liberalisation, sustaining its political and economic interests with countries in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. This section revealed that a resolution for this dilemma will be stalled by 
Turkish policy makers, as long as possible, preferably until the country’s accession to the 
Union is secured. However, if the EU demands a resolution sooner, as expected to do, 
considering the policy instrument is already linked to the visa liberalisation road map, 
Turkish policy makers are expected to do a cost benefit calculation and shape the country’s 
visa policy accordingly. In this policy field, Turkish policy elites are relatively independent 
from the limits to state capacities. A normative international framework to define appropriate 
ways of behaviour is absent from policy decision making. Domestic limits to states’ 
capacities are also weak, as the only relevant actor is the Turkish business elite, and even 
they do not have a concrete preference on whether to prioritise EU demands or relations with 
Turkey’s East.  
Such absence of external and internal limits to state capacities, has centralised policy and 
transformed it into a rationalist bargaining process between the EU and Turkey, in which 
policy compliance will occur in Turkey after the EU has introduced incentives to meet the 
costs of compliance. However, in this case, the EU was unable to present necessary incentives 
to meet costs for a policy change in Turkey. Instead, the EU has linked this issue to the visa 
liberalisation road map. This issue linkage is not expected to be effective in facilitating policy 
change, because visa liberalisation was already linked to the readmission agreement and the 
cost of both policy changes is unlikely to be met. This linkage can even be counterproductive 
to implementation of the readmission agreement as lack of progress in visa liberalisation 
because of this linkage would not be welcomed by the Turkish government. As a result, 
linking this policy change to the politically valuable expectation of visa liberalisation could 
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lead to negative spill-over and interrupt domestic change for the readmission agreement as 
well. If the costs related to the readmission agreement, coupled with the alignment of the 
Turkish visa regime, do not meet with the benefits expected from visa liberalisation, Turkish 
policy elites may halt progress in both these areas, and this could intercept implementation 
of the readmission agreement. Thus, while Turkish government officials both in the Ministry 
of Interior and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not even mention such an issue linkage, 
even Commission officials accept that it is a long shot and continue their claims in the 
framework of accession conditionality.  
This issue linkage was added to the visa liberalisation road map, to overcome member states’ 
concerns on transit migration from Syria to Turkey, when the Danish Council presidency was 
aiming to rapidly conclude the readmission-visa facilitation deal with Turkey before Cyprus’ 
presidency. The language used in the visa liberalisation road map, concerning this policy 
instrument, is particularly vague. For instance, instead of using the phrase of the annual 
progress reports “countries in the EU’s positive and negative visa lists”, the road map states 
“countries representing important sources of illegal migration for the EU” which signals 
flexibility, for some countries that are important to Turkey. The parties also signal this term’s 
negotiability as a pre-request of visa liberalisation, as both Commission officials and Turkish 
policy makers continue to consider this policy change as an accession conditionality. 
Continuing to consider it in this way satisfies preferences of Turkish policy makers who aim 
to benefit from the deadlock in accession by stalling this policy change until the country’s 
EU accession is secure.  
Although, it is not viable for the EU to accept Turkey’s preferred outcome in these 
negotiations and stall policy until the country’s accession, this case study shows that currently 
there is no plausible alternative available. Since the interruption in the accession negotiations 
in 2007 and in line with the AKP’s foreign policy goals, Turkey has been using visa 
liberalisation agreements as initiatives for rapprochement with the country’s Eastern 
neighbourhood. This new foreign policy approach has profited Turkey by increasing trade 
volume, improving diplomatic relations and establishing links for cooperation with countries 
in the Black Sea, the Caucasus the Middle East, and North Africa. Though valuable, these 
newly established links are still volatile and Turkish government officials are not willing to 
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test the strength of these links, by re-introducing visas for these countries, without solid 
compensation from the EU. Moreover, Turkish government officials plainly express their 
apprehensions on applying visas to these countries. Turkey has an established common 
history narrative with the Turkic Republics and Iran, even after the country’s accession to 
the EU is secured.  
In such an environment, a significant shift in Turkish foreign policy is required to facilitate 
policy change in this policy field. Considering Turkey shifted its foreign policy approach 
initially as a response to the decline in its EU accession prospects, a shift back to EU oriented 
foreign policy alignment can only be secured if Turkey changes its foreign policy approach 
once more, prioritising its relationship with the EU. In other case studies presented here, the 
EU has facilitated domestic change through detaching migration policy area from the 
deadlock of accession negotiations. However, as Turkish visa policy is not only a part of 
Turkish migration policy, but also an element of its foreign policy, Turkish policy makers 
expect compensations for a change in the country’s foreign policy. If Turkey is going to align 
its foreign policy solely to its partnership with the EU by interrupting its links with its Eastern 
neighbourhood, Turkish government officials expect concessions from the EU to secure this 
alignment.  
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Chapter 8: Case Study 4, Removal of the Geographical Limitation  
The geographical limitation Turkey maintains on the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, limits refugee status to asylum seekers coming 
to Turkey from events arising in Europe. However, since the late 1970s, the majority of 
asylum seekers who come to Turkey are from the Middle East and Africa and currently, 
except for a negligible number of Chechens from Russia, almost all asylum seekers who seek 
refugee status in Turkey are from non-European countries76. In the last ten years, the citizens 
of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan have constituted 85.5 per cent of all asylum applications to 
Turkey, while between 2011 and 2015, the number of Syrians, whose status is evaluated 
independently from these overall flows, has reached 2.5 million77. Although these non-
European asylum seekers are granted non-refoulement, if they are granted refugee status, 
they wait to be resettled in a third country. However, this waiting period could take years, 
and before the new legislation was introduced in 2013, during this period, refugees’ basic 
rights were delayed until resettlement, due to the temporariness of their condition.  
Prior to adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, this incompatibility 
between the nature of asylum movements to Turkey and Turkey’s dominant policy response 
shaped around the geographical limitation, produced external pressures on Turkey to lift the 
geographical limitation. With the introduction of the Law, although Turkey maintained the 
geographical limitation, it also introduced an alternative category for non-European asylum 
seekers whose refugee status is approved by the Turkish authorities, as conditional refugees. 
With this category, the Turkish asylum system aimed to eliminate inequalities non-European 
asylum seekers face due to their temporariness (Açıkgöz & Arıner, 2014). While the Law has 
introduced social and economic rights, such as health benefits and access to employment, to 
conditional refugees, Turkey has preserved its right for resettlement, which implies that 
conditional refugees are still expected to be resettled to a third country. 
                                                          
76 An elaborate explanation of the implications of geographical limitation, presented with contemporary data, is available 
in the Background Chapter of this study.  
77 For up to date information on Syrians, please visit UNHCR’S Syrian Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Retrieved in January 15, 2016. 
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In this chapter, I analyse and compare the relative influence of the EU and international 
organisations on removal of the geographical limitation, before and after the introduction of 
the Law. I expect a shift in the leverage of external influences pressuring policy change, after 
the Law was introduced and external pressures based on human rights to begin to lose impact. 
Turkey’s role during the Syrian civil war has further reduced the impact of external 
influences, as Turkey’s apprehensions over burden sharing began to be supported by 
contextual developments. The EU’s weakness in responding to the crisis has strengthened 
Turkish claims on the need for the resettlement clause in the scope of the geographical 
limitation, to ensure at least some burden sharing.  
As implied above, the EU is not the only international organisation, aiming to influence 
domestic change in this policy field. Turkey’s membership of UNHCR and IOM has also 
contributed largely to the change in Turkish asylum policies. Accordingly, in this chapter I 
also show how Turkish policy makers have strategically used these diverse actors’ positions 
against each other. This case study is significant in analysing how domestic actors balance 
their relationships with external actors, and gain leverage from the context as well as from 
positions of other external actors. Consistent with the pervious case studies in this thesis, in 
this chapter, I undertake such analysis by focusing on the relative actor influences, during the 
dynamic process of policy change, analysing the influence mechanisms implemented by 
external actors and Turkish policy responses to these mechanisms.  
8.1 EU-Level Actors 
The EU has presented the removal of the geographical limitation from Turkish asylum 
legislation and practices as an accession conditionality, whose significance has been 
consistently stated in progress reports for Turkey, since 1998. The decline in Turkey’s 
accession prospects, beginning in 2006, affected EU influence in this policy field too. The 
EU’s inability to present Turkey an alternative incentive to accession, to compensate for costs 
related to lifting the geographical limitation has left this policy field solely dependent on the 
power of accession conditionality. Commission officials have presented such inability as a 
tactical policy preference, not to divert the focus of migration policy relations between the 
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parties to the issue of asylum. Responding to Turkish policy preference to stall policy until 
accession, the Commission left this low priority policy field as a negotiating point for Turkey 
and chose to focus on higher priority ones like readmission. A high-ranking officer from the 
Justice, Freedom and Security department of Delegation of the EU to Turkey shared the 
following remarks:  
“We want them to do it. But we know the Turkish government’s position on accession. 
This policy area is constantly mentioned in the progress reports, but Turkey stated that 
this will be upon accession. It’s a negotiation point for Turkey. In reality, asylum 
seekers are here, but they are here with different titles. Turkey already provides 
services to them. It is only a matter of negotiations. Negative and positive lists and 
geographical limitation will stay as they are until the accession. We will not raise our 
voice on these matters (Official B, Ankara, 16 January 2014).” 
The Commission’s choice to leave the geographical limitation as a final negotiation point 
was also based on loss of relevance in the EU’s main claims to influence policy. In the EU 
accession documents, the pressures for lifting the geographical limitation are established 
upon two main principles: respect for the international human rights regime and assuming 
responsibility through burden sharing. The Commission officials dominantly stress human 
rights concerns related with the delay of rights non-European asylum seekers experience, 
during their stay in Turkey, because of their temporary status while they wait for resettlement. 
A policy officer from the DG Enlargement describes the Commission’s apprehensions based 
on the geographical limitation with the following statement:  
“… So, Turkey receives them, these people apply for asylum. They apply to Turkey, 
Turkey examines their application. But at the same time, these people apply also to the 
UN, where, for a number of reasons, the deadlines for examination of their application 
by the UN may take years. So these people are practically blocked in Turkey without 
having a status … Because Turkey cannot give them the status of an asylum seeker, 
and in some cases, I presume, that these people just whenever they find the opportunity, 
they escape from where they are and they pass to Europe or elsewhere in Europe. 
Because, can you imagine, somebody being found in Turkey for any reason and waiting 
for the UN to consider, to examine its application three, four, five years. If I remember 
right somebody there gave us some figures: any application for an asylum seeker, 
submitted to the UN will be considered by 2017 or something like this. It will be 
examined, not resolved. So what will these people do there until 2017 or 2018? So, I 
don’t have the solution for this question, but I’d say, empirically and reasonably, that 
Turkey will have to take some measures in order to address this problem… I mean, 
Turkey says to these people, OK, stay there in a limbo, you have no status, you have no 
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identity, I don’t know exactly how they are, until 2017-18 I don’t know what. It’s 
impossible. What these people will do there? So it is an inconsistency I’d say (Official 
B, Brussels, 25 April 2014).” 
After the accession prospects of Turkey began to lose credibility, the EU has continued its 
presence in this policy field with an emphasis upon these two main principles. However, after 
2010, the EU began to lose leverage on influencing Turkish policy change on both grounds. 
While its claims over respect for the international human rights regime began to decline with 
the introduction of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the claims over 
burden sharing lost their relevance with the role Turkey has undertaken in the Syrian refugee 
crisis.  
The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, introduced in April 2013, granted the 
same social and economic rights to non-European asylum seekers whose refugee status has 
been confirmed by the Turkish authorities, by establishing a new category for their status 
called conditional refugees. By maintaining the geographical limitation, Turkey has aimed to 
continue the practice of resettlement for conditional refugees. As the first case study 
presented in this thesis has also shown, the Law was prepared with a participatory approach, 
where Turkish policy makers have legitimised their policy positions, through their 
cooperation with international organisations. These legitimisation efforts have continued 
after the introduction of the Law. It has gained the approval78 of international organizations 
that are active in Turkey, for granting necessary protection to the asylum seekers. Turkish 
policy makers have strategically used this approval to legitimise their actions against the EU, 
and to reduce EU leverage to influence Turkish asylum policy change on humanitarian 
grounds with an emphasis on the global migration regime.  
As the EU’s human rights based claims weakened after the introduction of the Law, the 
union’s position for influencing policy change became solely shaped around burden sharing, 
                                                          
78 This claim is derived from the interviews conducted with the representatives of the international organisations in 
Turkey. Relevant quotes supporting this claim are presented in the international actors section of this chapter, and also in 
the international actors section of the case study on Law on Foreigners and International Protection.  
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with a direct emphasis on the practice of resettlement. However, the dramatic increase in the 
number of Syrian asylum seekers coming to Turkey in 201379, and the EU member states 
policy responses against this, which praised Turkey’s open border policy on humanitarian 
grounds, but supported a non-entrée regime to the EU itself; decreased EU leverage for 
criticising the geographical limitation, with an emphasis on burden sharing. These claims 
have lost further relevance as, according to the UNHCR’s 2014 Global Trends report, the 
country became the largest refugee-hosting country worldwide with 1.59 million refugees 
and the Turkish government and international organisations demands for burden sharing 
from the EU have escalated (UNHCR, 2014). Thus, the EU has lost its leverage to influence 
change in Turkish asylum policies with claims around burden sharing while, by the beginning 
of 2016, the country has been hosting a rising number of 2.5 million Syrian refugees80.  
As the union began to lose leverage for influencing policy, considering the credibility of 
accession was already in decline, and the geographical limitation was a low priority policy 
instrument for the member states to introduce any further incentives; the EU shifted its 
position on the removal of the geographical limitation and adopted a more flexible position 
against this policy change. Although the EU has linked geographical limitation to the visa 
liberalisation road map as a benchmark as well, within two years, the union was also flexible 
in its insistence on such a position. In the 2014 report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa 
liberalisation road map, the Commission recognizes that in recent years Turkish authorities 
have granted asylum to thousands of asylum seekers from Syria as well as from many other 
countries, without any reported push-back cases (European Commission, 2014). Thus, the 
Commission acknowledges that Turkey has fulfilled its obligations under the benchmark, 
considering its border management carried out in accordance with international refugee law 
and respect for the non-refoulement principle. Furthermore, under the benchmark 
considering removal of the geographical limitation, the Commission states that the new Law 
has reduced the impact of the geographical limitation to a marginal level as “conditional 
                                                          
79 Although the initial flows began in December 2011, the number of Syrian asylum seekers registered in Turkey has 
raised alarm for the Turkish policy makers only in mid-2013, as their numbers have reached to 500,000.  
80 The data is obtained from the UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, available in: 
<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 > Retrieved in February 15, 2016.  
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refugee” status grants almost the same security as the Convention does. It is implied that as 
long as the provisions of the law are effectively implemented and necessary secondary 
legislation is adopted, the removal of the geographical limitation may be re-negotiated 
(European Commission, 2014). 
This re-negotiability was also implied by a senior official from the DG Enlargement, 
emphasising the necessity of continuing relations concerning migration policy:  
“We said in the road map that Turkey should lift the geographical limitation. But as 
we have explained to Turkey, the Commission Working Documents, are for the 
Commission, it’s how the Commission sees things at the beginning of the process. We 
believe, to the best of our knowledge, that to protect asylum seekers in Turkey, is to lift 
the geographical limitation. Now Turkey says, ‘no way are we ever, never going to do 
this etc. But we have another way of reaching the same goal. This is the Law on 
Foreigners.’ If the goal is to give asylum seekers, refugees, rights in international 
standards and if Turkey reaches through its Law on Foreigners or through lifting the 
geographical limitation, we might say, at the end of the day ‘OK, Maybe Turkey did 
not lift the geographical limitation, but nevertheless, it attains to the same objective 
through other means.’ This is why you’re having a number of benchmarks that we put 
on the roadmap (Official C, Brussels, 29 April 2014).” 
This statement implies flexibility in EU policy preferences in this policy field. This is mainly 
due to the low political significance of the country’s asylum policies for EU member states, 
and for the Council. This is also a tactical move, as with the increase in the number of asylum 
seekers in Turkey, the EU became aware that to demand a substantial policy change, such as 
the removal of the geographical limitation, the Union needed to share some of Turkey’s 
burden. Being unable to introduce mechanisms for burden-sharing with Turkey because of 
political reactions from its member states, the Commission increased the tone of its normative 
discourse on asylum legislation, which was never absent, though subtle while the accession 
conditionality was powerful, and declared satisfaction with Turkey’s new Law on Foreigners 
and International Protection. By doing this, the Commission successfully set this issue of 
geographical limitation in the background and evaded criticism for the absence of burden 
sharing with Turkey.  
In this policy field, neither the vertical mechanism of conditionality, nor the horizontal 
mechanisms of social policy learning or normative suasion have been influential on policy 
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change. As for vertical mechanisms, the EU did not introduce any external incentives other 
than weak accession conditionality. In consideration of horizontal mechanisms, in the asylum 
policy field, the EU could not establish itself as an ideational or normative authority in 
Turkey, in the presence of an active UNHCR office. Moreover, the Commission directed its 
personnel in Turkey, to politically more significant policy instruments, such as 
implementation of the readmission agreement and border control. While the intensity of 
interactions between domestic actors and EU institutions in these areas are much higher, the 
Commission even having a permanent task force in Turkey for implementing the readmission 
agreement, the representatives of EU institutions rarely meet with Turkey to discuss the 
implications of the geographical limitation. As a result, in this policy field, socialisation in 
the framework of Europeanisation is weak. Top-down socialisation is immature as 
representatives of EU-level institutions rarely meet with policy-makers and bottom-up 
socialisation is ineffective as Turkish civil society and non-governmental organisations do 
not perceive the EU as the normative authority. Consequently, the EU’s relative influence on 
urging Turkey to lift geographical limitation is minimal in the absence of sufficient vertical 
or horizontal mechanisms to act upon domestic change. The following section demonstrates 
the shift in international organisations’ preferences on this policy instrument, and further 
clarifies how the EU has lost its normative push on geographical limitation, as international 
organisations have indicated contentment with the existing policy reform.  
8.2 International Actors 
Among the policy fields that I have analysed in this study, asylum policy is the only one 
having a formal and coherent multilateral global governance framework. Turkey is a party to 
the related international conventions and bound by the rules and regulations of the 
international migration regime. The UNHCR and the IOM have offices in Turkey to closely 
monitor the condition of asylum seekers and refugees within Turkey and assess the country’s 
performance with respect to compatibility with international Conventions and Covenants to 
which the country is a party81. These organisations directly participate in policy 
                                                          
81 These Covenants and Conventions were specified in the theoretical framework and the background chapters of this 
study.  
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implementation and more recently in policy making as well. Thus, in this policy field, the 
higher relative influence of these international organisations is anticipated in comparison 
with the other case studies here, where a coherent multilateral global governance framework 
is weak, or even absent. Thus, although in EU policy, the issue of geographical limitation is 
very similar to the case of visa lists, meaning the EU accepts that Turkey would delay the 
response until post-membership. The EU is not the only source of external influence on 
Turkey. As Turkey’s other international commitments also influence policy, the Turkish 
government benefits from frictions at the EU and international level and evolves its position 
to strategically respond to each actor’s policy preferences. This section presents the ways 
international organisations have aimed to influence change in Turkish asylum policies. It also 
shows intersections and discrepancies between the EU and international organisation policy 
positions to provide a basis for the next section which elaborates further how domestic actors 
strategically use external actors’ positions against each other.  
Until the late 2000s, the international organisations that are active in Turkey, the IOM and 
the UNHCR, benefited from the pace of EU-Turkey accession negotiations, to implement 
their objectives in Turkey. The documents and reports prepared by the EU, beginning with 
the Accession Partnership document adopted in 2001, presented both concrete goals to be 
completed for accession and provided legitimacy for these organisations’ objectives on 
reforming Turkey’s asylum system within the framework of the country’s relation with the 
EU. As also noted previously, these organisations’ objectives inevitably overlap with EU 
legislation on asylum, as the latter is established upon the former. Accordingly, until 
accession conditionality began to lose power in 2006, international organisations which were 
unable to present any external incentives for reform, benefited from the power of EU 
accession conditionality, to establish their presence in the asylum policy change in Turkey. 
A high-ranking official, working in the Turkey office of UNHCR stated:  
“The UNHCR has benefited a lot from the acceleration of Turkey-EU relations. After 
a framework was introduced to the political will, the UNHCR guided the Turkish 
government in harmonising the country’s asylum system to the EU’s 24th Chapter. In 
return, Turkey presented an approach which is more committed to change. In terms of 
Turkey’s commitment, the 2001 Accession Partnership Document is very significant. 
As a response to this document, in the same year, the first national program was 
prepared. With this program, Turkey has agreed that it may lift the geographical 
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limitation and pass a new law on migration. In this matter, the UNHCR supported 
Turkey by mainly providing training programs. These training programs actually 
began in 1994, but we didn’t have a concrete purpose (Official A, Ankara, 14 January 
2014).82” 
Although these organisations have benefited from the EU trigger to establish a reform agenda 
on asylum, as decline in the credibility of the accession conditionality began in 2006, 
UNHCR chose to distance itself from being the implementing agency for the EU 
conditionality. As elaborated in the fourth chapter of this study, the international 
organisations that are active in Turkey often abstain from challenging Turkish government 
officials and bureaucrats during policy making processes, to prevent exclusion from the 
implementation process. Both UNHCR and the IOM situate themselves in the field, rather 
than on policy making negotiations, and aim to be seen as technical practitioners rather than 
political entities, aware that politicisation leads to exclusion in Turkey. In line with this 
attitude, after EU-Turkey relations began to decline, UNHCR tried to disassociate itself from 
the EU and establish itself as a non-politicised normative authority, reforming Turkish 
asylum legislation. The above-mentioned official explained this shift in the UNHCR’s 
attitude:  
“From time to time, the UNHCR has put some distance between itself and the EU. 
Because, UNHCR’s objectives are international standards, not EU criteria. The main 
political reason behind this disengagement is that the UNHCR has been trying to avoid 
being an organization that implements whatever the EU dictates. We couldn’t be in the 
position of the EU’s spokesmen. EU-Turkey relations always experience ups and 
downs, however, the UNHCR could not bear these ups and downs in the 
implementation of international standards. The UNHCR used the EU pragmatically 
for the implementation of international norms (Official A, Ankara, 14 January 
2014).83” 
                                                          
82 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin ivme kazanmasından UNHCR çok faydalandı. Siyasi 
iradenin önüne bir çerçeve konulunca UNHCR, Türkiye’nin iltica sisteminin AB’nin 24. Faslına uyması için Türk 
hükümetine yardım etti. Türkiye de değişikliğe daha bağlı bir yaklaşım gösterdi.Türkiye’nin bağlılığı açısından 2001 
katılım ortaklığı belgesi çok önemli. Buna karşılık olarak ilk national program hazırlandı, aynı yılda. Bu programla 
Türkiye coğrafi çekinceyi kaldırabileceğini ve bir yasa çıkarabileceğini kabul etti. Bu yolda UNHCR Türkiye’ye destek 
verdi. Training programları sağladı. Bu training programları aslında 1994’te başlamıştı fakat önümüzde somut bir hedef 
yoktu.” 
83 The original Turkish text is as follows: “UNHCR zaman zaman AB ile arasına mesafe koydu. Çünkü UNHCR’ın hedefi 
AB kriterleri değil, uluslararası standartlar. Bunun ana politik sebebi ise UNHCR’ın AB’nin diktesini uygulayan bir 
kurum olmaktan kaçınması oldu. Kendimizi AB’nin sözcüsü konumuna düşüremezdik. AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde iniş ve 
çıkışlar oluyor ancak UNHCR uluslararası standartların uygulanmasında iniş çıkışlara göz yumamazdı. UNHCR AB’yi 
uluslararası normların uygulanmasında pragmatik olarak kullandı.”  
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This distance between the UNHCR and the EU on policy objectives has become evident in 
both parties’ position against geographical limitation in Turkey. During the preparation phase 
of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the UNHCR Turkey office withdrew 
from its position on geographical limitation, as a response to the government’s commitment 
to policy reform. After the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was adopted in 
April 2013, the UNHCR further backed down from its claims on geographical limitation and 
maintained its focus on rights provided for conditional refugees and implementation of the 
Law. A protection assistant from the Turkish office of UNHCR stressed the significance of 
protection rather than maintaining their position on the removal of the geographical 
limitation:  
“Until the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was adopted, geographical 
limitation was a significant problem. However, with this law, the “conditional refugee” 
concept was developed. In terms of rights, refugees and conditional refugees are equal. 
The only difference between them is that, conditional refugees are subject to 
resettlement. However, their rights are protected by law, during the time they are in 
Turkey. Although the limitation is still present, in the implementation, the Law brought 
a more durable solution by improving the rights of conditional refugees and bringing 
them closer to obtaining international refugee rights. We are satisfied with the 
implementation. It is a much more important and urgent issue to establish and 
implement the new system rather than pressuring for lifting the geographical 
limitation. It is significant to ensure that the geographical limitation is not an obstacle 
to an effective and fair protection system. The political implications of this does not 
concern us at all. What is important to us is to ensure that all asylum seekers can obtain 
full protection granted by refugee status (Official B, Ankara, 15 January 2014).84”  
As noted by this official and many others that were interviewed during this study, the main 
difference between conditional refugee status introduced by the new Law, and the 
internationally acknowledged refugee status that Turkey would adopt if the geographical 
                                                          
84 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Bu kanun çıkana kadar coğrafi kısıtlama bir sorundu ancak bu kanunla 
beraber “şartlı mülteci” konsepti geliştirildi. Haklar bağlamında şartlı mülteci ve mülteciler eşitler. Tek farkı şartlı 
mültecilerin resettlement’a tabi olmaları ancak Türkiye’de bulundukları süre içinde hakları korunuyor. Bu kısıtlama 
kalkmasa da, uygulamada şartlı mültecilerin haklarının uluslararası mülteci haklarına yaklaşması daha kalıcı bir çözüm 
getirdi. Uygulama bizi tatmin etti. Yeni sistemin kurulması ve uygulanmasındaki işbirliği, kısıtlamanın kaldırılması için 
baskı yapmaktan çok daha mühim bir konu.Coğrafi kısıtlamanın etkin ve adil bir koruma sisteminin önünde engel 
oluşturmaması önemli. İşin politik tarafı bizi hiç ilgilendirmiyor. Tüm sığınmacıların mülteci statüsüyle tam korunmaya 
sahip olması bizim için çok önemli.”  
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limitation is lifted, is the clause on resettlement. Conditional refugees are primarily held 
subject to resettlement, which is to a large extent undertaken by the IOM, in Australia, 
Canada and the USA. Though up-to-date data is not available on this, until 2009, the IOM 
have resettled around 65 per cent of asylum seekers, whose refugee status have been 
determined by the UNHCR85. Only 3 per cent of these resettlements have been to EU member 
states. In meetings held in the IOM Ankara office, both project officers and experts framed 
Turkey’s insistence on maintaining the geographical limitation as a result of the Turkish 
government’s intention to continue this resettlement program, as the number of refugees 
within the country has been increasing since 2011. Together with supporting the UNHCR’s 
priorities on refugee protection, a project officer from the IOM added the following remarks 
on the maintenance of geographical limitation:  
“It is not important whether there is a geographical limitation or not. What is 
important is the access to services and enhancement of human rights standards. Thus, 
new regulations were introduced in this matter. Turkey does not want to give up its 
right to resettlement. After a good system is established, it is significant from the first 
moment, to ensure the right to asylum application within a mixed group of people and 
sustaining the process with procedures that are not taking too long (Official A, Ankara, 
17 January 2014).86” 
In conclusion, this section has initially shown UNHCR’s functional use of EU accession 
conditionality as a trigger for policy reform. Despite having the highest level of 
multilateralism in comparison to other cases presented here, in this case too, international 
organisations remained inadequate to introduce concrete incentives to trigger policy change. 
Although these organisations participate in policy making and implementation, without the 
power to trigger policy with a concrete incentive, they cannot initiate the reform agenda. 
Thus, here, the UNHCR has pragmatically used EU conditionality to overcome this 
shortcoming. However, with decline in the power of EU accession conditionality in the late 
2000s, the UNHCR has distanced itself from the EU, and especially withdrew support from 
the EU’s agenda in the issue of geographical limitation. Derived from its strict mandate on 
                                                          
85 This data compiled from the resettlement statistics in the IOM’s website (http://www.turkey.iom.int/operations.htm) 
and UNHCR Turkey’s data on refugee status determination, provided in the background section of this study.  
86 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Coğrafi kısıtlamanın olması ya da olmaması değil, hizmetlere erişim ve insan 
hakları standartlarının arttırılması önemli. Yeni düzenlemeler getirildi. Türkiye resettlement hakkından vazgeçmek 
istemiyor. İyi bir sistem kurulunca, ilk andan itibaren o karma grup içinde sığınmacıların başvuru hakkının olması, çok 
uzamayan süreçlerde prosedürlerin sürdürülmesi önemli.” 
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refugee protection, UNHCR succeeded in establishing itself as the normative authority in 
Turkey, and beginning in the late 2000s, the EU was obliged to act consistently with this 
organisation’s policy preferences. To put it more precisely, after the UNHCR and IOM 
became content with the refugee protection introduced under the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection with “conditional refugee” status, they set aside their apprehensions 
on geographical limitation. The EU persistence on its removal lost strength as the union was 
neither the main normative authority on this matter nor providing any assistance to Turkey 
for the fulfilment of its demands in the domestic arena.  
8.3 Domestic Actors 
At the domestic level, actors that express their preferences on geographical limitation are 
government actors and state bureaucracy, that oppose lifting it until Turkey is a member of 
the EU; and the non-governmental human rights organisations that have supported lifting the 
geographical limitation but shifted their emphasis to good practices after the introduction of 
the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. Focusing upon these two types of actors, 
this section both examines domestic pressures on policy change, but more dominantly, it 
analyses domestic level reactions to external pressures introduced in the previous two 
sections. The section argues, while these two types of domestic actor preference for removal 
of the geographical limitation varies, their attitudes against external influences on policy 
change are similar.  
Since the accession negotiations with the EU began, Turkish government officials and state 
bureaucracy have been consistently against lifting the geographical limitation. It is not a 
policy instrument, such as the adoption of the EU’s negative and positive visa lists where 
policy was directly influenced by the progress of accession negotiations. There has been no 
progress resulting from strong accession conditionality nor any retractions resulting from 
decline in the power of accession conditionality. Thus, it is not valid to assume that Turkish 
negotiators have backed down from their position on lifting the geographical limitation as a 
result of absence of a strong conditionality. What can be derived from the interviews with 
Turkish officials is that Turkish negotiators began to question their commitment to the EU in 
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asylum policy, as a result of EU preoccupation with the issue of geographical limitation, 
ignoring Turkish reforms in other areas of its asylum policy. A high-ranking official from 
the Ministry for EU Affairs stressed that Turkey was given the right to maintain the 
geographical limitation in the framework of international law, so there would be no 
foundation for external actors to compel Turkey to lift the geographical limitation as an 
international responsibility and as a pre-condition to provide sufficient protection to the 
asylum seekers:  
“As the Turkish state, we do not hesitate to provide humanitarian aid on our Eastern 
Border. Turkey strictly adheres to the non-refoulement principle. In the last 3-4 years, 
there is no case filed against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights. Non-
refoulement is currently under complete legal guarantee. The humanitarian dimension 
of the situation is important for Turkey. Turkey follows certain principles to face the 
situation. It is very welcoming within the bounds of its capabilities. The geographical 
limitation is not a drawback imposed by Turkey. The agreement is signed in this 
fashion. Turkey is using its rights arising from the text of that agreement (Official A, 
Ankara, 14 January, 2014).87” 
In the previous two sections, this study have suggested that in the absence of a concrete 
incentive to offer Turkey for lifting the geographical limitation and in the presence of 
UNHCR as the main established normative authority within the country, the EU could not 
succeed in influencing domestic change in Turkey either through vertical mechanisms, or 
with horizontal ones. Moreover, the implementation of the readmission agreement signed 
between the countries has caused further doubt as, with the removal of the geographical 
limitation, Turkey would obtain the status of a “safe third country” which would enable the 
EU to ask for readmission of asylum seekers by Turkey as well. In such an environment, the 
Turkish state elite, perceives EU insistence on domestic change, with suspicion. An expert 
from the Directorate for Political Affairs in the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs has expressed 
his apprehensions on EU pressure for the removal of the geographical limitation, stating both 
the inability and unwillingness of the EU to establish a working asylum system and also 
                                                          
87 The original Turkish text is as folows: Biz Türkiye olarak doğu sınırında insani yardımdan gocunmuyoruz. Türkiye 
non-refoulement ilkesine titizlikle uymaya çalışıyor. Son 3-4 senedir Türkiye’nin aleyhine açılmış bir dava yok. Non-
refoulement şu anda tamamen yasal güvence altında. Durumun insani boyutu Türkiye açısından mühim. Türkiye bu 
konularda belli ilkeler çerçevesinde hareket ediyor. İmkanları çerçevesinde misafirperver. Coğrafi kısıtlama Türkiye’nin 
koyduğu bir çekince değil. Anlaşma o şekilde yapılmış. Türkiye o anlaşma metninden doğan haklarını kullanıyor.  
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indicating the EU’s incompatibility to constrain Turkey on geographical limitation when the 
UNHCR was approving the county’s asylum management:  
“The fundamental objective of the EU on the matter is to prevent Turkey being a bridge 
to the EU as it is now, and ensuring these irregular immigrants stay in Turkey. 
Greece’s acceptance rate is very low, its asylum system is collapsing. The EU wants 
Turkey to cope with asylum seekers. We need to understand why currently UNHCR 
does not put pressure on Turkey in this matter but the EU does. If Turkey becomes a 
“safe third country” by lifting the geographical limitation, the EU will be able to return 
asylum seekers as well in the framework of the readmission agreement. This topic does 
not articulate a lot, but it is true. EU’s motivations are suspicious. Thus, Turkey will 
not lift the geographical limitation (Official B, Ankara, 14 January, 2014).88”  
Currently, the most significant form of international burden-sharing Turkey experiences in 
its asylum management is resettlement to third countries. In the area of resettlement, there is 
limited support for Turkey from the EU, with only 3 per cent of resettlements being to EU 
member states. While lifting the geographical limitation suggests withdrawal from this claim, 
Turkish officials become further sceptical of EU intentions as EU pressure on geographical 
limitation does not only suggest an increase in the number of asylum seekers within the 
country as a result of granting them refugee status; it also suggests such increase as a result 
of the above mentioned cases of readmission, as well as by giving up the claim to resettle a 
significant portion of refugees within the country. The above mentioned expert from the 
Directorate for Political Affairs in Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs expresses such conflict 
of interest with an emphasis upon the correlation between the ability to influence change with 
the level of burden sharing:  
“In the framework of the geographical limitation, third countries have resettlement 
programs. Every year, the United States accepts 5-6000 people. However, none of the 
EU countries have such a scheme or a quota. Burden-sharing is very significant. The 
EU has to show Turkey its spirit of international cooperation and solidarity. However, 
                                                          
88 Külfet paylaşımı çok önemli. AB’nin uluslararası işbirliği ve dayanışma ruhunu Türkiye’ye göstermesi lazım. Ancak bu 
konuda esas külfet paylaşımı Kanada, ABD ve Avusturalya ile gerçekleşiyor. UNHCR’ın bu konuda bir baskısı olmadığı 
halde AB’nin neden baskı kurduğunun anlaşılması lazım. Türkiye “safe third country” haline gelirse, AB, GKA 
çerçevesinde sığınmacıları da geri gönderebilecek. Bu konu dillendirilmiyor ama gerçek. AB’nin motivasyonları şüphe 
uyandırıcı. Bu yüzden Türkiye bu kısıtlamayı kaldırmayacak.  
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in this matter, we experience real burden-sharing with Canada, USA and Australia 
(Official B, Ankara, 14 January, 2014).89” 
In such an environment, while representatives of all human rights NGOs, interviewed during 
this study, were in agreement with the demand for unconditional removal of the geographical 
limitation, they were uneasy about this issue becoming an issue of political contestation 
between the EU and Turkey. The coordinator for the refugee rights at Amnesty International 
Turkey has revealed their preferred form of domestic change in Turkey by stating: “There is 
not any aspect of the geographical limitation that can be defended. It should be lifted without 
any conditions or limitations. This is a fundamental right that cannot be presented as a 
condition for EU membership (Ankara, 15 January 2014).90” Thus, despite their unequivocal 
support for the removal of the geographical limitation, these organisations are against 
establishing it as an item in the EU’s reform agenda, influenced by fluctuations in the 
accession process. Inherently, their position is similar to the international organisations as 
both types of actors are concerned about refugee protection influenced by instabilities related 
to EU accession negotiations.  
Overall, this section suggests, both governmental and non-governmental domestic actors 
involved in refugee protection in Turkey seek a domestic, or at least a non-EU solution to the 
country’s asylum policy, independent of their opinion on lifting the geographical limitation. 
Turkish state and government officials refuse to implement the EU’s reform agenda without 
a concrete incentive for a policy change. This refusal is revealed more clearly as Turkey has 
recently prepared a new comprehensive legislation on international protection, and chose to 
introduce novel categories for asylum seekers rather than lifting the geographical limitation. 
Moreover, non-governmental actors are not only uneasy about refugee protection becoming 
an item for international bargaining, they are also apprehensive over the issue of asylum 
being influenced by instabilities in EU-Turkey relations. Recent developments coupled with 
sceptical perceptions of Turkish domestic actors against the EU, support the conclusion of 
                                                          
89 Coğrafi kısıtlama çerçevesinde üçüncü ülkelerin yerleştirme programları var. Her sene ABD 5-6.000 kişi alıyor. Ancak 
AB ülkelerinin böyle bir yerleştirme şemaları ya da kotaları yok. Türkiye’nin sağladığı geçici korumadaki destek ve 
kanuna koyduğu güvenceler ortada. Bu kişilerin Türkiye’de sıkışıp kalmaması için elden gelen yapılıyor. AB’nin düştüğü 
hatalara düşmeden hedef ülke olmanın sorumluluğunu toparlamak çok önemli.  
90 Coğrafi çekincenin savunulacak hiçbir durumu yok. Şartsız ve sınırsız olarak kaldırılmalı. AB’ye üyeliğe şart 
koşulamayacak temel bir hak bu.  
154 
 
the EU-level actors section of this case study. The flexibility the EU Commission presented 
to Turkey, by temporarily removing the geographical limitation from the negotiation agenda, 
can be interpreted as an international organization avoiding burden sharing in a policy field 
in which it is normatively expected to intervene. In the end, together with the introduction of 
a satisfactory law in Turkey, flexibility the EU presenting is also an outcome of its inability 
to share Turkey’s burden. With significant decline in membership prospect and the lack of 
any rewards attached to this policy change, the EU could not continue to put pressure on 
Turkey, without providing any assistance.  
Moreover, not only the EU, but also the UNHCR is losing its external influence on Turkey 
as international law is becoming embedded in domestic practices. Until the introduction of 
the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection, state and government practices were 
externally limited by Turkey’s commitment to international norms and the global migration 
regime, where the UNHCR was a point of reference for policy implementation. In the case 
of asylum, these external limits are being transformed into domestic constitutional limits to 
Turkish state authority, with the introduction of the new Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, established upon these norms and within the framework of Turkey’s membership 
to international entities. In May 2015, the Directorate General of Migration Management 
undertook all the work and operations of Turkish asylum policy. Thus, in the near future, it 
is expected Turkish state bureaucracy to further strengthen itself with the new Law and for 
EU and international level actors to further lose their influence on policy change in Turkish 
asylum policies.  
8.4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this case study has revealed that, in the case of domestic change in Turkey’s 
asylum policies and discussions over the removal of the geographical limitation, EU level 
external influence is limited in comparison to the other case studies introduced here. This 
decline in the EU’s influence is mainly due to the absence of credible conditionality 
mechanisms. When compared with the other two cases preceding this one, in this case, the 
EU did not facilitate a strong issue linkage, by maintaining its position on the removal of the 
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geographical limitation as a benchmark for the visa liberalisation road map. Instead it has 
showed some flexibility in the first assessment report for the visa liberalisation road map.  
In this chapter, I explain the reasons behind such flexibility, around two main factors. The 
first factor is constituted around statements of Commission officials suggesting that the EU 
chooses to postpone discussions in this non-priority policy instrument to a more suitable time 
in the future, to prioritise more important ones in its relations with Turkey. The interviews 
suggest, seeing Turkish state and government actors’ consistent response against discussions 
on the geographical limitation, the EU Commission left this issue as a final negotiation point 
for Turkey. As current migration policy negotiations between the entities continue in an 
intense manner in the implementation phase of the readmission agreement and the visa 
liberalisation road map, the Commission has considered the addition of another politically 
deadlocked issue would be ill timed. The second factor is not constituted around the EU’s 
choice to postpone negotiations but developments that have compelled the EU to do so. The 
EU has been legitimising its position for removal of the geographical limitation around 
claims based on the global human rights regime and burden sharing. The loss of relevance of 
the bases of these claims, after the introduction of the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection and Turkish response to the Syrian refugee crisis, reduced the EU’s leverage 
dramatically and thus led to such a flexible approach to its external influence.  
On the contrary, in this policy field, international organisations had the highest level of 
external influence, in relation to other case studies introduced here. UNHCR, especially, has 
emerged as a powerful external actor. Although the organisation did not have any vertical 
mechanisms in the form of concrete incentives, the organisation has succeeded in using 
socialisation as a mechanism for facilitating domestic change. The organisation primarily 
established top-down mechanisms of socialisation in Turkey, after the country became a 
party to the Geneva Convention. The UNHCR has had an active office in Turkey since the 
1960s and the organisation has been working on refugee status determination in collaboration 
with the Turkish state and government officials. Afterwards, it began to benefit from bottom-
up socialisation to further establish its normative authority as Turkish domestic actors began 
to recognize the organisation as such. Being in the field and managing not to politicise itself 
also enabled this socialisation as the organisation managed to remain the implementing 
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agency of Turkish asylum policy for a long time. In asylum policy reform, the Turkish policy 
elite did not only grant UNHCR a seat on the policy table, during the preparation of the Law 
on Foreigners and International Protection, they have also used them as a source of 
legitimisation against EU’s claims for lifting the geographical limitation. It is a common 
practice for the Turkish government and state actors to use EU conditionality for legitimising 
radical policy changes against domestic veto players. However, this is a rare instance where 
Turkey used international organisations, dominantly the UNHCR but also the IOM, to 
legitimise its actions on policy change. Turkish policy makers could facilitate this 
legitimisation due to the UNHCR’s established normative precedence and superiority over 
the EU in asylum and refugee protection.  
This section has identified UNHCR as the main source of external influence, though this does 
not suggest an increase in its power. It was empowered as a source of legitimisation against 
the EU, though its overall power in Turkey is in decline, mainly due to the internalisation of 
the external constraints to state policy making with increased constitutionalism in the asylum 
policy field. By introducing legislation for international protection, which was prepared in 
collaboration with the UNHCR and the IOM, Turkey not only constitutionalised refugee 
protection, it also reclaimed UNHCR’s duties on implementation, such as refugee status 
determination, to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate General for Migration 
Management. While introducing domestic limits to state sovereignty in asylum policy 
making, the Law also restricted external influences. As a result, although UNHCR emerged 
as the dominant source of external influence, in the future, this policy field is expected to be 
more dominantly determined by the Turkish state and government actors.  
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Chapter 9: Actor Relationships and Influence Mechanisms  
The cases presented in this study have so far explicated the influence of domestic, 
international and EU-level actors on domestic change in Turkish migration policies. The case 
studies focus on three levels of actors that influence domestic change in Turkey and their 
relative success in determining policy outcome. In the case study chapters, I have examined 
the influence of each actor on policy change and identified the most influential actors for 
each policy field. In this chapter, I establish a narrative based on actor relationships and 
compare their relative influences across policy fields and instruments. Here, I specifically 
focus on the literature on external influences and influence mechanisms and aim to identify 
the impact of each mechanism, depending on the actor who facilitates it, and the context.  
In the following sections, I initially introduce influence mechanisms expected to be found in 
this analysis, derived from the literature on external influences. I have elaborated these 
mechanisms with respect to relevant theoretical frameworks in the second chapter of this 
study. Here, I briefly re-introduce them to clarify findings of the analysis on relative 
influences. Then I present a relationship-based cross-case analysis where I seek these 
mechanisms in relation to migration policy, between three levels of actors. I conclude the 
chapter by identifying the relative influence of each actor, and the mechanisms they facilitate 
at the peak of their influence. In the conclusion, I re-visit the international and domestic 
context for these peak events, and explain the significance of context on the relative 
influences of actors and their choice of influence mechanisms.  
9.1 Mechanisms of External Influence in Turkish Migration Policy Change  
Based on evidence presented in the case studies in previous chapters and with reference to 
the literature on external influences, both in the EU and at international level, in this chapter 
I expect to find three main mechanisms of external influence, implemented varyingly, by all 
levels of actors in different phases of their relationships on the Turkish migration policy 
change. Available literature on external influences at the EU level, mainly focus on either the 
Central and Eastern European countries, or on third and the ENP countries. Regarding EU 
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external influence on policy change, Turkey is an intermediary case between these two 
groups of cases, as it is still a candidate country, with an accession conditionality framework, 
receiving funds, assistance and assessment related to accession; but it has also lost its 
prospects for full accession and negotiates with the EU as a third country, demanding short-
term concessions beyond the remote prospect of accession. Thus, it is not viable to expect 
the full applicability of influence mechanisms presented in the literature for those cases, to 
Turkey. Moreover, while the literature on the EU and international level mechanisms of 
policy change is dominantly focused on policy fields with a solid international normative 
framework, such as democratic consolidation (Youngs, 2002; Baracani, 2009; Freyburg, et 
al., 2009; Kubicek, 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011), most of the issues within 
migration still lack such a framework which makes it harder for external actors to use 
mechanisms based on a logic of appropriateness. With these considerations, in this chapter, 
I seek the following mechanisms in each relationship in Turkish migration policy change 
mainly based on the conditionality and socialisation division in the literature on external 
influences. Further discussion on the theoretical foundations and the implications of these 
mechanisms is available in the second chapter of this study.  
Conditionality is a top-down mechanism where an international or an EU level actor 
introduces external incentives, conditional to policy in a state (Kotzian, 2007; Piedrafita, 
2012). It is an issue linkage established between benefits desired by a state and fulfilment of 
certain conditions presented by an international or an EU-level actor (Smith, 2003). The 
mechanism of conditionality depends on a cost and benefit calculation where leverage or 
bargaining power is central to determine the actors’ relative influence. Although 
conditionality is essentially a bargaining process, where actors exchange threats and 
retractions to maximise their benefits from the process, it is distinguished from a regular 
competitive bargaining framework with the existence of a structured and, in most of the 
cases, well documented, rewards scheme presented to nation states in the initial stage of 
negotiations. Such a scheme can be modified to some extent during the bargaining process, 
but modifications are centred on core incentives presented at the initial stage. In a regular 
competitive bargaining process, the incentives are introduced during the process, as a 
response to exchange of information, threats and retractions.  
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While conditionality is an effective mechanism facilitated by both the EU and also 
international organisations (Pridham, 1999), due to the incapacity of international 
organisations to establish a conditionality framework on migration policy, for the purposes 
of this study, it is presented dominantly as an EU-level mechanism. On Turkish migration 
policy change, the EU level mechanism of conditionality functions both as accession 
conditionality and policy conditionality. While the former presents the long term prospect of 
accession as a final reward for policy change, the latter attaches shorter term policy-specific 
rewards to certain areas of reform (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Grabbe, 2002; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Kotzian, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Kubicek, 2011; 
Langbein & Börzel, 2013). In a cost-benefit analysis, accession conditionality is recognised 
as the most effective incentive, during the processes of democratisation in Central and 
Eastern European states (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). However, the strength 
of accession conditionality to influence policy change on third countries depends directly on 
the credibility of the candidate countries’ accession prospects (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004). In consideration of the declining accession prospects of Turkey, although 
accession has a much greater benefit in comparison to the policy conditionality framework 
presented by the visa liberalisation road map (European Commission, 2013), it does not have 
the necessary credibility. An elaboration of the relative success of policy conditionality will 
be presented below, for the intermediary case of Turkey, as a result of its low prospect of 
accession, situated between EU candidate countries and neighbourhood countries.  
Socialisation is a process by which external influences function through social policy 
learning or normative suasion aiming to change and determine domestic norms and 
collective understandings about appropriate behaviour in targeted states. It is a long term 
mechanism where, in the final stage, the international or EU level actors expect 
internalisation and institutionalisation of these norms to change the identities, interests and 
behaviours of the institutions and actors in policy making processes of the targeted state 
(Müller, 1993; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). This internalisation and institutionalisation is 
expected to occur through norm entrepreneurs, including epistemic communities, advocacy 
networks, and even missions directly commissioned by international and EU-level 
institutions, who socialise the domestic actors into norms and appropriate ways of behaviour 
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by facilitating persuasion and social learning (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005). Due to Turkish civil society’s low level of participation in migration 
policy change, socialisation in the scope of this paper does not suggest a linkage approach 
through cultivation of civil society and transnational ties (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 
2011), it suggests a more direct relationship between policy making and implementing bodies 
of both parties where rather than a realist cost and benefit framework, social policy learning 
and normative suasion influences actor policy preferences.  
Social policy learning in the framework of socialisation is likely to occur through frequent 
policy consultation when highly technical or scientific issues are under discussion (Thomas, 
2009). This suggests an increased level of external influence in policy fields where external 
actors have permanent missions or frequent meetings with their domestic counterparts. 
However, in less technical policy fields, for socialisation to be influential, social policy 
learning needs to be supported with normative suasion where external actors present 
normative reasons to domestic actors to influence policy. Thus, for an effective socialisation 
mechanism, facilitated through a collaboration of social policy learning and normative 
suasion, external actors need a normative claim to support their influence on determining 
ways of appropriate behaviour. In this study, policy fields where the EU or an international 
organisation have a normative claim are identified as areas where these actors are able to 
shape conceptions of “normal” and “appropriate” ways of behaviour, through ideational 
means (Diez & Manners, 2007). The policy fields where the EU has a normative claim is 
established as ones where the EU claims to act in compliance with the international legal 
framework and aims to influence policy change by claiming such universal legitimacy 
(Sjursen, 2006). 
Legitimisation is a mechanism that frequently arises in the early stage of socialisation, where 
states use normative claims of external actors to legitimise their actions against domestic veto 
players or other external actors. The main difference from domestic power re-distribution 
resulting from technical and financial assistance provided within the conditionality 
framework, is its ideational nature. It does not involve any means of external aid and it is 
expected to influence policy change through acceptance of any normative claim as legitimate. 
Legitimisation is a powerful mechanism to empower domestic actors who support policy 
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reform, especially in policy fields where an international normative framework exists. For 
politically costly reform processes, legitimisation is specifically valuable for state 
governments as they can legitimise their actions through external influences and diminish 
political fallout at the national level (Lavenex, 2001; Geddes, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Lahav & 
Guiraudon, 2007).  
The following sections present a relationship based, cross-case analysis of relative influences 
with the final aim of identifying actors who dominantly influence change in Turkish 
migration policies. Initially, the following sections seek these above-introduced mechanisms 
within each relationship to determine the relative impact of each mechanism of influence. In 
respect to context, the following sections identify suitable international and domestic 
conditions for each mechanism. By doing so, in this chapter I aim to explain the reasons 
behind the three levels of actors’ relative influences with respect to the choice of mechanisms, 
time and context.  
9.2 Relationship between Turkey and the EU: Conditionality Supported with 
Socialisation and Balanced with Power Politics  
In the early 2000s, the EU initiated Turkish policy change in migration through accession 
conditionality. During this time, the prospects for accession were credible and the newly 
elected AKP government was keen to implement EU conditionality to strengthen the 
country’s political and economic connections with the EU (Kubicek, 2011). At the peak of 
Turkey’s accession prospects’ credibility, the EU induced the preparation of the Turkish 
Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration and set 
a systematic reform agenda for Turkish migration policies91. However, the EU’s power to 
influence Turkish policy with accession conditionality began to decline by 2006, in parallel 
to the decline in Turkey’s accession prospects. In subsequent years, resulting from the EU’s 
decision to freeze the relations on eight chapters followed by France’s and Cyprus’ unilateral 
                                                          
91 “Turkish Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration (İltica ve Göç 
Alanındaki Avrupa Birliği Miktesebatının Üstlenilmesine ilişkin Türkiye Eylem Planı)” adopted in 25 March 2005. Full 
text in Turkish is available at: http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/turkiye_ulusal_eylem_plani(2).pdf. Full text in English 
(unofficial translation) is available at: http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2TUR003_EN.pdf. Retrieved in 13 
February 2015.  
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decisions to block ten others, the EU began to lose its leverage on accession conditionality 
and sought alternative ways to influence policy in Turkey.  
This section focuses on these alternative ways, and explains how, despite Turkey’s receding 
accession prospect, the EU continues to maintain a high level of influence on Turkish 
migration policies. The most prominent explanation for the continuation of EU influence on 
domestic change in Turkish migration policies, is the replacement of accession conditionality 
issue linkage with policy conditionality, by establishing a connection between compliance 
with EU demands and visa liberalisation (Langbein & Wolczuk, 2012; Ademmer & Börzel, 
2013). Thus, the EU has replaced the vertical mechanism of accession conditionality, with 
yet another vertical mechanism. This new policy conditionality issue linkage was strongly 
established in policy fields where the EU was seeking a rapid conclusion to negotiations on 
migration policy change, while the link was kept looser for policy fields of lesser importance.  
9.2.1 Visa Liberalisation Road Map: A Policy Conditionality Framework for Migration Policy 
Reform 
The issue linkages of each policy instrument to the visa liberalisation road map vary in 
strength, depending on the timing of the linkage, the context, and the perseverance of EU 
level actors to maintain such a linkage, by risking delays in implementation in other policy 
fields. Thus, the same policy conditionality ensures the EU varying levels of influence and 
leads to different policy outcomes depending on the strength of the issue linkage in each 
policy field. Since the decline in the country’s accession prospects, the strength of the issue 
linkage between any given policy instrument and visa-free travel to the EU has been the most 
prominent factor determining EU influence on Turkish migration policies.  
The initiation and implementation of the readmission agreement has the strongest issue 
linkage to visa liberalisation. Turkish government initially demanded visa related 
concessions as compensations solely in return for the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. 
Although the EU introduced some visa-related concessions during the 2000s, they were 
limited in scope and were not welcomed by the Turkish state and government officials as 
sufficient compensation to meet with the costs of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. 
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After 2010, they were expanded to include visa-free travel for all Turkish citizens, resulting 
from contextual developments, increasing EU need to imminently conclude the readmission 
agreement with Turkey. These contextual changes were both international, expectations of 
increased mobility through Turkey as a result of the Arab Spring, and EU-level domestic, 
Denmark Council Presidency’s aspiration to conclude a deal before Cyprus’ term interrupts 
relations with Turkey.  
However, the EU did not directly grant Turkey visa liberalisation in return for concluding 
the readmission agreement. Instead, the Commission introduced a road map to visa 
liberalisation, adopted in parallel to the conclusion of the readmission agreement in 
December 2013 (European Commission, 2013). This road map consists of the benchmarks 
that Turkey needs to fulfil for obtaining visa liberalisation for all Turkish citizens (European 
Commission, 2013). This new, structured conditionality framework foresees that upon 
completion of these benchmarks, Turkey will overcome EU member state apprehensions 
over establishing a visa-free regime and be granted visa liberalisation. All of the policy 
instruments included in this study and many more on migration management, including ones 
on border security, are among the benchmarks of this document. In essence, it is a policy 
conditionality document, similar to its accession conditionality counterpart, the Acquis. 
While the fulfilment of the Acquis’ terms is conditional to accession, the fulfilment of 
benchmarks in the road map, including full implementation of the readmission agreement, is 
conditional on obtaining a specific policy goal, a visa free regime. Thus, although the EU has 
replaced the long term and unobtainable goal of accession with a short term and relatively 
more obtainable goal of visa liberalisation, in essence, it continues to facilitate conditionality 
as a mechanism to externally influence Turkey. 
This policy conditionality framework granted the EU leverage comparable to the accession 
conditionality, but diverged from such a comprehensive, long-term and inflexible framework 
by being a short-term, attainable and flexible policy goal. It is a custom-made document 
prepared for the specific case of Turkey, and hence, more accommodating for its policy 
preferences in comparison to its accession counterpart. The establishment of such a structured 
process independently from the accession conditionality also changed the venue for Turkish 
migration policy negotiations from the accession framework to migration specific 
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negotiations. This has enabled parties to isolate migration policy, from Turkey’s politically 
charged problem of trust to the EU, established during accession negotiations. For instance, 
a medium rank official from the DG Home Affairs of the EU Commission defines this new 
policy conditionality framework as “a confidence and a cooperation building process 
between the member states and Turkey (Official C, Brussels, 30 April, 2014).” 
The policy conditionality framework established around the visa liberalisation road map 
facilitated policy change in Turkey by introducing mechanisms for compensating for the 
social, economic and political costs of this change. The politically valuable incentive of visas, 
coupled with assurances of financial and technical assistance helped to overcome Turkish 
government and policy makers’ apprehensions over the introduction of the readmission 
agreement and facilitated its conclusion. The position of both Turkish government and policy 
makers on the readmission-visa liberalisation deal was summarised by a senior migration 
policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the following statement:  
“The main objective of Turkey for the readmission agreement was to establish the 
balance between EU support in a burden sharing framework, and visa liberalisation. 
We have been successful in accordance with the aims we have specified for ourselves 
(Official A, Skype Interview, 17 October, 2014)92.” 
This issue linkage did not produce similar results of policy compliance in the policy fields of 
asylum and visa93. Turkey and the EU have been negotiating the readmission agreement, in 
return for a visa-related concession since the mid-2000s. Turkish policy makers have 
perceived the addition of other policy instruments, to the visa liberalisation road map, as last 
minute and unwelcome additions to the initial link between the readmission agreement and 
visa liberalisation. A senior official from the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs states his 
uneasiness on this addition:  
                                                          
92 The original Turkish text is as follows: “GKA’daki Türkiye’nin ana amacı AB desteği (burden-sharing çerçevesinde) ve 
vize arasındaki dengeyi korumaktı. Belirlenen amaçlar konusunda başarılı olundu.” 
93 Although legislative reform was also a benchmark in the visa liberalisation road map, the new Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection was prepared and adopted prior to the introduction of the road map. The legislative reform 
framework was loosely and flexibly linked to the visa liberalisation during the preperation process, but the official 
documentation in the road map was introduced after the introduction of the new Law.  
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“Essentially, geographical limitation and visa are not two topics of negotiations yet. 
These issues have never been in a position to be negotiated. We have always stressed 
that these negotiations would begin in parallel to the accession. In this policy area, the 
most important negotiations are on the readmission agreement (Official A, Ankara, 14 
January, 2014)94.” 
However, Turkey has accepted the road map, presuming the Commission introduced these 
linkages to overcome member states’ apprehensions, impetuously introducing the road map 
before the Cyprus’ Council presidency. Similar to the Commission’s position, Turkish 
government officials also perceive the introduction of the road map as a big leap forward, 
separating the country’s reform agenda on migration policies from its accession process. 
They expect this new reform framework to be more flexible and negotiable than the accession 
framework. They accepted it as it is despite their reluctance to implement the reform agenda 
on visa lists and geographical limitation. A migration expert from the Turkish Ministry of 
Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, expressed views of the agency 
responsible for the implementation of the readmission agreement:  
“The EU already knew about our visa policy (during the preparation of the road map). 
The apprehensions on this issue shall be expressed during the negotiations ... We will 
implement the readmission agreement. If the political will suspends the relations, we 
respect that... (Official A, Ankara, 17 June, 2015)95. ”  
As evidenced in these statements from diverse ministries, the Turkish government and policy 
elite have perceived additional benchmarks as negotiable. EU Commission officials also have 
a similar approach. For instance, a medium-level manager from the Delegation of the EU to 
Turkey has clearly stated: “Negative and positive lists and geographical limitation will stay 
as they are until accession. We will not raise our voice any further on these matters (Official 
B, Ankara, 16 January, 2014).” A senior Commission official from the EU Commission’s 
DG Enlargement, also clarified their stance on negotiability of benchmarks other than the 
readmission agreement with the following statement:  
                                                          
94 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Coğrafi kısıtlama ve vize aslen henüz müzakere konusu değil. Bu konularda 
müzakere edilebilecek bir duruma gelinmedi hiç. Hep bu müzakerelerin üyelikle paralel olacağı söylendi. Bu alandaki en 
önemli müzakereler geri kabul anlaşması üzerine.” 
95 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Vize’yi zaten biliyorlardı. Bu müzakerelerde dile getirilir…Biz Geri Kabul 
Anlaşması’nı uygulayacağız. Olur da siyasi irade ilişkileri askıya alırsa, biz buna saygı duyarız…” 
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“These are the benchmarks we consider important because they are to reach a specific 
goal. If this specific goal could be reached through other means, we are happy to 
discuss this. This is where you have a margin of discussion. Having said this, I believe 
there will be no margin of discussion about things like the implementation of the 
readmission agreement to third country nationals for instance. It will have to be 
implemented. But on the other topics, Turkish authorities may say let’s do it this way 
rather than this way (Official C, Brussels, 29 April, 2014).”  
Due to this negotiability, stated since the introduction of the visa liberalisation road map, this 
policy conditionality framework granted the EU limited influence on domestic change in 
policy instruments other than the implementation of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. 
This flexibility and negotiability were officially documented in the Commission’s report to 
the European Parliament and the Council on progress of Turkey in fulfilling the requirements 
of its visa liberalisation road map (European Commission, 2014). It shows the transformation 
in the EU’s position against adoption of visa lists and removal of the geographical limitation, 
which signals discontinuation of external pressures in these policy instruments. Such change 
of attitude, is an outcome of the EU Commission and member states’ attempt to maintain the 
credibility of the visa liberalisation road map as a reward for implementing the readmission 
agreement. Readmission has been the prioritised policy instrument in Turkey’s migration 
policy reform agenda, long before other issues were linked to the visa liberalisation road map 
in 2013. Against the background of the Syrian refugee crisis, and with the increasing 
significance of irregular migration through Turkey, the EU has further prioritized 
implementation of the readmission agreement, and did not risk the credibility of the reward 
for this agreement by strongly linking issues of secondary importance, which Turkish 
government actors have strong positions against implementing. As a result, to maintain the 
credibility of this policy conditionality, the Commission has presented some flexibility and 
negotiability on other policy instruments, linked to the visa liberalisation road map. Also, 
within one year between the introduction of the visa liberalisation road map (European 
Commission, 2013) and the publication of the assessment report (European Commission, 
2014), Turkey progressed significantly in establishing the organisation and infrastructure 
necessary for the implementation of the readmission agreement. Such flexibility is also an 
assurance for Turkey to continue its efforts on readmission.  
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9.2.2 Socialisation as a Supportive Mechanism: EU Influence through Ideational Means 
Although the EU has highly influenced the change in the policy field of readmission through 
the vertical mechanism of policy conditionality, in other policy fields, its influence through 
such a conditionality framework remained at a lower level. In the literature, international 
organisations that have limited capacities to use vertical mechanisms of conditionality, 
typically aim to influence policy change through horizontal mechanisms of socialisation, 
assuming that they obtain normative claims on determining the appropriate direction for 
policy (Müller, 1993; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). An overview of the case studies introduced in 
this study, in terms of the means used to influence policy change and the ends that the EU 
aimed to obtain, shows that only policy fields of legislation and asylum partially fit such 
normative claims and are suitable for the EU to influence policy change through horizontal 
mechanisms of socialisation, social policy learning and normative suasion. The aims of 
readmission and visa policies are obvious material gains, and the means the EU uses to 
influence domestic change is conditionality framed around rational choice institutionalism. 
Whereas the EU is expected to benefit from a better institutionalised migration legislation 
and an asylum policy in Turkey, the gains are not as obvious and the means the EU uses to 
influence domestic change include indisputably horizontal mechanisms as well. Moreover, 
the EU’s policy change agenda for Turkey is parallel to policy preferences of international 
organisations that are representative of the international migration regime which suggests EU 
policy preferences are internationally “appropriate.” In the absence of such a parallel, the EU 
significantly loses its power to influence policy in Turkey through socialisation, as these 
organisations, especially the UNHCR, are strongly established in Turkey.  
The EU, due to the limited effect and long time frame of influencing policy change through 
socialisation only facilitates it as a supportive mechanism to conditionality or uses it to 
maintain a low level of influence in policy fields where EU-level actors do not seek rapid 
policy change. In the case of Turkey, these horizontal mechanisms are either supplementary 
to vertical ones or emerge when introduction of any vertical mechanisms is not viable, due 
to member states’ unwillingness to introduce any in areas of lesser significance. For instance, 
the EU has successfully used social policy learning through frequent policy consultation in 
highly technical discussions during the preparation of the Law on Foreigners and 
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International Protection. The Delegation of the EU to Turkey, being the permanent EU 
mission in Turkey, participated in frequent meetings with policy makers and after the 
introduction of the Law, were closely involved with the implementation phase. An attaché 
from the Delegation summarises their involvement as: “We have worked with the Turkish 
authorities in terms of international norms and EU acquis (Official A, 16 January, 2014).” 
Although the EU has the means, including a permanent centralised mission, additional 
missions in the field, inclusion in the policy processes and a normative claim, its power to 
influence domestic change through socialisation is limited. This limited influence is an 
outcome of the changing nature of migration policy in Turkey, where even the most 
technicalised and scientific issues as well as ones defined with a strict international normative 
framework, are influenced by the politicisation of the migration policy area and the absence 
of mutual trust built in parallel to it. For instance, for the removal of the geographical 
limitation clause, the EU has strongly established normative claims, in parallel to 
international Conventions and international organisations. However, suspicions over the 
motives of the union, which are caused by experiences in other policy instruments, like the 
readmission agreement, strip the EU influence through mechanisms of socialisation, most 
significantly, by normative suasion. The Turkish state elite claims such a change coupled 
with the readmission agreement could lead Europe to shift its overall asylum burden to 
Turkey, through safe third country policy .Turkish policy makers initially expect a concrete 
compensation for policy change, in the form of sufficient burden sharing mechanisms, to 
perceive the union as an equally committed partner in policy reform and eventually build 
trust to the EU. This tendency is applicable to all case studies presented here, as only after 
the union presents its commitment by establishing the burden sharing structures with Turkey, 
can it begin to have a normative influence on Turkish migration policies through 
socialisation.  
Established presences of the UNHCR and the IOM in Turkey also limit the EU’s capability 
to establish itself as a normative authority in the country. In policy fields where Turkish 
government officials seek normative legitimisation, they primarily seek it from these 
organisations by legitimising their policies domestically and internationally. Moreover, when 
these organisations’ claims over appropriate behaviour clash with the EU’s, Turkish 
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government officials present these organisations as normatively superior to the EU, which 
the EU Acquis also recognises, and legitimise non-compliance. This most visibly occurred 
when the UNHCR stated the new Turkish legislation sufficiently protected the rights of 
refugees and Turkey should focus on best practices rather than lifting the geographical 
limitation96. In that instance, international contextual factors also diminished the EU’s 
normative power. Especially , after the Syrian asylum mobility escalation began in late 2011, 
not only Turkish domestic actors, but also international actors began to criticise the EU on 
insufficient burden sharing with Turkey as the country rose to become one of the top refugee-
hosting countries worldwide. As the number of Syrians within the country rose above 1.5 
million, in 2014, the country introduced a new Law on Foreigners and International 
protection, which gained praise from international organisations that are active in Turkey for 
legally granting sufficient protection to asylum seekers97. The Commission, to evade 
criticisms on insufficient burden sharing and to abstain from clashing with international 
organisation support of Turkey, backed away from its persistence on the removal of the 
geographical limitation and began to signal its negotiability. These events have blocked EU 
ability to influence Turkish domestic change with normative claims over appropriate 
behaviour.  
In policy fields where the EU had a higher level of influence, the readmission agreement, and 
to a large extent the legislative reform, the union combined a strong issue linkage, more 
precisely the policy conditionality established upon the visa liberalisation road map, with 
financial and technical burden sharing mechanisms. In the policy field of medium level of 
influence, asylum policy, the EU has unsuccessfully sought normative claims to induce 
policy change, though induced changes to a certain level were through the burden sharing 
mechanisms initially established for the other two policy fields, but spilled over to influence 
this one as well. However, the EU had a very low level of influence on Turkish visa policy. 
States claim full sovereignty on visa policy, in the absence of any international norms or 
regulations to govern regular migration. This restricts EU ability to influence policy change 
through socialisation. Due to the lesser importance of the policy field in the member states’ 
                                                          
96 Interview with a middle-rank official from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey, January 15, 2014.  
97 Interviews with officials from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey; and IOM Ankara, Turkey, January 13-17, 2014.  
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domestic agendas, the EU cannot facilitate any vertical mechanisms to influence change 
either. Thus, it is understandable for the EU not to be as influential as the other policy fields 
presented in this study, but to explain the drawbacks from the already implemented 
compliance after 2006, one needs to look further than influences arising from the EU, and 
further than migration policy.  
Unlike the other three policy fields introduced here where Turkish government only needed 
to justify its actions on compliance to the EU, and to its domestic constituencies; the visa lists 
impact relations with third countries, their adoption is a foreign policy decision with 
symbolic, diplomatic and economic implications. Especially after 2006, when the Turkish 
government initiated “visa diplomacy” as a foreign policy goal, the issue of visas extended 
its scope from solely being a sub-heading in Turkish migration policy, it also became a tool 
of foreign policy. As a result, visa policies are not only a representation of state sovereignty 
exempt from external influences; but they also represent Turkish foreign policy’s adaptability 
to other partners when the EU’s credibility in the country is in decline in parallel to the 
country’s accession prospects.  
9.2.3 Turkish Responses to the EU-level Mechanisms: Bargaining, Legitimisation and Re-
framing 
Domestic, international and EU level contextual changes in the last decade empowered 
Turkey to transform itself from being a sole receiver of EU conditionality to a powerful actor 
able to negotiate significant concessions from the EU. At the domestic level, the country’s 
economic development in the last decade and its transformation into a country of 
immigration, generated the need for a coherent migration policy, whereas previous 
discussions for adoption of such a policy were centred on the country’s relationship with the 
EU. This development enabled Turkish policy makers to re-frame policy as a domestic need 
which provided further flexibility in implementation. At the international level, the Syrian 
refugee crisis and the settlement of more than 2.5 million98 registered Syrian asylum seekers 
in Turkey by the end of 2015 granted the country leverage on its negotiations initially on the 
                                                          
98 The data is obtained from the website of the UNHCR Syrian Regional Refugee Response: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224, Retrieved on 19 November, 2015.  
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introduction and afterwards on the implementation of the visa liberalisation road map. At the 
EU level, the decline in the power of accession conditionality, and the establishment of a 
more flexible policy change framework with the visa liberalisation road map, enabled 
Turkish policy makers to influence EU policy preferences and negotiate concessions for 
implementing policy. Against this background, the Turkish government and policy officials 
were empowered to respond to EU-level influence mechanisms, with methods determined in 
accordance with the country’s leverage, generated by the relative significance of policy in 
both Turkey and the EU.  
In policy fields where the EU has signalled some flexibility for adopting a less costly policy 
instrument for Turkey, the Turkish government proceeded with policy negotiations to adopt 
such an alternative, together with negotiating to obtain similar concessions, or more precisely 
assistance, presented by the EU for the EU’s initial policy preferences. This flexibility is due 
to the low level of pressure on the EU Commission by member states for rapidly concluding 
policy in fields of lesser significance. Turkey’s legislative and asylum policy reform are in 
this category where the Turkish government has implemented policy, similar to EU initial 
policy preferences, with the assistance of the EU but without adopting some of the socially, 
economically and politically costly elements, most significantly the removal of the 
geographical limitation. In these policy fields, Turkish policy makers became able to be 
selective from a comprehensive reform package, by re-framing policy beyond their 
relationship with the EU, as a domestic need for a transition country in the midst of being 
recognised as a country of immigration. For instance, a senior official from the Turkish 
Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management suggests: “We want 
to regulate our own migration flows. In the meantime, these efforts also regulate relations 
with the EU and have a positive impact on the readmission agreement (Official A, Ankara, 
17 June, 2015)99.” Turkish government officials and policy elite have perceived and 
legitimised these policy changes as tools to transform migration flows to be beneficial for 
Turkey, instead of turning to their old habit of using EU accession conditionality to legitimise 
                                                          
99 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Biz kendi göçümüzü düzenlemek istiyoruz. Bu AB ile ilişkileri de düzenliyor. 
GKA’ya da pozitif etkisi oluyor.” 
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their actions against practitioners in the field, beginning with the Turkish National Police and 
the Armed Forces.  
As a result, in these policy fields, Turkey executed policy not as an EU conditionality where 
the country fulfils a list of benchmarks presented by the EU, but as a policy change triggered 
by the external influences where policy is implemented as a response to the domestic and 
international context. The EU continued to exert influence on Turkish legislative and asylum 
policy reform directly by the Commission and its Permanent Delegation in Turkey. This re-
framing transformed the process of policy change from being a top-down EU conditionality 
framework to a negotiation process where both parties influenced each other’s policy 
preferences. The policy outcomes did not end up in full compliance with EU policy 
preferences. The legislative reform has introduced new categories for asylum seekers that do 
not have any equivalent in the EU Acquis and Turkey did not even consider lifting the 
geographical limitation. However, these reformed policies were much closer to fulfilling the 
EU’s policy preferences, than their predecessors. Coupled with the context, limiting the EU 
influence on Turkish migration policies, especially the EU’s inability to introduce any 
sufficient burden sharing mechanisms as a response to the Syrian asylum flows, and the 
member states’ unwillingness to introduce incentives for policy change in these areas, the 
EU Commission has settled for the existing outcome. 
On the other hand, since the mid-2000s, in negotiations over the readmission agreement, the 
EU did not signal any flexibility for adopting a less costly policy outcome for Turkey, due to 
the importance of policy for EU member states and high level of pressure the Commission 
was facing to conclude the agreement without any modifications. However, along with the 
usual technical and financial assistance the EU provides to Turkey in the policy area of 
migration, such importance led the Council and the Commission to be more accommodating 
to present incentives to Turkey in the form of compensation for the political costs of the 
agreement. Such a cost-benefit framework enabled the Turkish government to bargain as 
well, by using retractions and threats for non-compliance to increase its gains from the deal 
as much as possible. The Turkish government’s leverage in these negotiations peaked in the 
early 2010s, due to the above-mentioned contextual factors. While EU member states have 
increased their pressure on the Commission to conclude a readmission agreement with 
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Turkey to minimize the expected costs of the asylum and migration flows related to the Arab 
Spring and the Syrian Civil War, the Turkish government’s leverage to negotiate a more 
beneficial deal has increased considerably. While these external factors urged the Council to 
conclude the readmission agreement, some internal factors, beginning with the expected 
stagnation in relations with Turkey under the upcoming Cyprus Council presidency, pushed 
the member states to finalise negotiations in a swift manner. As a result, Turkey became more 
influential and negotiated significant concessions from the EU.  
As a policy instrument where non-compliance has a high political significance for Turkey 
and compliance has a relatively lower significance for the EU, the adoption of EU visa lists 
has the lowest level of mutual influence. The low significance of the policy field for the EU 
has prevented the union from presenting any incentives or compensation, where Turkey could 
build its negotiation position to influence the EU’s position in return. The union also did not 
signal any possibility for flexible compliance, where Turkey could negotiate partial 
compliance, as in the case of Turkey’s legislative reform or the removal of the geographical 
limitation. For the adoption of the visa lists, although the EU’s attitude for full 
implementation remained similar to the readmission agreement; it was not willing to provide 
compensation to Turkey that would justify a cost-benefit calculation. Consequently, although 
the EU’s fixed, a priori determined policy preference resembled rational choice 
institutionalism, the mechanisms for influencing domestic change in such a framework were 
missing. In such an environment where compliance to the EU meant losing the expected 
economic and political gains established by its “visa diplomacy” without any compensation, 
the AKP government has retreated from its endeavour to adopt the EU’s policy preferences 
and introduced a completely diverse visa policy in parallel to the their foreign policy 
alignment. With this new visa policy, the Turkish government further increased the cost of 
adopting the EU’s negative and positive visa lists. As a result, among the case studies 
introduced here, the adoption of the EU’s negative and positive visa lists has remained as the 
only policy field where EU external influence is still attached to accession conditionality and 
the Turkish government postponed compliance after the remote possibility of accession.  
In conclusion, the Turkish government and policy elite chose the mechanisms to influence 
the policy preferences of the EU-level actors, in correspondence to the EU’s chosen 
174 
 
mechanism for influencing policy change, which is determined as a response to the changes 
in the international, EU-level and domestic context. Resulting from an increasing sense of 
urgency in the Commission and the Council to induce policy change in Turkey, in the 
readmission-visa liberalisation deal, the Turkish government did not become a sole receiver 
of EU external influence, but it has influenced the EU’s policy preferences by bargaining 
coherent costs and benefits such as the readmission-visa liberalisation deal. In the policy 
fields where change is not urgent , and the EU signals flexibility, Turkish policy makers have 
influenced EU policy preferences by re-framing policy domestically and presenting these 
new policies as being in the same direction as the EU policy preferences though not fulfilling 
them in fields where Turkish policy makers are apprehensive. When Turkish policy makers 
could legitimise their position with the support of other international organisations, the EU 
also implied contentment with policy. Undertaking policy as a national priority, rather than 
compliance to the EU acquis, has enabled Turkish policy makers to ensure adjustability to 
their policy preferences and apprehensions. While in all of the case studies introduced here, 
Turkey has primarily sought to influence EU policy preferences for either providing further 
incentives in return for a policy change, or for altering EU reform agenda to meet 
apprehensions of Turkish policy makers. In the case of the visa lists, the country has followed 
a completely diverse path. The main reason why the Turkish government did not aim to 
influence EU policy preferences in this policy field is the absence of the mechanisms Turkey 
uses to influence the EU, introduced in the first three cases. Coupled with its foreign policy 
salience, the Turkish government took the position of not negotiating with the EU at all, until 
the policy field becomes highly salient for the union as well, motivating the Council to 
present compensation to meet with the costs of altering Turkey’s foreign policy position.  
9.3 Relationship between the EU and the International Organisations: Indirect 
Influences of Socialisation and Legitimisation  
There is an indirect interaction between international organisations that are active in Turkey 
and the EU, which influences the leverage of each level of actor for influencing policy change 
in Turkey. The IOM and the UNHCR have often benefited from Turkey’s relationship with 
the EU and are empowered by the EU influence on Turkey, undertaking the reform agenda 
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on migration, initiated by the EU through conditionality100. In a similar way, these 
organisations add leverage to the EU-level actors’ policy objectives by normatively 
legitimising EU policy preferences or reducing their leverage by questioning the legitimacy 
of the policy101. Thus, these two levels of actors complement each other on external 
influences, while the EU uses the mechanisms of conditionality and assistance, the 
international organisations contribute by providing legitimisation and normative suasion. 
These actors also support each other in the implementation and assessment of policy. For 
instance IOM Turkey undertakes projects on implementation of the integrated border 
management and UNHCR provides information and feedback to the Delegation of the EU in 
Turkey, regarding Turkey’s asylum system. However, the EU prefers to exclude these 
organisations from politicised negotiation processes, established with strong issue linkages 
and a cost and benefit calculation. Discussions on the limits of the mandates of these 
organisations and the apprehension related to state sovereignty are also present in such 
negotiation processes, which international organisations prefer to avoid.  
Accordingly, for the readmission agreement and visa lists policy instruments, these actors 
did not directly or indirectly influence, or attempt to influence each other. The issue of visas 
is beyond the mandate of international organisations, and there is no precedent for 
international involvement in any country’s visa policy, as it would interrupt the nature of 
state sovereignty. Thus, international organisations do not present any position on state visa 
policies and Turkey was not an exception in this matter. On the other hand, since their first 
introduction, international organisations have been questioning the legitimacy of the EU-
level readmission agreements, because of possible human rights violations related to their 
implementation (UNHCR, 1994). This clash would de-legitimise agreements and cause a 
decline in EU leverage on Turkey, if the union had any normative claims on the issue of 
readmission. However, since the beginning the union has acknowledged the possible political 
costs related to the questionable normative legitimacy of the readmission agreement, and 
built its negotiation position with a focus on compensating them with issue linkages in a cost-
benefit framework. EU strategy on the readmission-visa liberalisation deal was not focused 
                                                          
100 Interviews with officials from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey; and IOM Ankara, Turkey, January 13-17, 2014.  
101 Interviews with the officials from the EU Commission DG Home Affairs and DG Enlargement, Brussels, April 24-30, 
2014.  
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on legitimising it globally by maintaining the support of international organisations, but 
focused on providing compensations to Turkey, for possible reactions the country may face 
in implementing the readmission agreement. When parties established such a strong and 
functioning cost-benefit framework, international organisations who lack those mechanisms 
could not effectively influence policy with claims over legitimacy. Thus, the EU did not seek 
any change of perception in the case of EU-Turkey readmission agreement in these 
organisations’ Turkey offices and did not attempt to gain their support.  
Among the cases that were introduced in this study, the policy fields of legislative and asylum 
policy reform are the only two, where international organisations that are active in Turkey 
have supported the EU by providing legitimacy, but also recently began to challenge EU 
influence. These policy fields are framed with a high level of multilateralism, through 
Turkey’s participation in binding international Conventions and Covenants, as well as its 
membership of international organisations that are responsible for monitoring those. The 
areas of legislative and asylum policy reform contain significant elements that are directly 
within the mandates of these organisations. Thus, after the reform process is initiated, these 
organisations became influential on Turkish policy processes with an advisory status, having 
a permanent seat in policy discussion meetings. However, these organisations have limited 
power to initiate the reform process, with such an advisory status while Turkish policy 
makers seek viable financial or technical assistance or political compensation for initiating a 
reform agenda with external influences. They only campaign for promoting reform in some 
specific policy fields, stating their policy preferences. They do not have the mechanisms for 
issue linkages, conditionality or compensation, except for an idea of normative 
appropriateness.  
However, the EU does and in the policy fields where the policy preferences of the union 
overlap with the IOM and UNHCR these organisations benefit from the EU trigger for 
domestic change through conditionality. EU policy preferences on legislative and asylum 
policy reform in Turkey, not only overlap with these international organisations but they 
were built upon the same principles in the first place. Hence, in the early 2000s, these 
organisations supported the initial EU push for policy reform. They welcomed the 
introduction of a structured reform agenda with the 2005 Action Plan for Asylum and 
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Migration and adopted an advisory status for its implementation. When EU influence over 
Turkey was interrupted in 2006, these organisations distanced themselves from the EU 
reform agenda, to evade a similar interruption in their relationship with Turkey. They 
maintained their positions in Turkish policy change, which they solidified through their 
involvement in policy implementation. A high-ranking official from the UNHCR Turkey 
describes the organisation’s position as having “… benefited from the developments, but also 
kept a certain distance in the process (Official A, Ankara, 14 January, 2014).” In such an 
environment, international organisations that are active in Turkey have been normatively 
supporting the EU. This support is specifically important when there is a political conflict of 
interests between Turkey and the EU, with the possibility of blocking the EU induced reform 
agenda in Turkish migration policies. In such instances, these international organisations who 
make substantial efforts to avoid involvement in these political disagreements, unofficially 
overtake the responsibility to implement the reform agenda and prevent setbacks from 
previous efforts. This happened in the aftermath of the partial freeze in the accession talks in 
the mid-2000s, when international organisations overtook the EU trigger for legislative and 
asylum policy reform in Turkey as advisory bodies with strong claims on appropriate ways 
of behaviour.  
When in conflict with the EU in policy fields where they have socialised in Turkey to 
determine the appropriate ways of behaviour, these international organisations have the 
power to considerably diminish EU influence. In such instances, the EU may establish a 
strong issue linkage, or a policy conditionality to re-frame mechanisms of policy change to 
restrict these organisations’ claims on appropriateness and maintain its influence. However, 
despite such a conflict, if the EU tries to continue maintaining its influence through normative 
claims, its leverage declines considerably and it needs to re-evaluate its policy preferences 
as its claims on appropriateness clash with the UNHCR or the IOM. Such re-evaluation was 
evident in Turkey’s asylum reform, when both the UNHCR and IOM stated their contentment 
with the protection guaranteed with the new Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection102. Both international organisations suggested continuing the reform process in 
                                                          
102 Interviews with officials from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey; and IOM Ankara, Turkey, January 13-17, 2014.  
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the framework of this Law, by ensuring its sufficient implementation. The organisations have 
backed out from their claims on removal of the geographical limitation as the only way of 
providing sufficient protection to the asylum seekers, and accepting such alternative paths as 
being normatively appropriate. The international organisations’ changing position against the 
removal of the geographical limitation have influenced EU policy preferences as Turkish 
policy makers have used such positioning to legitimise the progress by maintaining the 
geographical limitation. Thus, in the end, international organisations indirectly influenced 
EU policy preferences by granting legitimisation to domestic actors, to act in non-compliance 
with the EU. 
In conclusion, the EU supports international organisation involvement in Turkish migration 
policies by initiating a structured reform process in policy fields where EU policy preferences 
are parallel to these organisations. EU support began in the early 2000s, when the union 
presented a structured reform process which had significant parallels to these organisations’ 
policy preferences, and continued during its implementation. The EU has supported the 
leverage of these organisations through conditionality and assistance, while these 
organisations lacked such mechanisms. In return, the EU has benefited from the legitimacy 
provided by these organisations to continue with its reform agenda. However, the EU did not 
facilitate their inclusion to policy processes in areas where the Commission has foreseen a 
possible clash between EU policy preferences and these organisations’. When the policy 
fields overlap, while the initial EU conditionality and assistance enhances these 
organisations’ influence, this influence is maintained through these organisations’ ability to 
transform themselves as principal advisory bodies, rather than implementing agencies of EU 
conditionality. This transformation enables them to maintain their influence even after the 
EU’s ability to support that influence declined dramatically by the mid-2000s, in parallel to 
the decline in the power of accession conditionality. 
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9.4 Relationship between the International Organisations and Turkey: 
Socialisation, Legitimisation and Policy Implementation  
International organisations that are active in Turkey only attempt to influence Turkish policy 
making in the policy fields where a strong multilateral governance framework exists to 
legitimise their involvement in policy processes. In the policy fields where Turkish state’s 
claims over sovereignty dominate policy preferences, the governments perceive international 
organisation involvement as an interruption of state sovereignty. Furthermore, in policy 
fields where the EU has established policy as a rationalist negotiation process, by introducing 
incentives dear to the Turkish government, these organisations’ influence on Turkish policy 
preferences are reduced to a minimum, and their involvement is only sought in the 
implementation processes. In such cases, presented with the readmission agreement-visa 
liberalisation deal in this study, the negotiations proceed independent of any normative 
claims, while the EU is the sole source of external influence.  
To maintain their presence in the policy making processes, both the UNHCR and the IOM 
balance their priorities on migration policy change in Turkey by taking these apprehensions 
into account. Turkey has a centralised tradition in policy making where state and government 
bodies exclusively participate in policy making without any involvement of international and 
non-governmental organisations. However, this trend is changing for technical policy 
instruments of migration management. Since the establishment of the Directorate General for 
Migration Management in 2008, Turkish policy elite is granting these organisations direct 
inclusion in policy making discussions in these more technical fields, together with excluding 
them from more politicised ones, and indicating overall exclusion from migration policy 
areas if they try to get involved in the areas they are excluded from. These organisations 
value direct participation in policy making processes. It is the most efficient way of 
influencing migration policy in Turkey, considering the low level of public or political 
interest in migration makes it ineffective to influence policy decision making through 
pressuring the government by raising awareness. Thus, to maintain their influence in direct 
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contact with policy makers, these organisations avoid presence in politically contested policy 
fields, where the government prefers a more centralised decision making103.  
For instance, both the UNHCR and the IOM have internationally stated their position against 
the readmission agreements in reference to possible human rights abuses related to these 
agreements, most noticeably, refugee refoulement with a chain of readmissions (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1994). However, although these organisations were 
present in policy decision meetings preparing the new Law, which were undertaken in 
parallel to negotiations on the readmission agreement, these organisations have refrained 
from presenting their policy preferences on readmission, in respect of the centralised 
negotiation process. In another instance, after the introduction of the new Law on Foreigners 
and International Protection, these organisations have considerably changed their approach 
against the removal of the geographical limitation. Despite their international offices 
implementing refugee protection worldwide in the framework of the Geneva Convention, 
these organisations agreed to implement an alternative form of protection in Turkey. Due to 
the increased number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, which politicised the issue of refugee 
protection, Turkey offices of these organisations were content with the new Law considering 
the domestic context of Turkey, and guaranteed inclusion in the implementation phase104. 
Their ability to distinguish politically charged areas from technical ones, and maintaining an 
advisory technical body’s status by situating themselves in the field have ensured direct 
involvement of these international organisations in Turkish migration policy making.  
This direct involvement has most noticeably emerged in areas of legislative and asylum 
policy reform, through mechanisms of socialisation, normative suasion and social policy 
learning. In both policy fields, although the reform process was initiated by the EU trigger, 
established upon accession conditionality, as EU power to influence Turkish policy change 
began to decline by the mid-2000s, these organisations undertook reform in these policy 
fields. With a logic of appropriateness, and utmost attention to keep the reform agenda on 
legislation and asylum policy immune from disturbance related to EU-Turkey accession 
negotiations, these organisations have influenced Turkish policy change as advisory bodies. 
                                                          
103 Interviews with officials from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey; and IOM Ankara, Turkey, January 13-17, 2014.  
104 Interviews with officials from the UNHCR Ankara, Turkey; and IOM Ankara, Turkey, January 13-17, 2014.  
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The long term presence of these organisations in policy implementation in Turkey and their 
active involvement in the field, in areas such as refugee status determination and resettlement, 
enabled them to more effectively socialise with their Turkish counterparts in policy 
implementation, as well as with Turkish policy makers. This long-term socialisation, not only 
built trust, which is essential for establishing a normative power, but also enabled these 
organisations to embrace the peculiarities and sensitivities related to Turkish migration 
policies and shape their influences accordingly. As a result, these organisations’ policy 
preferences were established with a case-specific perspective, and gained acceptance to 
influence policy change, with solely normative mechanisms.  
The domestic context in Turkey also helped to increase these organisations’ influence in 
shaping policy preferences of the Turkish policy elite. Before the Syrian mobility in Turkey 
reached alarming numbers in 2013105, policy change in Turkish migration legislation and 
asylum policies were technicalised and de-politicised. Turkish public opinion, political 
parties or interest groups did not have any strong opinions on these policy changes. For 
instance a senior external affairs official from the UNHCR Turkey suggests that “on the one 
hand, lack of information and interest (on migration) are working to our advantage (Official 
A, Ankara, 14 January, 2014)106.” This de-politicisation enabled international organisations 
to be influential in policy processes, which otherwise could be restricted due to political 
sensitivities related to policy. Also, at the institutional level, the establishment of the Bureau 
for Migration Management, specifically to undertake reform of Turkish migration policies 
and afterwards transformed into the Directorate General for Migration Management 
(DGMM), has increased these organisations influence. The DGMM partnered the UNHCR 
and IOM, both for seeking advice, but also for legitimising the reform agenda against other 
national stakeholders, who also accept these international organisations as normative 
authorities. In such a context, these organisations have played the role of mediator among 
government officials, bureaucrats and the law enforcement officers. This partnership enabled 
these organisations to participate in the policy processes of the Law on Foreigners and 
                                                          
105 In January 2013, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey have reached 175,000. Although the border 
crossings have begun in December 2011, the problems related with such mobility became a topic of political discussion 
only by 2013.  
106 The original Turkish text is as follows: “Bilgi ve ilgisizlik bir yandan aleyhimize çalışan bir şey.” 
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International Protection, and as a result, to directly influence the policy making as advisory 
bodies in the policy meetings. These case studies show that, in the policy fields where the 
IOM and UNHCR have used the mechanism of socialisation efficiently, having been in the 
field for a long time, and domestically acknowledged as normative authorities, they have 
succeeded in transforming the EU-triggered reform agenda with a logic of appropriateness.  
In conclusion, international organisations that are active in Turkey maintain their influence 
in the technical policy discussions of migration policy change, such as the legislative and 
asylum policy reform and withdraw their persistence from politically contested policy 
instruments, such as the readmission agreement, to prevent exclusion from the overall 
migration policy making processes. These organisations have benefited from the EU trigger, 
but successfully distanced themselves from it when accession related disputes between the 
EU and Turkey began to hamper the progress of migration policy reform and continued to 
influence policy making as purely technical advisory bodies. Their influence was based on 
their active socialisation in the field which built trust and made these organisations sensitive 
to the peculiarities of Turkish migration policy making. Establishment of a new Directorate 
General for Migration Management in Turkey, which was initially an inexperienced but 
cooperative and transparent body, have further facilitated the inclusion of these organisations 
in policy processes. These organisations have directly influenced policy making and the final 
product of Turkish legislative and asylum policy reform has been parallel to their policy 
preferences, in which representatives of these organisations are content.  
9.5 Conclusion: Drivers of policy and the Mechanisms of Influence  
In this chapter, with an analysis based on the actor relationships, I have identified variations 
in actor influences during the policy processes, the relationships beyond EU influence on 
Turkey that hinder, or support EU influence; and Turkish attempts to use these other 
relationships to enhance its influence on the EU. In this chapter I suggest the relative 
influences of actors, vary in the course of time, and are the direct outcomes of mechanisms 
used to influence policy; and the domestic and international context upon which these 
mechanisms are established. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the policy 
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conditionality framework introduced by the EU, established upon the visa liberalisation road 
map is the most influential mechanism. In Turkish migration policy change, conditionality 
has remained an exclusive EU level mechanism, due to the incapacity of the migration-
related international organisations to introduce such a cost-benefit structure. However, 
international organisations have used mechanisms of socialisation, social policy learning and 
normative suasion more successfully than the EU, resulting from the trust they have 
established with policy makers and implementing bodies.  
These two types of external influences, conditionality and socialisation are not mutually 
exclusive. The EU-level and international organisations support or undermine each other’s 
influence through these mechanisms. For instance, during legislative and asylum policy 
reform, these influences have supported each other, while each became relatively more 
effective in different phases of the policy processes. In the early stages of reform, the EU has 
triggered domestic change through accession conditionality and introduced a structured 
reform agenda to Turkey. When the power of the EU accession conditionality began to 
decline in 2006, international organisations that are active in Turkey undertook 
implementation of this reform agenda with a logic of appropriateness, by normative suasion 
and social policy learning. Although during this time these organisations did not make any 
considerable progress, prevention of a total abandonment of the reform process ended up 
being valuable for the EU as the union aspired to maintain its relation on migration-related 
issues with Turkey, despite stagnation in accession negotiations. When the union began to 
introduce new financial and technical assistance packages and visa liberalisation policy 
conditionality, the process benefited from this continuity, ensured by international 
organisations. Moreover, international organisations have elevated EU influence by 
legitimising policy to domestic actors in Turkey, including approximately twenty one 
ministries, the Turkish National Police and Armed Forces, who perceive the IOM and the 
UNHCR as representatives of appropriate behaviour, empowered by their long term presence 
in Turkey and bottom-up socialisation in the field, but sceptical about EU motivations.  
Besides this support, there are instances when international organisation power to legitimise 
policy in Turkey has ended up undermining EU leverage on Turkey. In consideration of the 
removal of the geographical limitation, by showing contentment with protection provided by 
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the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and stating the redundancy of continuing 
discussions on the geographical limitation, these organisations have provided Turkish policy 
makers leverage to legitimately pursue their policy preferences to provide refugee protection 
together with maintaining the geographical limitation, against EU policy preferences. The 
opposite of this disempowerment has occurred in the negotiation process on the readmission 
agreement, when the EU established a politically valuable issue linkage for Turkey and the 
Turkish policy elite have entirely excluded other parties from policy discussions and 
undermined the influence of international organisations. The indirect, but complex interplay 
between the EU and the international organisations, has been one of the main determinants 
of each level of actors’ influence in Turkey.  
In a like manner, in the case of visa lists, a policy field where states claim to full sovereignty 
disrupts the involvement of international organisations in policy making (Koslowski, 2011), 
Turkish government relationships with non-EU member states has provided Turkey leverage 
in its relationship with the EU. In an era when Turkish prospects for accession were 
dramatically low, Turkish governments have framed their “visa diplomacy” as a 
manifestation of the change in their foreign policy alignment, while the visa issue was 
elevated to the hard politics of foreign policy from more technicalised migration policy 
negotiations. This elevation has further empowered Turkey to adopt a harder bargaining 
position on adoption of the visa lists. Turkish governments were empowered and gained 
further leverage against the EU resulting from their relations with third parties, either by 
legitimising the Turkish position against the EU in the case of international organisations, or 
empowering its bargaining power in the case of non-EU member states. 
The other main determinant of influence in these relationships, is the international, EU-level 
and Turkish domestic context. This is the main determinant of the sense of urgency, which 
causes member state pressure on the Commission to quickly conclude policy in Turkey. This 
sense of urgency determines the mechanisms the EU Commission facilitates, which shapes 
Turkish responses to gain leverage in return. In the last decade, the main international context 
that shaped the external influences on Turkish migration policies has been the mass asylum 
mobility from the Middle East, initially emerging as a result of the Arab Spring and 
afterwards continuing with the Syrian Civil War. Transit mobility of these asylum seekers, 
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through Turkey to EU member states has been the main trigger for the Council to expand 
components of the incentives to be offered to Turkey as compensation to rapidly conclude 
the readmission agreement. Within this context, the Council gave a mandate to the 
Commission to negotiate visa liberalisation with Turkey, in return for a readmission 
agreement. Moreover, in the following years, with increasing number of asylum seekers in 
Turkey; and Turkish and international level criticisms directed to the EU for insufficient 
burden sharing, this international context has further declined the leverage of the EU against 
Turkey and entrapped the Union to show at least some flexibility for implementation of the 
EU reform agenda in Turkey.  
While the international context has considerably strengthened Turkey’s leverage for 
obtaining considerable concessions from the EU, the EU-level context have also supported 
Turkey’s hand. In light of these international developments and as the increase in asylum 
mobility through Turkey is expected to continue, the Denmark Council Presidency, serving 
in the first term of 2012, was determined to conclude the readmission agreement with Turkey 
during its term, before the upcoming Cyprus Presidency would possibly block the relations 
with Turkey. Therefore, Denmark systematically pressured members of the Council with this 
sense of urgency and the EU’s incapability to risk an interruption in its migration policy 
relations with Turkey. This sense of urgency led the Denmark Council Presidency to add all 
issues of concern by member states to the visa liberalisation road map, in which upcoming 
reports on its implementation would signal considerable flexibility. Finally, the Commission 
was granted a mandate to offer this visa liberalisation road map to Turkey, in return for the 
readmission agreement within Denmark’s term. This EU-level domestic institutional 
mechanism of rotating Council Presidency, has been one of the main contextual determinants 
of EU relative influence on Turkey, which set a time limit to conclude a deal and as a result 
more quickly granted Turkey some concessions the country had been seeking. If the Council 
would not foresee a possible interruption with the Cyprus presidency, without doubt both 
parties would seek a more elaborate discussion of the preparation of the visa liberalisation 
road map. Under such circumstances, the agreement was rapidly concluded, but with further 
room for negotiations during the implementation phase.  
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At the Turkish-domestic level, the establishment of the Directorate General for Migration 
Management (DGMM) under the Turkish Ministry of Interior, with a direct emphasis on 
Europeanisation and the need for an institution to implement EU conditionalities on 
migration policy, has been a facilitator for EU and international organisation influence on 
Turkey. Replacing some units situated under a diverse number of ministries, the DGMM was 
established as a unified agency, specifically to undertake Turkish migration policy reform, 
and consequentially, it has become the main respondent for the external influences on 
Turkey. This new unit was established with a technical mission and it has continued its 
existence as a technical body in close cooperation with academia, non-governmental 
organisations, international organisations and the Delegation of the EU in Turkey. As an 
inexperienced body it aims to make up for this with a cooperative attitude. The DGMM 
granted direct presence to these units in Turkish legislative and asylum policy reform. The 
DGMM does not negotiate with the EU over concessions and incentives to be demanded, 
where the domestic change is structured as a rational choice bargaining framework. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs concludes such negotiations while the DGMM is oriented 
towards the best implementations with a focus towards demanding technical and financial 
assistance from the EU. This division of labour also grants the DGMM relative immunity 
from politics related to EU-Turkey negotiations which enables it to be an honest broker 
between agencies responsible for policy implementation in the field, such as the Turkish 
National Police and the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
In this chapter, I have identified the relation between the EU and Turkey as the main 
determinant of Turkish migration policies. The main mechanism determining the influence 
of this relationship is policy conditionality, framed around a cost-benefit structure, with 
rational choice institutionalism. Although not as influential, the financial and technical aid 
packages, emerge from the EU’s characteristic as a civilian power also support EU influence 
on policy change in Turkey. The relationship between international organisations and the EU 
exerts indirect influences. In policy fields of convergent policy preferences, the EU supports 
the influence of international organisations through conditionality while international 
organisations support the EU influence by providing legitimisation to EU policy preferences. 
Whereas the relationship between the international organisations and Turkey functions 
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directly through socialisation and influences policy in the country. Moreover, these 
organisations also indirectly influence Turkish policy change, through empowering or 
disempowering Turkish leverage against the EU. While both international, EU-level and 
Turkish domestic level contexts were shaped to enable an increase in the influence of Turkey 
to enhance its gains from this policy change, the Commission has benefited from the sense 
of urgency in the migration policy area to gain a mandate to influence policy change in 
Turkey directly in a negotiation framework and the international organisations were directly 
included in the policy processes as an outcome of the same context.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
In this thesis, I study Turkish migration policies over the last decade. My research question 
is “How does the changing constellation of the relations between the EU, international 
organisations and Turkey shape Turkish migration policies? How does it vary across the 
policy fields and over time?” My perspective takes migration policies as an outcome of the 
interactions and negotiations between the EU, international organisations and domestic 
migration governance. In contrast to approaches that emphasise external influences, and most 
significantly the EU’s influence over the candidate countries (Börzel & Risse, 2000; 
Lavenex, 2002; Boswell, 2003; Grabbe, 2005; Bicchi, 2006; Baracani, 2009; Dedja, 2012; 
Langbein & Wolczuk, 2012), that see candidate and third countries, such as Turkey primarily 
as a recipient of EU power (Macmillan, 2002; Içduygu, 2007; Kubicek, 2011; Oğuzlu, 2012), 
I contend that there are benefits to attributing a more active role to Turkey by defining 
migration policy as an outcome of the interrelationships between the external and domestic 
actors. Changes in the respective domains of international relations, Turkey’s relationship 
with the EU, and internal to migration governance are all factors that shape the ways each 
actor exerts influence. Hence there are multi-directional influence flows for shaping the 
policy outcome. I show that each actor’s relative power to influence policy varies according 
to the specific context factors of policy type, time and relative balance of power between the 
actors.  
The study has a ‘double’ comparative research design across four cases of migration policy 
decision-making and by actor-type. This cross-field and cross-actor comparative design 
allows us to investigate the research question, by examining each actor’s efforts to exert 
influence relative to the others, and in relation to four specific policy cases. I analyse an 
aspect of policy from each of the main four fields of Turkish migration policy: legislative 
reform (Law on Foreigners and International Protection), irregular migration (EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement), regular migration (adoption of the EU’s visa lists) and asylum 
(removal of the geographical limitation clause from the 1951 Refugee Convention). I 
structure this concluding chapter around the outcomes of each one of these policy elements, 
and synthesize the empirical findings of the thesis, in order to address the formation of the 
respective policy outcomes. First I look at how the actor’s influence efforts relative to each 
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other lead to specific policy outcomes. Then, I discuss the main factors contributing to 
variance in policy outcomes, in order to generalise about when, why, and in what ways, the 
EU, domestic actors, and international organisations are influential relative to one another. 
10.1 Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
In the case of migration policy decision-making for the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, I find that this is shaped primarily by the policy preferences of actors from within 
Turkish domestic migration governance. However, the outcome was also able to satisfy the 
other actors, due to the flexibility in their policy preferences, around basic principles. In this 
policy field, Turkey re-claimed authority over its migration legislation, although this issue 
was initially triggered by the EU in the framework of the accession conditionality. After the 
decline in Turkey’s accession prospects in mid-2000s, the EU aimed to maintain its influence 
on the content of the legislation via a “spill-over” influence from the negotiations for a 
readmission agreement-visa liberalisation deal. However, despite this, the Directorate 
General for Migration Management under the Turkish Ministry of Interior, has been able to 
re-frame the Law as a domestic need and thereby limited the EU influence on the process.  
Turkish policy makers’ ability to do this was facilitated by the highly technical nature of the 
policy, the timing of the legislation, and their ability to gain leverage from the differences 
between the EU and international organisations. The technical nature of the policy led to 
participatory processes where multiple domestic and international actors were able to 
contribute to the policy outcome as consultants (Thomas, 2009). This would not have been 
possible under conditions of politicisation. Important in this move towards an inclusive 
approach has been the establishment of the Directorate General for Migration Management 
in 2008. This also facilitated the participation of international organisations in policy 
processes and thereby challenged the EU’s exclusive presence as an external influence on 
Turkish legislative reform. Additional factors that led to a participatory approach are the 
timing of the legislative reform and inexperience of the newly founded Directorate. The 
Directorate was only three years old when the Syrian asylum movements to Turkey began in 
2011, and the need for an all-encompassing asylum and migration legislation became an 
urgent matter. This sense of urgency initially facilitated the transformation of the legislative 
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reform to a matter of national interest, and restricted the EU’s power to assert further terms. 
In such an environment, the UNHCR and IOM were able to increase their influence by direct 
participation around the policy table as consultants. Turkish policy makers saw these 
organisations as experts with grounded normative power due to their established presence in 
the field and their inclusion also added legitimacy (Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2011). This 
provided an opportunity for these organisations to input social policy learning and normative 
suasion in the Turkish policy making processes. The actors in Turkish Migration governance, 
not only benefit from these organisations’ expertise, but they also use their involvement for 
legitimising the policy outcomes (against the EU). Their presence in the policy processes 
grants Turkish policy makers the means to restrict the EU’s presence in the policy processes 
as an agent of “appropriate behaviour”. Thus, Turkey gains leverage to advance its domestic 
migration interests by using the one external source, the international organisations, against 
the other, the EU. 
10.2 EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement 
The negotiation process of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement should be seen within the 
framework of changing relationship between the EU and Turkey. Although the readmission 
agreement was initially part of the accession conditionality policy transference framework, 
the parties established a new negotiation process in response to the political significance and 
urgency of the matter. This ran parallel to and was partially independent from accession 
conditionality. In this way the static compliance framework of accession, where the EU’s 
demands and presented incentives are strictly fixed, was replaced by a dynamic negotiation 
process of policy conditionalities (Langbein & Wolczuk, 2012; Langbein & Börzel, 2013), 
where each party was able to make demands. This led to a more open context for negotiations 
between the actors.  
In addition, the highly politicised nature of irregular migration combined with a sense of 
urgency and perceived need for a cooperative response, led the EU to seek to exert its 
influence through a credible conditionality framework in this more open process, while 
providing Turkey the opportunity to negotiate further concessions. Against the backdrop of 
Syrian refugee crisis, the EU presented a concrete incentive to Turkey by proposing visa 
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liberalisation. The significance of signing a readmission agreement with Turkey for the EU, 
the political value of establishing a visa free regime with the EU for Turkey and the need of 
both parties to cooperate to manage the irregular flows emerging from the Syrian Civil War, 
all accelerated the process and led both parties, and in particular the EU, to be more 
compromising and cooperative. Within the negotiation process, Turkey was active negotiator 
seeking further concessions from the EU, while pursuing its own migration interests. 
Effectively, Turkey became relatively empowered during the long negotiation process as a 
result of the changing context in its neighbourhood. Turkey was able to gain substantial 
concessions from the EU. The tight and closed nature of the negotiations between the EU 
Commission and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led to few opportunities for any third 
party, including the international organisations, to be directly involved in the policy 
discussions. 
10.3 Turkish Visa Policy and Adoption of the EU Visa Lists 
Turkey’s visa policies are shaped by domestic decisions following the country’s perceived 
foreign policy alignment and economic interests. Turkey applies a cost-benefit calculation to 
making decisions that leads to policy outcomes of non-compliance with the EU. The EU’s 
influence over Turkish visa policies, or to be more precise over enforcing Turkish compliance 
with the EU’s positive and negative visa lists, has been declining. This is especially the case 
since Turkey’s accession prospects began to wane in late 2006, after the negotiation Chapters 
were blocked first by Cyprus and then by France. Since 2006, Turkey has tried to establish 
new economic and diplomatic ties with non-EU partners, with a foreign policy based on visa 
arrangements, called “visa diplomacy.” In the absence of credible incentives from the EU, 
Turkish officials refused to comply and started to build better co-operative relations with 
bordering countries in the region. Thus, Turkey expects clear and tangible incentives from 
the EU in order to take on the risks of potentially damaging such relations with its neighbours.  
Aiming to benefit from the political significance of visa liberalisation for the Turkish 
government, the Commission added the adoption of the EU’s visa lists as a policy 
conditionality to the visa liberalisation road map (European Commission, 2013). However, 
Turkish officials perceived this as the Commission’s attempt to persuade the member states 
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and the Council to rapidly grant a mandate for a negotiation framework, and for signing the 
readmission agreement, prior to the potential difficulty of Cyprus’ term. Thus, Turkey 
expected more flexibility, which then limited the EU’s relative influence in the visa 
liberalisation road map. Turkish officials’ views on state sovereignty and national interest 
and their emphasis on keeping this policy element as an accession conditionality, created the 
possibility of a negative spill over for implementing the visa liberalisation road map. The 
Commission indeed showed flexibility in the subsequent discussions leading to progress 
reports, by replacing strict demands with a loose and indefinite language. This gave Turkey 
the possibility to exempt its valued trade partners from visas and maintain its visa diplomacy 
(European Commission, 2014). Thus, as the EU’s capabilities are largely limited to shaping 
changes in the visa liberalisation road map, this policy field remains as an accession 
conditionality. This postponement accommodates Turkish policy preferences. All ministerial 
actors interviewed during this study stated that the government position is to stall the 
implementation of this policy change after the accession. The politicised nature of visa 
policies shaped by a bi-lateral bargaining process meant that international organisations were 
not involved. Thus, the decisive actors in shaping the policy are from Turkish migration 
governance. Strengthened by the multifaceted nature of the policy field, they framed issues 
with a cost-benefit calculation based on foreign policy and economic interests (Kotzian, 
2007; Piedrafita, 2012). Such framings relatively limited the scope for EU influence and to 
some degree the EU was ‘entrapped’ and made to put its policy preferences back to the 
accession framework.  
10.4 Removal of the Geographical Limitation 
Regarding ‘geographical limitation’, EU influence has also remained relatively limited as 
there have been few incentives for policy change. In a similar pattern to visas, the removal 
of the geographical limitation is an accession conditionality. It is also a policy linked to the 
visa liberalisation road map conditionality framework, though this became less the case over 
time. Turkish government actors were able to legitimate their position by cooperating with 
international organisations (Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2011) while undermining the EU 
by joining the widespread criticism over the EU’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In 
this way Turkey gained significant leverage to negotiate some degree of flexibility over the 
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EU’s visa liberalisation policy conditionality, and to maintain the geographical limitation 
within its asylum legislation.  
Similar to the case of legislative reform, in the asylum policy field, the Directorate General 
for Migration Management’s technical approach facilitated participation by the international 
organisations. Here, the UNHCR’s strong mandate and the presence of a multilateral 
framework of asylum, meant that it became not just a policy consultant but a normative 
authority for Turkish policy makers to justify their goals. As the UNHCR and IOM expressed 
their support for the Turkish approach to refugee protection, they moved away from an 
insistence on the removal of the geographical limitation towards an emphasis on ‘best 
practices’ within existing policies. In this way the EU lost some of its leverage over its 
preferred policy preference for the removal of the geographical limitation. Likewise the EU 
was made to accept Turkey’s legislative reform as a sufficient measure for refugee protection, 
due to the onset of the Syrian civil war and Turkey’s response to asylum seekers. Turkey 
gained praise from the international community for its open border policy for the Syrians and 
its newly adopted legislation granted the Syrian asylum seekers certain rights that were 
considered adequate by the international organisations. By 2016, Turkey became host to the 
world’s largest refugee population. This meant that the EU’s claims that it was necessary to 
remove the geographical limitation became less relevant. The Turkish policy elite would have 
viewed any further EU pressure for the removal of the geographical limitation with suspicion. 
Hence the EU showed more flexibility in the following discussions and reports on the 
implementation of Turkey’s visa liberalisation road map. It lifted its earlier emphasis on the 
removal of the geographical limitation. Overall, on asylum policy, Turkish policy makers 
have benefited from the international support, both for the new asylum legislation, and also 
for the country’s attitude towards the Syrian refugee crisis. This enabled them to legitimise 
their position for providing refugee protection without removing the geographical limitation, 
based on the support of the international organisations, and to some degree released the 
country from EU pressures.  
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10.5 A Generalisation of Factors that Shape Actor Influences  
In an attempt to present the main factors contributing to variance in policy outcomes and 
generalise the times, policy types, and the ways; the EU, domestic actors, and international 
organisations are influential relative to one another, some themes stand out. Table 10.1 
summarises these themes and unpacks the factors that form the actor influences relative to 
one another in shaping Turkish migration policy. The initial theme presented in the Table is 
the dependence of the EU’s power on credible conditionality. EU relative influence is 
dominant in the policy areas with a credible conditionality, whereas the influence of other 
actors increase, in the policy areas without one. A second theme that clearly stands out is the 
level of technicalisation and politicisation embedded in each policy type. While 
technicalisation leads to participatory processes and facilitates the inclusion and influence of 
the international organisations, politicisation leads to centralisation and exclusion. By the 
same token, policy fields with a higher level of technicalisation are more welcoming to 
normative pressures and influence mechanisms of socialisation; while politicisation leads to 
rational choice institutionalism and mechanisms of conditionality, based on a realist cost-
benefit calculation. A third theme is the role of time and international context. As Table 10.1 
shows, the urgency for a quick response to the crisis situations leads the EU to introduce 
credible short-term incentives, such as policy conditionality frameworks. In the policy fields 
where such an urgency is absent, the EU condones the stalling of the policy change by 
maintaining the relations in the not any more credible accession conditionality framework. 
And the final theme that stands out in Table 10.1 is Turkey’s tendency to set the external 
influences against each other to benefit from the relative balance of power. This becomes 
specifically relevant when Turkey collaborates with the international organisations on policy 
change and the international organisations legitimise Turkish position against the EU policy 
preferences. As expected, this kind of empowerment for Turkey is only relevant in the 
technicalised policy areas, where participation by the international organisations is 
welcomed. In remaining parts of this chapter, I will focus on these themes to present a general 
position on the actors’ relative influences under different conditions.   
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Table 10.1: Factors that Shape the Influence of Actors Relative to One Another in Shaping 
Turkish Migration Policy  
 The Law on 
Foreigners and 
International 
Protection 
EU-Turkey 
readmission 
agreement 
Visa policy 
and adoption 
of the EU’s 
visa lists 
Removal of the 
geographical 
limitation 
EU - Accession 
conditionality 
- Spill-over 
influence from 
the readmission-
visa liberalisation 
deal 
- Accession 
conditionality 
- Link to visa 
liberalisation  
- Strong and 
credible policy 
conditionality 
framework 
- Accession 
conditionality 
- Link to visa 
liberalisation  
- Possibility of 
negative spill 
over 
- Flexibility  
- Accession 
conditionality 
- Link to visa 
liberalisation 
- De-legitimisation 
through 
international 
support to Turkey  
- Flexibility  
International 
Organisations  
- Technicalisation  
- Participation 
- Policy 
consultancy 
- Normative 
pressures 
- Legitimisation  
- Politicisation 
- Centralisation 
- Exclusion 
- Politicisation  
- Centralisation 
- Absence of a 
mandate 
- Exclusion  
- Technicalisation 
- Participation 
- Strong mandate 
- Consultancy  
- Normative 
Pressures  
- Legitimisation  
Turkish 
Domestic 
Migration 
Governance 
- International 
context (Syrian 
Civil War) 
- Time (need for 
rapid response) 
- Re-framing as a 
domestic need 
- Setting the 
external 
influences against 
each other 
- International 
context (Syrian 
Civil War) 
- Time (need for 
rapid response) 
- Dynamic 
negotiation 
process 
- Cost-benefit 
calculation 
- Rationalist 
bargaining 
- Economy and 
foreign policy 
framing 
- “Visa-
diplomacy” 
- Cost-benefit 
calculation 
- Rationalist 
bargaining 
- Stalling until 
accession  
- International 
context (Syrian 
Civil War) 
- Presenting 
alternative policy 
for refugee 
protection 
- Setting the 
external 
influences against 
each other  
4 Factors that Shape the Influence of Actors Relative to One Another in Shaping Turkish Migration Policy 
The EU influence in Turkish migration policies is strongest when a policy field is driven by 
conditionality in a context where Turkish accession appears credible. Prior to 2006, the EU 
was influential through accession conditionality. Although the progress of policy reform was 
slow, Turkey’s actions on migration policy change were oriented towards compliance. By 
2006, with the decline of accession prospects, Turkey began to undertake policy changes in 
the opposite direction of compliance, especially in its visa policies. For Turkey’s prioritised 
policy field of irregular migration, the EU initially linked this to the readmission agreement 
and visa liberalisation, thus preventing any setback in the negotiations. Subsequently this 
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evolved into the visa liberalisation road map, a comprehensive policy conditionality 
document, including all of the policy elements analysed here, and many others, as conditions 
for granting Turkey a visa-free regime with the EU (European Commission, 2013).  
Turkey signed and began the implementation of the readmission agreement in the scope of 
this policy conditionality framework, while it sought and to a large extent secured, greater 
flexibility for policy change in other areas. This variation in the EU’s influence while it uses 
the same conditionality mechanisms, is mainly explained by the degree of politicisation of a 
specific policy field and the credibility of the issues link to conditionality. A high degree of 
politicisation matters because it tends to result in a centralised, focussed and structured 
negotiation process where parties bargain for pursuing their migration interests. In short, it 
brings parties to the table and makes things happen. Under conditions of politicisation, the 
progress of the policy change depends largely on the credibility of the conditionality 
mechanism. It becomes a rational cost-benefit calculation. From the Turkish perspective, 
policy compliance occurs when conditionality appears credible and is sufficient to outweigh 
the cost of the policy reform. This occurred in the readmission agreement. Non-compliance 
by Turkey tends to occur when accession seems less credibile and the costs of policy reform 
appear higher than the gains for compliance with the EU, as in the case of visa lists. In policy 
fields such as legislative reform and asylum that are less politicised and more technocratic, 
this context tends to facilitate the inclusion and participation of other domestic and 
international actors in the process, both as consultants and legitimating authorities. In this 
situation Turkish government actors tend to gain leverage over other sources of influence, 
and limit the EU’s power by disrupting the conditionality mechanism.  
The study presents evidence for a relative increase in the EU’s influence in a policy 
conditionality framework, while the EU’s stress on accession conditionality gradually 
declines. While Turkey seeks a return to the accession conditionality framework in the policy 
fields where it seeks to stall the policy change as long as possible, the EU only resorts to such 
mechanism in the politically less significant policy fields, where it can risk delays in policy 
compliance. EU influence tends to be strongest when a policy field is driven by credible 
prospects of realising conditionality, and the basis of conditionality is changing from long 
term accession conditionality to issue-specific, short-term and politically viable policy 
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conditionalities. Current events also support this view. Even against the backdrop of the 
Syrian refugee crisis, during the negotiation process of the EU-Turkey migration agreement 
dated 18 March 2016, the EU member states could not agree upon opening the Chapter 24, 
for undertaking the reform agenda under the relevant chapter of the accession framework. 
Instead, the EU has once more presented an acceleration of the visa liberalisation process as 
an incentive to Turkey, along with financial aid, and opened the Chapter 33. Our findings 
coupled with recent events, suggest that EU influence over Turkish migration policies, will 
proceed with policy conditionalities, which are incentives and concessions established 
outside of the accession process.  
The main role of international organisations is to add value to the decision making, especially 
in the more technical and less politicised policy fields. In such cases international 
organisations tend to directly participate in the policy making and input social policy learning 
and normative suasion. Their expertise facilitates quick responses to emergency crisis 
situations. For instance, the preparation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
accelerated due to their expertise on specified priorities. Given their long-time involvement 
in policy implementation, the Turkish government has seen the international organisations 
as sources of appropriate and legitimate behaviour. Thus, they value cooperation with the 
international organisations during the policy processes for legitimising the policy outcomes 
domestically, and at the same time providing a counterbalance to EU power. However, in the 
policy fields with a high level of politicisation, Turkish policy makers centralise the 
negotiations with the EU and exclude the international organisations from the policy decision 
making processes. In sum, international organisations are more influential when a policy field 
is technical and there are calls for their expertise, for example, in times of crisis, or 
alternatively, when Turkish government actors need their approval to legitimise a position 
and take a stance against the EU.  
Finally, Turkish government actors tend to engage in hard rational choice bargaining. They 
use international negotiations, context and timing, strategically, to gain concessions from the 
EU, while pursuing their own domestic migration goals. Such a bargaining approach by 
Turkey officials has been facilitated by the transformation of Turkey’s relationship with the 
EU, in particular, the replacement of the accession with policy conditionalities. This has 
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effectively reduced the asymmetry in the power relations between EU and Turkey and 
redressed the balance. While in the accession framework the EU has relatively more power 
to enforce policy compliance by Turkey, once this changes, a new form of relationship 
emerges that is characterised by negotiations between the two partners and bargaining to 
reach a specific policy outcome. With regard to migration policy-making, the decline in 
Turkey’s accession prospects has made the government relatively freer and to move from an 
inflexible policy compliance framework towards a more constructive two-way form of 
negotiation process with the EU.  
Under conditions of politicisation, the negotiation process tends to become centralised 
between the EU Commission and relevant Turkish Ministries. In such instances, Turkey uses 
the leverage it gains from its role in the international context, and the timing of the negotiation 
process, to seek benefits. By international context we mean both the regional developments 
affecting worldwide migration flows, and Turkey’s political alignment in international 
relations, its economic and diplomatic partnerships. The bargaining process tends to result in 
compliance if the given incentives are more than the domestic adaptation costs, and in non-
compliance, if they are not. In less politicised and more technical policy areas, as already 
stated, the negotiations tend to proceed in a more participatory nature. In this case, Turkey is 
also able to challenge EU conditionality by using its relations with other partners, mainly 
with the international organisations and the third countries with established social, political 
and diplomatic ties, to legitimise its domestic position.  
To sum up, my main finding is that the degree to which there is ‘external’ influence over 
Turkish migration policy is contextually bound by time, the characteristics of a specific 
policy field, and the relative balance of power between the actors. EU influence is strongest 
when a policy field is politicised and driven by conditionality. International organisations are 
less influential actors overall, but are present in shaping more technocratic and less politicised 
policies when they input social policy learning and normative suasion. Turkish migration 
government actors are clearly able to be agents shaping outcomes, but the degree to which 
they are able to do so is contingent on contextual factors such as the type of policy field, the 
state of EU-Turkey relations, the international political situation, and the regional problems 
of migration. 
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Appendix I: Interview Questions 
Statement about the Interview  
The main aim of this interview is to contribute a better understanding of the decision-making 
process for migration policies in negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The main 
information that I am trying to gather is related with four main issue areas which are my case 
studies: the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement, adoption of the EU’s visa lists and the geographical limitation Turkey maintains 
on 1951 Geneva Convention. I would very much appreciate if you use one of these issue 
areas as an example in the issue areas where you can exemplify. Thank you.  
1. General Organizational Role  
1. Can you please describe the role and status of your organization in migration policy 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU? 
2. What would you identify as your aims in the EU-Turkey migration policy 
negotiations?  
3. Can you explain the basis of your organization’s decision to prioritize these as its 
aims? 
4. To what extent do you think your organization was successful in achieving these 
aims? Why? 
5. If the obstacles are left out: (Can you please continue with the main constraints on 
your way to success?) 
2. Policy Instruments 
6. Which main issue areas does your organization prioritise in the EU-Turkey migration 
policy negotiations? Why? 
7. Can you elaborate your organization’s position on 
a. the Law on Foreigners and International Protection  
b. EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
c. adoption of the EU’s visa lists  
d. the geographical limitation Turkey maintains on 1951 Geneva Convention  
3. Organizational Role in Relation to Other Actors  
8. Which organizations would you define as your main three allies? In what way and 
why? 
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9. Which organizations would you consider as your organization’s main opponents? In 
what way and why?  
10. From the perspective of your organization where do you see the power is located in 
these negotiations?  
11. Which organizations would you consider as the main drivers of the policy outcomes? 
Why do you think this is the case?  
12. Can you elaborate the main processes of the policy making negotiations? Can you 
please provide me some specific examples based on the issue areas of: 
a. the Law on Foreigners and International Protection  
b. EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
c. adoption of the EU’s visa lists  
d. the geographical limitation Turkey maintains on 1951 Geneva Convention  
13. What are the forms of interaction between the organizations in the policy making 
process? Can you elaborate on the efficiency of each form? Why do you think this is 
the case?  
a. What are the formal ways of communicating with other actors in the 
negotiation process?  
b. What are the means of communication and interaction outside of this formal 
process?  
4. Changing Context and Expectations 
14. How would you formulate your position in accordance to both domestic and 
international variables?  
15. Can you please speculate about what do you think will happen next in these 
negotiations? Why? 
16. Are there any reports, papers or statistical information you can provide or suggest 
me?  
17. Finally, do you have any suggestions of colleagues who I might contact for an 
interview?  
Thank you very much for your time.  
